The effectiveness and ineffectiveness of transplanting laws into Bermuda by Richardson, Dennis
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED LEGAL STUDIES, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDIES, 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 




THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE PhD DEGREE BY  








This study examines the subject of transplantation of laws and rules generally, and the 
need to naturalise laws and rules to ensure that, once transplanted, they operate effectively 
for the end-user. Laws and rules must be naturalised to avoid the effectiveness of the 
transplanted law or rule being compromised. Save for one Order in Council from before the 
period being studied, the objects for examination are specific laws and rules transplanted 
to Bermuda between 2008 and 2012. 
To test whether the objects for examination were effectively transplanted to the Island of 
Bermuda, the legal theories of Alan Watson, Pierre Legrand, Otto Kahn-Freud, Rudolf von 
Jhering, and Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz were chosen. 
Effectiveness in relation to the operation of a transplanted rule or law occurs when it 
operates according to: (a) its intended purpose as determined by the perspective of the 
country or entity that first authored the rule or law; (b) its intended purpose as determined 
by the perspective of the recipient or host country prior to the impending; or (c) 
unforeseen but still beneficial purposes which may also include purposes (a) and (b). 
This study asserts that the best way to achieve effectiveness is by ensuring that the 
transplanted law has been modified or naturalised, taking into account the donor country’s 
or the recipient country’s history and culture, thereby ensuring that the law is generally fit 
for purpose in the recipient country. 
This study also asserts that the crucial question to be asked, in relation to legal 
transplantation, is from whose perspective one should look; that of the primary end-user 
or users or the ultimate end-user or users. This study asserts that it is only from the 
vantage point of an end-user (be they a primary or ultimate end-user) can one truly 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the subject of transplantation of laws and rules generally, and the 
need to specifically naturalise laws and rules to ensure that, once transplanted, they 
operate effectively for the end-user. Laws and rules must be naturalised to avoid the 
effectiveness of the transplanted law or rule being compromised. Save for one Order in 
Council predating the period under examination, the objects for examination will be 
specific laws and rules transplanted to the Island of Bermuda between 2008 and 2012 
Overview 
This Chapter will state the hypothesis and research questions; will outline  the candidate's 
motivation for undertaking the research giving background information about Bermuda 
and will give an outline regarding the general approach which is intended to be taken by 
the thesis;. 
Aims of the Thesis, Scope and Definitions 
The aims of the thesis, including its scope and Definitions, is to record that the main aim of 
the thesis is to test the hypothesis and to answer the Research Questions; that the period of 
study involves transplantation of Laws. Rules and Orders in Council in Bermuda from 2008 
to 2012; include a Definition section to define key terms such as globalisation and 
transplantation.  
Reasearch Method 
In this study the reasearch method will state the reasearch method used, including the 
formulation of a hypothesis and research questions. 
Structural Outline of the thesis 
The structuarl outline of this thesis sets out a synopsis of each Chapter. 
1.1 Motivation for research 
Many Orders in Council since the 1950s have been used to extend UK legislation and 
treaties to Bermuda, but occasion have been at odds with Bermuda’s North American 
focused-economy as the majority were more focused on the European Union (EU). They 





Although ostensibly devices by which rules can be extended from the UK to Bermuda, a 
number of Orders in Council have clear origins within the EU. Given that Bermuda’s 
economy is North American-focused and has no direct representation within the EU or the 
European parliament, this is problematic.  
This study examined Orders in Council, case law, and legislation relevant to Bermuda. It is 
not a study into the specific subject of Orders in Council. Rather, it focuses on the 
transplantation of laws and rules, with close examination of only one Order in Council used 
by the UK to extend the Landmines Treaty to Bermuda (the Ottawa Treaty). 
Orders in Council are statutory instruments issued by the UK government to, inter alia, 
extend UK legislation to Overseas Territories such as Bermuda. Although various UK 
governments have consulted Bermuda prior to such extension, consultation is not 
mandatory as UK legislation and treaties can be extended to Bermuda by Order in Council 
whether Bermuda wants it or not. This is in keeping with the historic colonial status that 
Bermuda has with the UK.  
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer1 noted that it is hardly surprising that transplanted law often does 
not function as it does in the origin country if the law is imposed abruptly and without 
preparation, as happened in the post-Soviet transition countries in the 1990s that had 
neither the time nor the expertise to engage in careful assessment and deliberation of the 
models being offered. They also noted that the process of legal adaption was such that it 
hardly gives the receiving countries a chance to read, much less to understand or adopt the 
legal concepts embodied in the new statutes to specific conditions of their countries. 
The second issue drawing attention to the subject was the plethora of criminal rules 
transplanted en masse by the Bermudian Government from Canada and the UK during the 
wave of gang-related murders in Bermuda from 2008 to 2012.  
The third reason was the plethora of finance rules, also transplanted en masse from 
organisations such as the EU, the OECD, and G12 Countries during the world-wide 
economic recession between 2008 and 2012. During that period there was a rush by 
Bermudian legislators to implement finance legislation that would stop overseas financial 
                                                        
 




entities including France and the OECD from placing Bermuda on their respective blacklists 
of countries, which would prohibit people or companies from other countries from trading 
with Bermuda-based financial and insurance entities, thus posing a very real risk of 
crippling Bermuda, as an offshore jurisdiction doing business with international business 
sectors.  
Major financial institutions collapsed all over the world in 2008, and to stave off financial 
collapse or outright ruin, many OECD countries began to implement rescue plans such as 
bailing out banks, reinsurance companies and investment companies. As a result of the 
bailouts, many of these nations began to target countries that they perceived as tax havens, 
and thus partly or wholly responsible for the financial mess that the world’s markets and 
financial jurisdictions found themselves in. Although many financial commentators have 
determined that the actual cause of the near financial meltdown of financial markets 
worldwide originated in the United States,2 many OECD countries still have in their sights 
on countries perceived as tax havens, including Bermuda. As a result, Bermudian 
legislators now find themselves being forced into implementing legislation to prevent such 
blacklisting, which would result in the destruction of Bermuda as a major offshore financial 
jurisdiction, which may have been the intent of the OECD countries. However these actions 
may result in the same effect, as signs of a faltering international business sector are 
beginning to show, and many finance, insurance and reinsurance businesses are 
downsizing or leaving Bermuda altogether. The cumulative effect of the legislation being 
forced on Bermuda is that it is now becoming too expensive a place in which to do business 
as, since 2008, the Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) has greatly increased the volume of 
industry-related regulations, which in turn has meant that it has had to increase its ability 
to properly oversee the industries being regulated; the BMA will not be able to absorb 
these costs and will have to pass them on to those that are being regulated, who in turn will 
try and pass them onto their customers. Those customers will see that these costs are 
prohibitive and will seek cheaper jurisdictions in which to do business. All of this is being 
forced on Bermuda which, prior to 2008, prided itself as being of a culture of light 
regulation and being user-friendly to offshore businesses, and one where local regulators 
                                                        
 




felt that they knew and had adequate controls over those operating within Bermuda’s 
finance, insurance and reinsurance industries.3 
All of these rules and laws and the four theories on the transplantation of laws will be 
considered in this thesis in the context of existing and forthcoming laws and rules, 
including the Orders in Council and Tax Exchange Information Agreements (TEIAs). 
1.2 The hypothesis of this thesis and the resulting research questions 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted 
to Bermuda. The effectiveness of transplanted legislation requires crafting it to take 
account of the perspectives of the government or governments (i.e. the two governments in 
the case of a colonial relationship) that caused the legislation to be transplanted, and the 
people who will be affected by it. The research questions resulting from the hypothesis are: 
 Can un-naturalised laws or rules be transplanted from one country or entity (i.e. 
G20, OECD, Canada, US, UK) to Bermuda while maintaining their effectiveness?; 
 Can un-naturalised laws or rules be transplanted from one country or entity (i.e. 
G20, OECD, US, UK) to Bermuda via direct or indirect naturalisation and 
maintain their effectiveness?; 
 Can un-naturalised laws or rules be transplanted from one country or entity (i.e. 
United Nations, UK) to Bermuda, with the sole determining factor being the 
utility of the laws or rules as determined by the UK parliament?; 
 Can unatauralised and naturalised laws or rules be transplanted effectively from 
one country or entity (i.e. G20, OECD, Canada, US, UK) to Bermuda without there 
being a findinging that the law or rule satisfies the rule of law test (i.e. that the 
rule or law applies to all of Bermuda's inhabitants and is not applied in an 
arbitrary fashion)? 
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and Premier Mrs. Paula A. Cox, Shadow Minister of Finance Mr. Bob E.T. Richards, and 






The act of transplanting laws or rules (‘transplantation’), from one country or entity to 
another is something that has been done for centuries. Parliamentary counsel or legislative 
drafters, in particular, have used transplantation as a quick and easy means of finding 
ready-made legislation or rules as solutions for problem issues in their home jurisdictions; 
there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Such a simplistic approach serves to hide the hidden 
dangers of such a course, but it has often been adopted when drafters have rushed to find 
solutions for problems that their paymasters (i.e. the governments or entities that employ 
the Drafters) deem as requiring urgent solutions.  
1.3.1 Documents examined 
This thesis will rely on the written arguments of legal writers and academics expert in the 
field legal transplantation theory, especially in relation to law reform and its interplay with 
the science of comparative method. For the purpose of setting the background that will 
serve to help determine whether a transplanted rule or law has been transplanted 
effectively (i.e. naturalised), it will: 
in relation to transplanted criminal rules: 
 analyse articles written by people in Bermuda (although only one legal writer 
with an intimate knowledge of Bermuda as a jurisdiction was found), Canada, 
and the UK in relation to criminal laws and rules transplanted to Bermuda; 
 analyse various Royal Commission reports and Bermudian government 
sponsored reports, as these are the best means of illustrating Bermuda’s history 
and culture; 
 interview Bermudian barristers who specialise in criminal defence work; 
In relation to finance laws and rules: 
 examine articles specific to the international finance industry generally;  
 analyse various Royal Commission reports and Bermudian government 
sponsored reports, as these are the best means of illustrating Bermuda’s history 
and culture; 
 interview Bermuda-based people who specialise in the areas of international 
business or finance work in Bermuda;  





 analyse various Royal Commission reports and Bermudian government 
sponsored reports, as these are the best means of illustrating Bermuda’s history 
and culture; 
 in order to obtain a broader understanding of the practical effectiveness of the 
Ottawa Treaty as a whole, determine what, if any, concerns did the signatories 
and the prospective signatories have in relation to the practical application of 
the Treaty as a whole (aside from its laudable altruistic purposes); 
In relation to Finance and or Tax related treaties transplanted from the OECD or its 
member states: 
 interview Bermuda based people who specialise in international business or 
finance work. 
The reason why written articles are being considered regarding criminal laws and rules 
transplanted to Bermuda from Canada and the UK is because it is from these jurisdictions 
that the subject laws have been transplanted. By using Bermuda as the subject of study, it is 
hoped that this thesis will add to academic research in this area, especially in relation to 
how laws and rules are transplanted (i.e. their effects and consequences) to countries such 
as Bermuda that still today exist as British Overseas Territories. 
1.3.2 Proving the hypothesis: The use of six case studies and bias, generally 
In order to prove the hypothesis, six case studies were created. Each case study has a 
Bermuda rule as its core for analysis. These Bermuda rules case studies were, save for one 
treaty,4 selected from those enacted during the time period of 2007 to 2012 (i.e. a time 
period when Bermuda saw a large and simultaneous number of unlawful gang-related 
rules and treaty-related rules being added to its statute book). They are: 
(i) s. 315F ‘stop and search’ of the Criminal Code Act 1907 (Bermuda); 
                                                        
 
4 The 1986 US Tax Treaty was added as a case study because it was used as the foundation for the creation of 
other tax treaties between Bermuda and other countries- the TIEAs. To exclude the same as a case study 
would not allow one to understand the context in which the subject of tax has been dealt with by Bermuda 




(ii) s.29A ‘warrant for detention without charge’ of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 2006 (Bermuda);  
(iii) s.70JA and s.70JB ‘unlawful gangs’ of the Criminal Code Act 1907; 
(iv) Tax Exchange Information Agreements (‘TIEAs’); 
(v) USA- Bermuda Tax Convention Act 1986; and 
(vi) Ottawa Treaty (or ‘Landmines Treaty’).  
 
Do Case Studies Contain a Subjective Bias 
There continues to be argument that case studies contain a subjective bias, imported by the 
researchers who create and utilise case studies for the purpose of research. In order to 
mitigate  against the possibility of subjective bias on the part of the author of this study, 
thereby adding to the positive credibility of this study, the case studies used were 
randomly selected from within the period of 2008 to 2012 (a period in which Bermuda 
enacted a large number of civil and criminal law rules) and from within the context of 
Bermuda. In addition, at the time the case studies were selected by the author, he had no  
knowledge of the outcomes associated with the selected case studies after they were 
transplanted to Bermuda. The outcomes were, accordingly, only made known at the 
conclusion of interviews held with those persons who had operational knowledge of the 
case studies/ rules. Further as another means of mitigating against subjective bias, on the 
part of the author, reports initiated by the Bermuda Government (e.g. Royal Commission 
Reports) were relied upon to give the author the most recent historical and social context 
in which the case studies came into being. The facts set out in these reports were and are  
findings of fact, thereby dramatically reducing the author of this study’s ability to import 
his own subjective bias (as well as dramatically reducing the import of subjective racial 
bias) into this study.  
In relation to the chosen case studies (the subject rules), the author prepared and asked the 
same questions of  the interviewees (e.g. asking them: to indicate their professional titles; 
indicate if they were aware of the case study (the rule); indicate what role if any that they 
play or played in the use of the case study; whether they were aware of the purpose for the 
case study coming into being and if  such purpose had been met; what were the outcoomes 
of the case study's use). However the answers received were all different  (mostly as a 
result of the roles they played in the case study's use and outcomes)- resulting in different 
follow-up questions being asked of the interviewees. Some interviewees were more 
forthcoming and candid than others. Some interviewees, although willing in the beginning 
to participate in the interviews, subsequently asked that the interview be stopped (on 
being reminded that the information being obtained would be used and published for PhD 
purposes) and that none of the information obtained from them was to be used- fearing 




Bermuda and overseas). All of the persons interviewed by the author were known to the 
author prior to the interview. However, to mitigate against subjective bias, the 
interviewees were at all times interviewed within their respective professional work 
capacities-with interviews taking place either in their offices or inside a nearby vacant 
office board-room.. However, to ensure that the persons interviewed were aware that the 
author was not dealing with them in a non-professional or friend capacity, and again to 
mitigate against subjective bias, the author identified himself as a PhD Candidate and 
produced university issued photo ID to verify the same- at the beginning of each interview.   
Again, in an attempt to mitigate against subjective bias, the questions and answers relied 
upon by the author were recorded in a bound notebook and read back to the interviewees  
exactly as they were asked and as they were answered, in order to have them corroborate 
that they were asked the subject questions and that the answers given were their answers 
alone. Immediately thereafter the interviewees were asked to date and append their 
signature on the last page of the recorded interview. With the exception of one interviewee, 
all interviewees were interviewed only once- although the authour did leave open the 
possibility of follow-up interviews to which the interviewees were in agreement to. The 
remaining interviewee was interviewed a second time for the purpose of gathering 
information to find out what was the recent outcome of an appeal to the Privy Council 
(Bermuda's final court of appeal)- an appeal that centered on one of the criminal rule case 
studies.  
Within the subject of academic study, in relation to the use of case studies, there is a 
recognized ‘misunderstanding about case-study research and it is that the method 
maintains a bias toward verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s 
preconceived notions, so that the study therefore becomes of doubtful scientific value’.5   
For example, it has been suggested that ‘the case study suffers from what he calls a 
‘crippling drawback,’ because it does not apply ‘scientific methods,’ by which Diamond 
understands methods useful for ‘curbing one’s tendencies to stamp one’s pre-existing 
interpretations on data as they accumulate.’6  It should be noted here that the aura of bias 
is of ‘general application and applies to all levels of academic research and other qualitative 
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methods’.7 It has been argued, too, that ‘case studies  ostensibly allow more room for the 
researcher’s subjective and arbitrary judgment than other methods: they are often seen as 
less rigorous than are quantitative, hypothetico-deductive methods’.8  
Awareness of bias in academic study 
These criticisms were of use to the author of this study because they forced the author (the 
researcher) to be   ‘sensitized and aware of the existence of the issue of bias- in relation to 
academic research’. However, the critiques mentioned ‘demonstrate (its been argued) a 
lack of knowledge of what is involved in case-study research’.9  This is because it has been 
shown that the critique(s) ‘are  fallacious, because the case study has its own rigor, 
different to be sure, but no less strict than the rigor of  quantitative methods. The 
advantage of the case study is that it can ‘close in’ on real life situations and test views 
directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice’.10 
It I has been shown that ‘researchers who have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies 
typically report that their preconceived views assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses were 
wrong and that the case material has compelled them to revise their hypotheses on 
essential points. The case study forces upon the researcher the type of falsifications 
described above’.11 Moreover, ‘criticizing single-case studies for being inferior to multiple 
case studies is misguided, since even single-case studies ‘are multiple in most research 
efforts because ideas and evidence may be linked’ 12 
Counter-arguments 
There are a number of counter-arguments that promote the use of case-studies.  'In a case 
study done by an alert social scientist who has thorough local acquaintance, the theory he 
uses to explain the focal difference also generates prediction or expectations on dozens of 
other aspects of the culture, and he does not retain the theory unless most of these are also 
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confirmed.13 Experiences of social scientists confirm this. Even in a single qualitative case 
study, the conscientious social scientist often finds no explanation that seems satisfactory. 
Such an outcome would be impossible if the caricature of the single case study . . . were 
correct--there would instead be a surfeit of subjectively compelling explanations’.14 
Further, it has been argued that ‘it is falsification and not verification, which characterizes 
the case study. Moreover, the question of subjectivism and bias toward verification applies 
to all methods, not just to the case study and other qualitative methods. For example, the 
element of arbitrary subjectivism will be significant in the choice of categories and 
variables for a quantitative or structural investigation, such as a structured questionnaire 
to be used across a large sample of cases. And the probability is high that (1) this 
subjectivism survives without being thoroughly corrected during the study and (2) that it 
may affect the results, quite simply because the quantitative/structure researcher does not 
get as close to those under study as does the case-study researcher and therefore is less 
likely to be corrected by the study objects ‘talking back.’15  The author of this study found it 
most valuable to have chosen the method of interview, the qualitative interview, that 
allowed for the objects of study to be able ‘to talk back’- thereby allowing for a free flow 
exchange of information, relevant to the case studies used,.  The exchange allowed the 
author to dispel preconceived notions (e.g. the notion that  the section 315F was of no 
benefit in stopping unlawful gang activity in Bermuda).16  
‘Here, too, 'this difference between large samples and single cases can be understood in 
terms of the phenomenology for human learning discussed above. If one thus assumes that 
the goal of the researcher’s work is to understand and learn about the phenomena being 
studied, then research is simply a form of learning. If one assumes that research, like other 
learning processes, can be described by the phenomenology for human learning, it then 
becomes clear that the most advanced form of understanding is achieved when researchers 
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place themselves within the context being studied. Only in this way can researchers 
understand the viewpoints and the behavior, which characterizes social actors’.17 
Valid descriptions ‘of social activities presume that researchers possess those skills 
necessary to participate in the activities described:……. and  it is right to say that the 
condition of generating descriptions of social activity is being able in principle to 
participate in it. It involves ‘mutual knowledge,’ shared by observer and participants whose 
action constitutes and reconstitutes the social world’18.  
‘From this point of view, the proximity to reality, which the case study entails, and the 
learning process which it generates for the researcher will often constitute a prerequisite 
for advanced understanding.19 In this context, one begins to understand Beveridge’s 
conclusion that there are more discoveries temming from the type of intense observation 
made possible by the case study than from statistics applied to large groups. With the point 
of departure in the learning process, we understand why there searcher who conducts a 
case study often ends up by casting off preconceived notions and  theories. Such activity is 
quite simply a central element in learning and in the achievement of new insight. More 
simple forms of understanding must yield to more complex ones as one moves from 
beginner to expert’.20 
The ‘misunderstanding--that the case study supposedly contains a bias toward verification, 
understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived ideas—is revised as 
follows: 
The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s 
preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience 
indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of 
preconceived notions than toward verification’.21 
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1.3.3 Proving the hypothesis: Why the Bermuda rules were selected for analysis 
Further, the Bermuda rules were selected to be a part of case studies because they also 
represent the two jurisdictions of rules that are used in Bermuda. For example, ss. 70JA, 
70JB and 315F of the Criminal Code 1907 and s.29A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
2006 would amount to criminal disputes, to be decided within the criminal jurisdiction; 
disputes arising from the TIEAs, USA-Bermuda Tax Convention Act 1986 and the Ottawa 
Treaty would amount to civil disputes, to be decided within the civil jurisdiction.22 
1.3.4 Proving the hypothesis: The use of the case studies and proving 
effectiveness 
In order to properly analyze the small number of case studies used in this thesis, namely 
the Bermuda rules case studies, the author of this thesis figuratively placed them within the 
context of Bermudian society itself. This was first done by obtaining an historical 
understanding of Bermuda’s most recent history, by way of the Royal Commission Reports 
and reports instigated by the Bermudian Government, and by obtaining the most recent 
understanding of the end-user practical understanding of whether or not the Bermudian 
rules were effectively implemented into Bermuda’s statute book. To do so, the author of 
this thesis relied on the Qualitative Interview.  Five Quantitative interviews were carried 
out to completion; three were commenced but were terminated part way by the author and 
or the interviewee because of the interviewee's concern about political reprecussions  (at 
the instigation of the Bermuda Government) and concern that what was being recorded by 
the author may be used to compete against their own reinsurance company and or political 
reprecussions (at the instigation of the Bermuda Government and the regulatory body, the 
Bermuda Monetary Authority).  All Qualitative Interviews were conducted within either an 
office (their office) or boardroom setting (the author's office boardroom but with the 
agreement of the interviewee and the author's head of department). The Author made 
great efforts not conduct the Qualitative Interviews in a public setting (such as a 
restaurant), to ensure that the interviews were as candid as possible- without fearing that 
someone may overhear us or disrupt us during the interviews.  For the purpose of the case 
studies dealing with the Bermuda criminal law rules, The author of this thesis conducted 
interviews with the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and the Superintendent of 
                                                        
 




Police (Intelligence Division). For the purposes of dealing with the Bermuda civila law 
rules, The author also conducted interviews with three Senior Attorneys with practical 
knowledge of  these rules.  Three interviews were aborted due to concern about the 
information given in the intervew being used by rival reinsurance companies in Bermuda 
and overseas. These latter interviews were with certain leaders within the Bermuda 
reinsurance industry. 
Effectiveness 
The benchmark for determing effectiveness is the existence of the rule of law. In other 
words one must determine if the transplanted law or rule to Bermuda applies to all of the 
inhabitants pf Bermuda. To determine this, the case studies were tested to determine if 
they had been unconditionally: (a) transplanted; (b) transplanted but ultimately for 
another purpose; or (c) not transplanted   From this the next step was to determine if the 
transplanted law or rule applied to Bermuda's inhabitants equally or was not applied in an 
arbitrary fasshion- thereby offending the rule of law.. This determination must be satisfied 
in order to comclude the rule of law exists, and where it does exist, effectiveness has been 
satisfied. Doing so, however, serves to identify a problem. The problem is that many laws  
are created to have application to to a country's population23 generally but  are also created 
to have application a class or classes of people or even to one person within a country. 
There are also instances where a transplanted law or rule was intended to apply to all of a 
country's inhabitants but in practice was only applied in select areas where certain people 
tend to pass or congregate (e.g. unlawful gang members). This in turn begs the question of: 
In these instances where a transplanted law or rule is only applied to a class of people (be 
they in a particular region or area or say a city or highway) does this mean that these laws 
or rules are not effective- falling foul of the rule of law?  
1.3.4.1 What is a Qualitative Interview? 
Firstly, it is important to indicate here that there are generally three types of interview: 1. 
structured; 2. semi-structured; and 3. unstructured. Moreover: 
                                                        
 




‘the structured interview is at the quantitative end of the scale, and more 
used in survey approaches. The rest of the scale, semi-structured and 
unstructured, is the area occupied by qualitative researchers, with the 
interviews characterised by increasing levels of flexibility and lack of 
structure’.24 
1.3.4.2 Why it was decided to use Qualitative Interviews 
The author of this thesis opted to use qualitative interviews because they allowed for: 25 
(i) an interactional exchange of dialogue (between author and the person being 
interviewed, in a face-to-face context);  
(ii) a thematic, topic-centered, and narrative approach where the author was 
able to introduce topics, themes or issues he wanted to cover (such as the 
Bermuda-specific rules and topical issues surrounding them while keeping in 
mind the historical and cultural relevance of the Royal Commission Reports 
and reports instigated by the Bermudan Government on Beremuda's race 
issues andculture issues), but with a fluid and flexible structure; and 
(iii) a perspective regarding knowledge as situated and contextual, that required 
the author of this thesis as the researcher to ensure that relevant contexts 
were brought into focus, thereby allowing situated knowledge to be 
produced. Meanings and understandings were created by way of an 
interaction between interviewer and interviewee, which is effectively a co-
production, involving the construction or reconstruction of knowledge. 
1.3.4.3 Qualitative interviews: the names of the people being interviewed 
It is important to note here that the label or title given by a researcher to the people who 
are being researched ‘often indicate ways of thinking about them and how they are 
understood as relating to the interview, and consequently reflect the philosophical stance 
of the researcher’. Terms for those being researched have included subject, respondent, 
informant, interviewee and participant, the sequence here suggesting a movement from 
                                                        
 





passive to active. The title ‘subject’ is typical of the close-ended, structured interview, 
matched by an interviewer. Historically: 
‘respondent and informant have been associated with ethnographic methods, 
where key figures are sought when researching particular groups or cultures, 
to provide useful information on the community being studied. Participant 
emerges from this field approach too, and applies specifically to the 
researcher in a method typical of ethnography: participant observation‘. 
The researcher in this case is still an ‘outsider’, albeit hoping to become more of an insider, 
or more accepted, by participating in the activities of the group being researched, 
‘who is expected to introduce no biases into the research and data, and 
deliver objectivity by asking the same questions in the same way’. 
Interviewee is matched by interviewer, the similarity of terms suggesting 
more equality in the research relationship. Participant takes this further, and 
carries with it from feminism and other interpretivist positions certain 
understandings of the part played by researched and researcher’. 
‘All those who appear for the interview, ignoring as far as possible the 
subjectivity of the subject’. 
‘Both researcher and researched bring with them concepts, ideas, theories, 
values, experiences and multiply intersecting identities, all of which can play 
a part in research interaction in the qualitative interview’. 
In addition, changes over time in the terms used for participants in research reflect changes 
in the underlying philosophical positions adopted. Broadly, they chart movement from the 
notion of the neutral interviewer, standardisation and exclusion of bias at the heart of more 
positivist approaches, to ideas of reflexive construction, difference and shifting 
positionalities of researcher and researched that have emerged from feminist, post-modern 
and interpretivist stances.26 
For the purposes of this thesis, the author has used the term 'interviewee'- thereby 
maintaining a level of equality between interviewer and interviewee (this was to prevent 
                                                        
 




against the possibility of intimidation on the part of either party and thus skewing the vale 
given to the information gathered by way of the qualitative interview).  
1.3.5 Proving the hypothesis: Why certain transplant theorist were chosen 
The transplant theorist chosen for this thesis were chosen because they were the principal 
persons who gave rise to the now current legal academic debate on the subject of legal 
transplants. More recent theorist, who either support, refute or present neutral arguments 
that are sympathetic to the two opposing arguments relative to legal transplantation, have 
also been relied upon- albeit under the primary headings of Professors Alan Watson and 
Pierre Legrand..   
1.3.5.1 Why Professors Watson’s and Legrand’s theories were chosen  
For the purposes of determining whether un-naturalised laws or rules can directly or 
indirectly be transplanted from one country or entity to Bermuda, I turned to the 
comparative law *albeit this thesis is not about comparative law), wherein I found the legal 
transplants theory, a theory that finds its origins in comparative law. Although legal 
transplantation has been taking place for many years, the subject of legal transplants really 
began to emerge as a theory in 1974 by way of Professor Alan Watson’s book titled: Legal 
Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law27 and after Professor Pierre Legrand’s 
counter article titled: The Impossibility of Legal Transplants.28 Although several legal 
transplant theorists have written articles subsequent to the writings of Professors Watson 
and Legrand, the writings of Professors Watson and Legrand still remain central to the 
legal transplants theory arguments. It is for this reason that I have chosen to remain reliant 
on these core theories of Professor Watson and Professor Legrand for the purposes of 
testing and proving my hypothesis and using information obtained by way of qualitative 
method interviews.  
1.3.5.2 Why Kahn-Freud theory was chosen 
Within the Comparative Law, in relation to legal transplants theory, the comparative law 
theorist are divided generally in favour of the theories of Professor Alan Watson or that of 
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Professor Pierre Legrand. Professor Otto Kahn-Freud appears to have been the first to 
acknowledge the practical realities associated with the use of legal transplants. He opined 
that ‘we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable’ and that ‘any 
attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the 
risk of rejection’. Moreover he stated that ‘the consciousness of this risk will not, I hope, 
deter legislators in this or any other country from using the comparative method. All I have 
wanted to suggest is that its use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law, but also 
of its social, and above all its political, context. The use of comparative law for practical 
purposes becomes an abuse only if it is informed by a legalistic spirit which ignores this 
context of the law.29 
It is because Professor Kahn-Freud was to realise the practical realities associated with 
transplanting a law or rule from one country to another (i..e. there is no certainty that the 
transplanted law or rule will operate effectively once transplanted), that I have chosen his 
transplant theory as one by which to test the hypothesis of this thesis. 
1.3.5.3 Why Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s theory was chosen 
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s theory was chosen for the purposes of testing 
the hypothesis of this thesis because their theory is a unique addition to the legal 
transplants theory debate. Specifically, their ‘better solutions theory’ not only requires one 
to consider if there are better solutions to the proposed transplanted law or rule, it also has 
embedded into it a test for determining the same. Specifically, the requires: 
(i) problem definition; and 
(ii) solution identification.30 
Such a test is unique within the legal transplant debate, as it is the only definitive test that 
can be applied for the purposes of determining if a transplanted law or rule has been 
effectively transplanted. 
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1.3.5.4 Why Professor Rudolf von Jhering’s theory was chosen 
The decision to use Professor Rudolf von Jhering’s theory, as a means of testing the 
hypothesis of this thesis, was made because his theory is also unique. Rather than being a 
theory made in the abstract, his theory directs that the user of his theory focus on seeking 
out the utility of a transplanted rule or law.31 This is to say that one must try an determine 
if the law or rule can be successfully used for any given purpose. Arguably, this includes 
seeking a purpose other than the intended purpose of the transplanted law or rule.  
This test, too, is unique within the legal transplant debate, as it is the only definitive test 
that can be applied for the purposes of determining if a transplanted law or rule can be 
used for its intended purpose or an unintended purpose. 
1.4 Discussion of concepts: Bermuda as end-user  
Bermuda was chosen for testing this thesis because there has been no academic study of 
how these theories apply to Bermuda or its people, although the question of 
transplantation was considered by Seidmans in a similar colonial context specific to the 
Republic of China and the former British colony of Hong Kong.32 This will make a significant 
contribution to academic study in this area of legal theory. This research has found that, not 
only is transplantation problematic for counties like Bermuda whose laws are founded on 
the common law tradition, but also for countries like Aruba whose laws are founded on the 
civil law tradition, being a former Dutch colony.33 
1.5 Why the subject for research was narrowed 
The focus of this study was narrowed to Bermuda’s criminal and finance and reinsurance 
laws because, from 2008 to 2012, domestic and international events caused these areas of 
law to rapidly escalate in respect of the volume and frequency of legislation that was 
drafted to help Bermuda to deal with these events. In 2008 a ‘perfect storm’, of negative 
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occurrences, occurred. First, the worldwide recession began to be felt, precipitated by 
collapses of international banks and investment companies. As a result, Bermuda was 
labelled as a ‘tax haven’ and cause of the collapse of international banks and investment 
companies. Indeed, a US Democratic Party election broadcast in the lead up to the 
American Presidential election of 2012 branded Bermuda as a tax haven and put Bermuda 
in the cross hairs of its biggest trading partner, the United States. 
The second event was that Bermuda, previously generally peaceful, was rocked by a spate 
of shootings and gang-related murders. 
To address these problems, a plethora of additional legislation was demanded by 
international bodies to deal with perceived acts of money laundering and solvency 
threshold deficiencies for insurance and reinsurance companies. A raft of criminal law was 
also needed to help address the increasing perceived lawlessness. 
1.6 Bermuda’s legal or constitutional system 
Bermuda’s legal system is based on English common law, the doctrines of equity, and 
Bermudian statute law dating back to 1612.34 Its highest courts are the Court of Appeal 
(consisting of the court president and at least 2 justices), the Supreme Court (consisting of 
a chief justice, 4 puisne judges, and 1 associate justice).  The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, located in London, is the court of final appeal. The selection and term of office of 
judges in Bermuda is determined by the Governor of Bermuda. Further, the judges are 
selected by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission and tenure is based on terms of 
appointment. There are also two subordinate courts: the commercial court (which began in 
2006); and the magistrates' courts.35 The existence and function of the judiciary are 
codified by way of the Bermuda Constitution Order 1968.36 
In regards to its Government, Bermuda has a bicamerial Parliament or Legislature, 
consisting of a Senate (the upper chamber) and and a House (the lower chamber).  They 
under the Bermuda Constitution Order 1968 are permitted to make rules for Bermuda- 
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including rules such as Orders in Council that are used to extend treaties to Bermuda thus 
making the extended treaties a part of Bermuda's legal system or legal order (in some 
instances Bermuda not not do anything to give effect to the treaties while in other instances 
such as in the Adoption of Children Act 2006), a rulle was required to be enacted by 
Bermuda in order to give effect to the underlying Convention on Protection of Children and 
Co-operation.3738 All rules enacted by the Legislature, including rules to give effect to 
treaties, require Royal Assent by way of Bermuda's Governor. The position and role of the 
Governor is also prescribed by the Bermuda Constution Order 1968.39 
The role and function of the Executive (Ministerial responsibilities including the Governor's 
functions as part of the Executive) are also codified within the Bermuda Constitution Order 
1968. 40 
The fundament rights and freedoms afforded to the citizens of Bermuda under law are also 
prescribed by way of the Bermuda Constitution Order 1968.41 
However, the UK Government retains the right to: make rules for Bermuda (by way of UK 
Acts of Parliament but extended to Bermuda typically by way of Order in Council but not 
always42); suspend or revoke all or part of the Bermuda Constituion Order 1968. These 
powers are reserved to the UK Government by way of the parent Act to the Bermuda 
Constitution Order 1968.43 
The Public Service (the Civil Service) is also prescribed by way of the Bemruda Constituion 
Order 1968.44 
Accordingly, it is by way of Bermuda’s legal system that the Bermuda rules at issue would 
have to be interpreted and enforced- thereby assuring (as best as possible) the legal 
effectiveness of any transplanted rules. 
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1.6.1 Bermuda’s legal system: the legal profession 
The legal profession of Bermuda or the Bermuda Bar follows many English traditions (for 
example, advocates wear wigs and robes in court). Unlike England (which still maintains a 
distinction between barristers and solicitors) Bermuda has a fused legal profession, which 
is similar to the Canadian and some Australian jurisdictions. All lawyers admitted to 
practice in Bermuda (called ‘Barristers and Attorneys of the Supreme Court of Bermuda’) 
have the right of audience before the Bermuda courts. Admission to the Bermuda Bar is 
restricted to persons possessing Bermudian status who have been admitted to another 
Commonwealth Bar and have completed twelve months’ pupillage, and to non-Bermudians 
who are entitled to practice in another Commonwealth jurisdiction, who have been 
resident in Bermuda for twelve months, and who possess a valid work permit. However, 
English Queen’s Counsel may be openly admitted in appropriate cases.45 
Still, one can make the argument that the effective use of a rule (be it in the form of a 
convention or in the form of a statute) is ultimately dependent upon international political 
will alone (in the case of a convention)  or domestic political will alone (in the case of a 
statute).46 
However such an assertion has the effect of excluding the significance and function of the 
judiciary (with the assistance of legal arguments made by lawyers), in instances where 
persons seeking to rely on a rule are unsure of its meaning generally or, specifically, unsure 
of its meaning or nuances as part of a dispute between parties. As alluded to previously, 
some of the functions of the judiciary include: interpreting the meaning of international (i.e. 
conventions) and domestic (statute) rules generally; and providing resolution to disputes 
that are founded on the interpretation of international and or domestic rules.  
Accordingly, it would be the members of the Bermuda Bar who would be called upon to 
assist the Bermuda Judiciary in determining if a transplanted rule has been transplanted 
effectively. 
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1.7 Means of transplanting laws and rules to Bermuda 
The transplantation of laws and rules to Bermuda occurs when: 
 the Bermuda Government uses laws and rules from other jurisdictions (e.g. in 
the form of criminal legislation and finance legislation);47 
 the UK government extends laws or rules to Bermuda (i.e. by way of Orders in 
Council);48 
 the EU, via UK Order in Council, extend EU regulations  to Bermuda via49; and 
 the OECD by forced imposition to Bermuda impose finance related obligations 
upon Bermuda (i.e. in the form of finance legislation and dual or multi-party 
finance agreements such as Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs)).50  
 
These occurances of transplantation are also indicators of how laws and rules are received 
('reception') by Bermuda, For a greater understanding of what is meant by 'reception', and 
how it relates to the concept of transplantation, see heading '1.9 The Reception of laws or 
rules by Bermuda within this thesis. 
1.7.1 Definitions 
Transplantation is the act of copying a law or rule from one country or entity and using it in 
Bermuda.51  
                                                        
 
47 For example: Criminal Code Act 1907 which finds its origins in Australia; Companies Act 1981 which finds 
its origins in the UK. 
48 For example: The Bermuda Constitution Order 1967 whereby the Westminster parliament made and 
extended a written Constitution to Bermuda but retaining the right to amend the same by way of the 
Westminster parliament. 
49 For example: The Bermuda Copyright Act and Copyright Act Regulations.  
50 For example: Basel II Reinsurance (solvency) Regulations; Proceeds of Crime Act (prohibition against 
money laundering and seizure of laundered funds); TEIAs between Bermuda and member states of the EU, 
G20, and OECD.  
51 For a general introductory overview of the meaning of ‘transplantation’ of laws or rules or the ‘borrowing’ 
of laws or rules, see. Maria Gaitan, P.R, 'The Challenges of Legal Transplants in a Globalised Context: A case 
study on working examples', University of Warwick, October 2014; Alan Watson, ‘Legal Evolution and 





A ‘law’ is: 
 civil law (which includes case law relative to the issue of taxation) and criminal 
case law (which includes case law relative to the issues of terrorism and 
unlawful gangs); 
 reinsurance and tax regulatory policy; and 
 tax exchange information agreements/treaties (‘TIEAs’); 
A ‘rule’ means: 
 legislation but specific to criminal, finance and tax laws; 
 legislation but specifically in the form of the chosen land mine related Order in 
Council (that are, collectively, criminal and international sanction focused); and 
 reinsurance and tax regulatory policy that has been translated by way of 
legislation. 
‘Direct naturalisation’ means the cumulative acts of: 
 taking a body of laws from one country (the ‘host’), for the purpose of resolving a 
problem in another country (the ‘transplantee’); 
 removing elements from the body of laws that would cause the laws not to work, 
effectively, on being transplanted to the transplantee; and 
 adding elements to the body of laws, unique to the transplantee, thereby 
allowing it to work effectively for and within the transplantee’s statute book. 
‘Indirect naturalisation’ means: 
 the act of allowing a transplantee, via the parliamentary process, to have a say or 
give direct input, during parliamentary debates, regarding a specific body of 
laws, that is to be imposed on a transplantee by a host country (i.e. the UK) or 
host entity (i.e. the EU).  
 This is to ensure that transplanted laws, being imposed on a transplantee, 




1.7.2 Definitions- legal culture, cross fertilisation of legal systems, and misc.  
rule making participants 
Legal culture 
Legal culture is a 'complex interraltionship on four levels: 
1. the level of valuses, beliefs and attitiudes towards law; 
2. patterns of behavior; 
3. institutional features; 
4. the body of substantive as well as proceedural law'.52 
 
 Cross fertilisation of legal systems 
The cross fertilisation of legal systems can be best illustrated by the fact that 'all 
legal systems contain ideas, concepts, structures and rules born in other legal 
soils, movings and cross-fertilising. All systems are mixed in the sense that even 
when the nation state is regarded as the only source of law, systems have mixed 
sources, that is, the element that combine to form a system are from different 
legal sources...These normative systems may also reflect differeing socio-
cultures..’.53 
 
 Rulemaking (within the common law system)- The participants 
Within most common law jurisdictions, such as Bermuda,  rules are in practice created, 
implemented, and tested with the assistance of four entities: Lawyers; Parliamentary 
Counsel; Members of Parliament (which includes policy makers on behalf of the 
Government); and the Judiciary.  
1. The Lawyers (and their role) 
The role of lawyers is best described by way of ‘the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
…formulated to assist Member States of the United Nations in their task of promoting and 
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ensuring the proper role of lawyers, should be respected and taken into account by 
Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice’.54  
1.a Duties and responsibilities of lawyers 
According to the Basic Principles: 
‘lawyers shall at all times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession 
as essential agents of the administration of justice and the duties of lawyers 
towards their clients include:  
(i) advising clients as to their legal rights and obligations, and as to the 
working of the legal system in so far as it is relevant to the legal rights 
and obligations of the clients;  
(ii) assisting clients in every appropriate way, and taking legal action to 
protect their interests;  
(iii) assisting clients before courts, tribunals or administrative authorities, 
where appropriate.55  
Also, lawyers, in protecting the rights of their clients and in promoting the cause of justice, 
are required to: 
‘seek to uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised by 
national and international law and shall at all times act freely and diligently 
in accordance with the law and recognised standards and ethics of the legal 
profession’. Lawyers are also obligated to ‘loyally respect the interests of 
their clients’.56 
Governments are also required to: 
‘ensure that lawyers: (a) are able to perform all of their professional 
functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper 
interference; (b) are able to travel and to consult with their clients freely 
both within their own country and abroad; and (c) not suffer, or be 
threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions 
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for any action taken in accordance with recognised professional duties, 
standards and ethics’.57  
Moreover:, ‘where the security of lawyers is threatened as a result of discharging their 
functions, they shall be adequately safeguarded by the authorities’. Further, lawyers are not 
be identified with their clients or their clients' causes as a result of discharging their 
functions’ on behalf of their clients.58 
 
Here too the Basic Principals also mandate that: 
‘no court or administrative authority before whom the right to counsel is 
recognised shall refuse to recognise the right of a lawyer to appear before it 
for his or her client unless that lawyer has been disqualified in accordance 
with national law and practice and in conformity with these principles’ and 
that ‘lawyers shall enjoy civil and penal immunity for relevant statements 
made in good faith in written or oral pleadings or in their professional 
appearances before a court, tribunal or other legal or administrative 
authority’.59  
The Basic Principles also impose a duty on relevant competent authorities, to ensure that: 
‘competent authorities to ensure lawyers access to appropriate information, 
files and documents in their possession or control in sufficient time to enable 
lawyers to provide effective legal assistance to their clients. Such access 
should be provided at the earliest appropriate time’.60  
Further the Basic Principals require governments: 
‘to recognise and respect that all communications and consultations between 
lawyers and their clients within their professional relationship are 
confidential’.61 










According to the Basic Principles, lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of 
expression, belief, association and assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take 
part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the administration of justice and 
the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local, national or 
international organisations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional 
restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organisation. 
In exercising these rights, lawyers shall always conduct themselves in accordance with the 
law and the recognised standards and ethics of the legal profession’.62  
On the subject of professional lawyers associations, the Basic Principles dictate that 
lawyers: 
‘be entitled to form and join self-governing professional associations to 
represent their interests, promote their continuing education and training 
and protect their professional integrity’ and that ‘the executive body of the 
professional associations be elected by its members and exercise its 
functions without external interference’. 
Moreover, these professional associations of lawyers are obligated to 
‘cooperate with governments to ensure that everyone has effective and equal 
access to legal services and that lawyers are able, without improper 
interference, to counsel and assist their clients in accordance with the law 
and recognised professional standards and ethics’.63 
However for the purposes of regulating the behaviour of lawyers , the Basic Principals 
mandate that professional bodies establish codes of conduct through their 
‘appropriate organs, or by legislation, in accordance with national law and 
custom and recognised international standards and norms’.  
Charges or complaints made against lawyers in their professional capacity are to ‘be 
processed expeditiously and fairly under appropriate procedures. Lawyers, in such cases, 







‘are to be afforded the right to a fair hearing, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer 
of their choice’.64  
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, according to the Basic Principles, are to be 
‘brought before an impartial disciplinary committee established by the legal profession, 
before an independent statutory authority, or before a court, and shall be subject to an 
independent judicial review’.65  
Finally, the Basic Principals mandate that: 
‘all disciplinary proceedings are to be determined in accordance with the 
code of professional conduct and other recognised standards and ethics of 
the legal profession and in the light of these principles’.  
Accordingly, in the case of lawyers and by way of the Basic Principles, it is clear that 
lawyers play a major role in the protection of client fundamental rights. Here, too, lawyers 
also play a key role in testing the validity of enacted or transplanted rules by way of legal 
argument before members of the judiciary. It is important to note the role of Parliamentary 
Counsel, too, as they, also lawyers, are charged with drafting or writing rules. 
 
2. Parliamentary Counsel (and their role) 
It should be noted here that Parliamentary Counsel are also trained lawyers and that they 
play a vital role. This role is one where ‘they participate in the start or conception of an Act 
of Parliament’. Moreover, It is ‘their primary function to express legislative policy in a 
language free from ambiguity’. In other words Parliamentary Counsel are responsible for 
‘transforming government policy into law’.66  
In the performance of this function, ‘governments expect Parliamentary Counsel to ensure 
that the governments’ policies are given legal effect’ and , in turn, ‘a government expects 
Parliamentary Counsel to express legislative intention as accurately as possible, capable of 
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one interpretation, delineating the intention that the government intends that law to 
have’.67 
In addition, ‘governments expect that Parliamentary Counsel will ensure that a Bill as 
drafted is in conformity with all existing legislation’. The Bill, too, ‘should not be in any 
conflict with the Common Law or the Customary Law. Perhaps most importantly a Bill 
should not be in conflict with (the fundamental rights found within) a Constitution. In other 
words once a Bill has become an Act or rule of Parliament it ‘should not stand on its own’ 
but ‘It should form part of the law as a whole’.68 
3. Parliament (and its role) 
The ‘expectations of Parliament or Legislature in the case of Bermuda, in regard to a Bill’s 
content or wording, is that the Bill ‘should be self-explanatory’ and that should be ‘arranged 
in a manner that allows for orderly debate’. The primary function of Parliament ‘is to pass 
legislation for the public whose affairs, approaches and aspirations will be governed’ by the 
enacted rule. The public, too, expect the rule ‘to be intelligible, precise, and free from 
ambiguity’.69 
The expectations of the public ‘stem from the fact that there are interests other than those 
of the government concerned with the quality and the vitality of legislation’. Moreover it 
should be noted here that: 
‘the policy of a piece of legislation may have its genesis from the public 
through the manifestations of political parties. The manifesto of a political 
party is an undertaking that, should it gain political power, it would 
introduce legislation to give effect to its policies and philosophies, cultural, 
economic, social or otherwise’.70  









The election of the members of a political party to office ‘is considered an endorsement of 
the philosophies that motivate that political party’. Therefore, ‘the public expects to see 
legislation that reflects the policies and philosophies it has endorsed’.71 
Departmental officials are responsible for the administration of ‘legislation passed by 
Parliament’, thereby becoming ‘another source of legislative policy’. However during the 
iuse of rules departmental officials may ‘discover defects and discrepancies’ in the rules. A 
body of rules (legislation) ‘may also have become obsolete or unworkable’; there may be 
‘gaps’ in the existing body of rules which need to be filled in. In such cases, ‘Departmental 
officials make recommendations as to how the defects and the discrepancies require 
alteration’. 72 
Interest or pressure groups may also be: 
‘the source for the initiation of legislative or rule making policy. In such cases, 
they would seek to use rules ‘as a means to an end for the achievement of 
their purposes’.73  
‘Commissions of Inquiry and Committees of Inquiry, too, act as sources of the origin of 
policy’.74 
It is ‘classic theory that Parliamentary Counsel do not initiate policy’. This is to say that 
‘they are only technicians whose function is to translate policy into law’. Policy issues, 
therefore, ‘are the preserves of others’. Crucially, one must appreciate that ‘the translation 
of policy into law requires a vivid understanding of the policy’. Unfortunately this results in 
‘the inevitability of Parliamentary Counsel getting involved in policy considerations’.75  
Vitally: 
‘the training given to Parliamentary Counsel, their vast knowledge of the 
existing law, their experience of the probable consequences of a piece of 
legislation, all these matters place them on a pedestal from which they have 










to be consulted on policy issues and from which they need to advise and to 
warn’.76 
Further ‘Parliamentary Counsel are not glorified amanuenses’. Still: 
‘the ability to discern the thin dividing line between policy and [use], 
between practice and procedure, between the motive and the motivation, 
between the problem and the solution of the problem make Parliamentary 
Counsel candidates for early participation in the policy issues that lead 
eventually to the drafting of legislation’.77 
 In this role, ‘it is important that Parliamentary Counsel do not usurp the role of a policy 
maker’. They have ‘an interest in substantive policy’ and have the requisite expertise’. 
Parliamentary Counsel, too, ‘must appreciate their own limitations’ and ‘should not seek to 
dictate policy’. Only by ‘recognising these facts’ can they, as seasoned legal advisers, help to 
shape policy. In this regard, ‘tact must tend talent as their duty demands diplomacy’. 
Purposes ‘must be measured by philosophical pragmatism’; ‘causes and cures must be 
considered’ for the purposes of achieving ‘effectiveness and common sense’. These factors 
are the means by which ‘Parliamentary Counsel can ‘contribute in improving substantive 
policy’.78 
4. The Judiciary (its independence, its role and its role in making the common law)  
The independence of the judiciary is required ‘to be guaranteed by the State and enshrined 
in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other 
institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary’.79  
The judiciary is required to ‘decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts 
and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, Roles of the 
judges. Further, the judiciary is ‘the third pillar of the state. In identifying and applying the 









common law, it is a primary actor. In giving effect to legislation it is more than an agent of 
the legislature. Rather it is a junior partner, mediating by interpretation’.80  
Fundamentally, ‘the judiciary stands as a counter-weight to the other two pillars: the 
legislature and the executive. Each needs the other, even if they are sometimes in healthy 
tension. The judiciary ensures that the pillars stay within their spheres and act in 
accordance with the law. Greater executive activity has given this role greater prominence. 
The judiciary also stands for certain values which may be ‘prominently expressed in a 
constitution by way of a fundamental rights Chapter. Others have been established by 
constitutional case law of the Privy Council and local appeal courts’.81 
Institutionally, ‘there must be a due separation of powers. The judiciary must be able to 
operate independently of the other two branches. That should be guaranteed at the highest 
constitutional or legal level.82  This principle has been held to underlie Westminster model 
constitutions, in a series of remarkable cases from all over the Commonwealth.83 It was 
described in them as ‘a characteristic feature of democracies’, ‘based on the rule of law’’.84 
Separation of powers ‘means security of tenure, normally until a defined retirement age. 
Unlike the current English position, Westminster model constitutions still distinguish in 
this respect between a senior judiciary, who enjoy such security, and lower levels, such as 
magistrates, who do not, since they may enjoy only short-term engagements. Security also 
means freedom from significant disciplinary sanctions save after a judicial process for good 
cause, appropriate facilities, adequate guaranteed remuneration, and control over core 
judicial activities, such as listing and deployment. In some systems, judges also have their 
own budget and greater control over courts and their management, despite the 
administrative burden. Promotion at least should also be on objective, non-political 
                                                        
 
80 The Role of Judges in a Representative Democracy Lecture given during the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council’s Fourth Sitting in The Bahamas by Lord Mance 24 February 2017 
81 Ibid. 
82 Opinion No 1 (2001) of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Council of European Judges (‘CCJE’), para 141 
83 Liyanage v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 196; Ahnee v DPP of Mauritius [1999] 
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grounds. Some countries operate politically based systems for initial, and some even for 
appellate, appointments, though I myself do not see that as a model to follow. Inevitably, 
some of these pre-conditions can only be fulfilled with the cooperation of the legislature 
and/or executive’.8586 
However, individually, a judge must also be both honest and incorruptible and independent 
of the parties and issues before him.87 Lord Bingham of Cornhill observed in in the case of 
Mollinson: ‘Whatever overlap there may be under constitutions on the Westminster model 
between the exercise of executive and legislative powers, the separation between the 
exercise of judicial powers on the one hand and legislative and executive powers on the 
other is total or effectively so. Such separation, based on the rule of law, has  recently been 
described as ‘a characteristic feature of democracies’.88 
A more basic pre-condition for the effective exercise of the judicial role ‘is acceptance by 
society at large and mutual institutional understanding, indeed dialogue – even if 
sometimes rather tense - with the other pillars of the state. The common law only 
established itself by taking account of the needs, attitudes and values of the communities 
and individuals it serves. The other side of the coin is that all three pillars of the state need 
to be sensitive to and respect each other’s roles.89  
However that may be, ‘a better model for the co-existence of the three pillars is found in 
Lord Hope’s attractive dictum in R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 
AC 262 at paragraph 25; 
‘In the field of constitutional law the delicate balance between the various 
institutions whose sound and lasting quality Dicey at p 3 likened to the work 
of bees when constructing a honeycomb is maintained to a large degree by 
the mutual respect which each institution has for the other. In Pickin v British 
Railways Board [1974] AC 765, 788A-B Lord Reid observed that for a century 
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or more both Parliament and the courts have been careful to act so as not to 
cause conflict between them. This is as much a prescription for the future as 
it was for the past.’90 
This then begs the question of how then is the judicial role to be defined? In R (Anderson) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; [2003] 1 AC 837, 890-891, at 
paragraph 50, Lord Steyn quoted from Windeyer J4. who had said: 
‘The concept seems to me to defy, perhaps it were better to say transcend, 
purely abstract conceptual analysis. It inevitably attracts consideration of 
predominant characteristics and also invites comparison with the historic 
functions and processes of courts of law. Nevertheless it has long been 
settled in Australia that the power to determine responsibility for a crime, 
and punishment for its commission, is a function which belongs exclusively 
to the courts: …’punishment for its commission, is a function which belongs 
exclusively to the courts: …’. 
Therefore: 
‘such as in the case of Liyanage, the legislature usurped the judicial role, 
when it legislated ad hominem to change procedure and redefined criminal 
offences to assist the prosecution of individuals allegedly involved in an 
attempted coup d’état. In Hinds, it did so, when it transferred judicial power 
to a New Gun Court, the majority of whose members did not qualify as judges 
under the Constitution. In Khoyratty the JCPC upheld the Mauritius Court of 
Appeal’s decision that, since the grant or refusal of bail is an essentially 
judicial function, a constitutional amendment removing any right to bail 
pending trial in terrorism or serious drugs cases (which could mean for 
years) was not merely contrary to the separation of powers, but so 
antithetical to the concept of democracy as to infringe the most deeply 
entrenched provision of the Constitution of Mauritius, section 1, providing 
that Mauritius shall be a sovereign democratic state’.91 
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If the legislature must not impinge on the judicial sphere, one may say that judges should 
avoid law-making and should stick to identifying and applying the law. And this is certainly 
an important general distinction. Law-making is essentially political, while identifying and 
applying the law is the role of the courts. Judicial decisions may have political implications, 
but that does not make them political. They are decided on legal argument and a legal basis. 
We were at pains to draw attention to this in Miller, and it is critical that it should be 
appreciated.92 
But it will already be clear – from what I have already said about the judges’ responsibility 
for the common law and for the interpretation of statute law – that applying the law is not 
an exercise in logic or mathematics. Indeed, pace Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said: ‘The life 
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience’, the life of the law is not just past 
experience, it is often closely related to an assessment of the future consequences of what 
will be decided.93 
For a long time and many centuries, judges down-played the implications of their role. 
Indeed, in the interests of legal certainty or perhaps for fear of undermining their authority, 
they denied it. According to what is called the ‘declaratory’ view of the common law, in its 
most traditional guise, the common law never changed. The judges merely revealed it from 
time to time. In the late 17th century, Sir William Blackstone, first Vinerian Professor of 
English law at Oxford, and later a colleague of Lord Mansfield on the bench, argued that the 
common law was rooted in Saxon law. Over 200 years later, Lord Esher MR, later Viscount 
Esher, subscribed to a similar view to Blackstone’s, saying in Willis & Co v Baddeley [1892] 
2 QB 324, 326: 
‘This is not a case, as has been suggested, of what is sometimes called judge-
made law. There is, in fact, no such thing as judge-made law, for the judges do 
not make the law, though they frequently have to apply existing law to 
circumstances as to which it has not been authoritatively laid down that such 
law is applicable’.94 
 









Put in these extreme terms: 
‘the declaratory theory, with its natural law overtones, was a useful 
protective device. It avoided questions about the legitimacy of judges to 
develop the law. The modern press encourages us to think about such 
questions. It asks who these unelected judges are, but does not always 
consider whether we might be worse off if judges were elected, or how the 
common law would have developed to meet modern needs without judicial 
activity’.95 
It is nearly 50 years ago since Lord Reid openly acknowledged extra-judicially that it was a 
fairy tale to suggest that judges do not make the common law. He made the following 
statements in this regard: 
‘[Judges] will consider the implications of [a] decision, and will ensure that it 
is consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the law or principle …. 
concerned…… 
Judging is thus not a science, but a discipline. The good judge is loyal to well-
established approaches and methods of reasoning. But she or he may in the 
last analysis have to exercise an important judgment as to the relevant 
weight of different and sometimes competing considerations, in deciding in 
which sense to state or restate the legal position.’96 
This is not to say that the declaratory theory has no continuing use. It is a way in which we 
explain why a development in the law or an over-ruling of a prior authority affects the case 
in which it occurs and all other cases, past or present – rather than having purely 
prospective effect as a change for the future. In that respect, the theory amounts to a 
pragmatic acknowledgement of the possibility of judicial error or second thoughts. The law 
is occasionally prone to that risk, like any other human institution’.97  
If ‘judging is a discipline, not a science, what are the disciplinary controls? The exhibition 
notice mentions loyalty to well-established approaches and methods. These are epitomised 








by the common law use of precedent and analogy. They help ensure consistency, the 
hallmark of any system of law or equitable adjudication. But it can also have dangers. In the 
USA, when oil and gas started to attract litigation, courts initially invoked the rule of 
capture, which applied to wild animals. They soon found this an unhelpful analogy. David 
Hume in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding accurately described experiences: 
‘If direct laws and precedents be wanting, imperfect and indirect ones are 
brought in aid; and the controverted case is ranged under them by analogical 
reasoning and comparisons, and similitudes, and correspondencies, which 
are often more fanciful than real.’ 
Judge Posner in The Problems of Jurisprudence has noted that a proliferation of precedents 
may be a warning, rather than an encouragement. They may show that the rule to which 
the precedents relate has proved an irritant – producing a blister, rather than a pearl’.98 
What then where there is no direct precedent and no helpful analogy? 
‘As even Lord Esher accepted, judges have often to consider what or whether 
a common law rule applies to a particular, perhaps novel situation. The 
common law tends to develop incrementally and cautiously, to that extent 
perhaps even experimentally in a scientific way. The process has been 
attractively compared by Professor Ronald Dworkin with the production of a 
chain novel by a series of different novelists, each adding a chapter, with the 
task of achieving as much overall coherence as possible and, one might add, 
with the final chapters perhaps providing some generalised key to all that 
preceded’.99 
The process is particularly evident in the field of tort. Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners 
[1964] AC: 
‘drew on prior authority to identify a general principle of liability for 
negligent misrepresentation causing financial loss in contexts of proximity 
akin to contract, where one party had to the knowledge of the other 
justifiably relied on the other’s representation. But sometimes the law is too 
quick. Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 generalised the liability of local 







authorities towards owners of houses suffering from the effects of negligence 
by local authority building works inspectors performing their statutory duty. 
Within 13 years the principle was found to operate in an unsatisfactorily 
haphazard way, and was overruled in Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 
398. A recent attempt to resuscitate it by reliance on the state’s duty to 
respect and protect private life was rejected in Gresty v Knowsley DC [2012] 
EWHC 29 (Admin)’.100  
The exhibition notice also mentions the judicial role in assessing the weight of different 
considerations, when deciding how to state or restate the law. Two recent UK Supreme 
Court cases illustrates this process. In Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, the Court restated the 
law of illegality, moving away from Lord Mansfield’s inflexible rule that no-one can rely on 
illegality, with the result that loss lies where it falls. In Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 33 & 34, 
the Supreme Court accepted a general right to claim damages for malicious pursuit of a civil 
action.101 
The judge’s role, in relation to contract law, is to give effect to the parties’ intentions, 
derived from the words used in the light of the terms of the contract as a whole and the 
surrounding circumstances known or taken to have been known by the parties when they 
made the contract – excluding evidence of contractual negotiations. Some academics think 
that recent Supreme Court and Privy Council case law shows a continuing tension between 
literalist or textualist and purposive or consequentialist interpretation of contractual 
language. Since judges on both sides of this case law insist that there is nothing between 
them in principle, it is a matter of impression whether any difference exists in the actual 
decisions they reach.102 
Traditionally, courts relied on technical rules of textual construction, some still useful. But 
today the courts approach parallels in an elevated way that of contractual interpretation. 
The courts examine the words used in the context of a scheme as a whole and against the 
background of whatever is identified as the ‘mischief’ which the statute sets out to address. 
A purposive construction is increasingly supported by reference to general principles 
which it is assumed that the legislature will have intended to observe. There is a 








presumption against any intention to legislate with extra-territorial effect; a presumption 
against penalisation of any activity by doubtful words; and, most importantly, a conception 
of fundamental common law rights – e.g. the right to liberty, the right to free speech, the 
right not to incriminate oneself and the right to legal professional privilege in respect of 
one’s communications with a legal adviser. In R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex Parte Simms (A.P.) Lord Hoffmann said: 
‘Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. 
This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their 
unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. 
In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, 
the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were 
intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.’.103 
In Ex p Simms, it was decided in the UK context, where Parliament is sovereign. Since 
October 2000, this principle has a statutory homologue, since UK courts are obliged to 
interpret legislation as far as possible consistently with the ECHR. However. in the 
Bahamian Constitution with its fundamental rights Chapter III, this Chapter prevails over 
any contrary provision (article 2) and enables the courts to make such orders as it 
considers appropriate to enforce or secure such rights. But the principle in ex p Simms still 
represents a first port of call, often enabling the courts to avoid inconsistency with 
fundamental principles, whether or not located in a constitution.104 
There is also the ‘sometimes controversial role of judges in a representative democracy: 
that is, in relation to public and constitutional law issues. In Matadeen v Pointu [1998] 
UKPC 9, the JCPC noted that: 
‘constitutions are not construed like commercial documents. This is because 
every utterance must be construed in its proper context, taking into account 
the historical background and the purpose for which the utterance was 
made. The context and purpose of a commercial contract is very different 
from that of a constitution. The background of a constitution is an attempt, at 
a particular moment in history, to lay down an enduring scheme of 
government in accordance with certain moral and political values. 







Interpretation must take these purposes into account. Furthermore, the 
concepts used in a constitution are often very different from those used in 
commercial documents. They may expressly state moral and political 
principles to which the judges are required to give effect in accordance with 
their own conscientiously held views of what such principles entail. It is 
however a mistake to suppose that these considerations release judges from 
the task of interpreting the statutory language and enable them to give free 
rein to whatever they consider should have been the moral and political 
views of the framers of the constitution. What the interpretation of 
commercial documents and constitutions have in common is that in each 
case the court is concerned with the meaning of the language which has been 
used. As Kentridge A.J. said in giving the judgment of the South African 
Constitutional Court in State v. Zuma [1995] (4) B.C.L.R. 401, 412: “If the 
language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 
`values' the result is not interpretation but divination.”105 
In a constitution, society expresses its commitment to enduring principles of which judges 
are to be the future guardians, whatever may from time to time be the vicissitudes of 
majoritarian or political opinion. It is easy to protect the interests of the majority or the 
popular. But, as Justice Iacobucci observed in Vriend v Alberta: ‘The concept of democracy is 
broader than the notion of majority rule, fundamental as that may be’. Where the law 
matters is when it protects the legitimate interests of unpopular minorities, including those 
strongly suspected of committing or intending very serious misdeeds. Those interests 
include due process and freedom from punishment without a finding of guilt. Thus, when it 
comes to the fight against terrorism, as the former Chief Justice of Israel, Aron Barak, said: 
‘Sometimes, democracy fights with one hand tied behind its back. Nonetheless, it has the 
upper hand’.106 
A major achievement of common law courts over the last forty years has been the 
modernisation and formulation of judicial review principles. Generally expressed statutory 
powers must be exercised only for the purposes for which they were created. Decision-
makers must observe due process, acting fairly and reasonably. Expectations about 
procedural steps such as consultation, and, more controversially, expectations about 







substantive rights may have to be respected: see most recently United Policyholders Group v 
Attorney General of T+T [2016] UKPC 17. All these are judicially led developments.107 
34. Courts also review decision-making for its substantive reasonableness. Traditionally 
this has been only in the diluted Wednesbury sense, that censures decision-making which 
no reasonable decision-maker could have reached. But increasingly it has been recognised 
that the intensity of review may increase, depending on the nature of the interests at stake, 
and their suitability for judicial review. The emergence of fundamental rights chapters, 
charters or conventions has also introduced the concept of proportionality, which the 
common law has started to pick up in allied areas: see e.g. Kennedy v The Charity 
Commission [2014] UKSC 20. On the other hand, courts have recognised that they are not 
and should not act as primary decision-makers. To repeat Justice Jacobucci’s words: ‘In 
carrying out their duties, courts are not to second‑guess legislatures and the executives.’ 
Judicial activity depends on the context. On issues of liberty, freedom of movement, speech 
or religion, courts can claim a special expertise. On issues about the use of public resources 
or economic judgment, the elected legislature or executive is better placed.108 
However, in none of these cases is it legitimate for the executive to submit that it is 
undemocratic for the courts to become involved. In A (FC) v Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 
In a case about the potentially indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism, the 
Attorney General submitted that, just as it was for Parliament and the executive to assess 
the threat facing the nation, so it was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the 
response necessary to protect the security of the public, since this called for an exercise of 
political and not judicial judgment.109 Rejecting this submission, Lord Bingham said: 
‘I do not in particular accept the distinction which he [the Attorney General] 
drew between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that 
the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to 
Parliament. It is also of course true ….. that Parliament, the executive and the 
courts have different functions. But the function of independent judges 
charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal 
feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. 








The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial 
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some 
way undemocratic.’110 
Judges in a representational democracy are not therefore ciphers or agents of past history 
or of the current legislature. Even in states like the UK without a written constitution, they 
have a significant role in defining the practical impact of what the legislator decides. A 
fortiori in a state like The Bahamas, where the role is fortified by a written constitution.111 
What then are the values to which we should aim to give effect in interpreting and applying 
a Constitution or any other law? The matter was well put by Dickson C.J. in R. v. Oakes, 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136: 
‘The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and 
democratic society which I believe to embody, to name but a few, respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and 
equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and 
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the 
participation of individuals and groups in society.’112 
Independence and accountability are, as one Canadian commentator put it, ‘rather testy 
friends’. Judges cannot be directly or personally accountable like agents or contractors for 
mistakes or faults in the judicial decision-making. But ensuring as much accountability as 
possible is an important part of the judicial role. This in turn links with Chief Justice Barak’s 
theme about inculcating law into society, and ensures that, despite any unanswered 
conundra, all elements of society will continue to coexist under the rule of law.113 
1.7.2.1 Judges and issues affecting small jurisdictions 
Small Social Pool 
Although judges tend to be ‘selected from a small pool of legal professionals within those 
jurisdictions that are of the common law tradition, the pool tends to be smaller in the case 









of small jurisdictions or small island jurisdictions’. For example, in the case of the Isle of 
Man, ‘there are frequently events at which business leaders, judges, ministers, politicians, 
senior civil servants and professionals with a high local profile gather together’. Moreover 
these events are ‘often significant events and attendance is frequently required so 
everyone tends to end up in the same place’. In such cases ‘a judge must be hyper vigilant to 
ensure he is not inappropriately or accidently lobbied or questioned by a politician, 
minister or business leader, or worse still, a litigant in pending proceedings’. Further, ‘the 
judge must always be on guard to ensure that the separation of powers and the judge’s 
independence and impartiality are maintained’. These issues are not unique to small 
jurisdictions but they become amplified due to the smallness of the small jurisdictions.114 
When ‘socialising in the local community, doing the everyday things that everyone does, it 
is at these that I am being judged – even at ‘local coffee shops, restaurants, sporting events, 
art exhibitions, cinemas, yoga classes’.115  
One judge suggested that in such cases that ‘the rule for judicial survival in a small country 
with a small social pool, in addition to compliance with the relevant judicial code of 
conduct, is to be acutely conscious of the need to be, and be seen as, independent and 
impartial and to see issues from each other’s perspectives and act accordingly. It also helps 
to keep to safe uncontroversial subjects’.116 
Recusal 
It is generally accepted that in small jurisdictions that there tends to be ‘a relatively small 
social pool of business leaders, ministers, politicians and judges, the percentage chance of 
the judge knowing or having links to the litigants involved in a case can increase’.117 
Such a scenario has been recognised as being very probable by the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council in in the case of Grant v The Teacher’s Appeals Tribunal [2006] UKPC 59. 
In this case the Court considered the issue of recusal and ‘indicated that they were mindful 
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of the problems which face judges in a community of the size and type of Jamaica (i.e. a 
small country) and other comparable common law jurisdictions’.118 
In large and small jurisdictions judges may sometimes have to recuse themselves. However 
such recusals ‘can put a strain on a potentially restricted number of judges in a small 
country’. In such cases ‘the law of recusal has to be applied robustly but with pragmatism 
and sensitivity in small countries’. Aside from these practical problems ‘judges must 
maintain their objectivity, impartiality and independence by being prepared to step down 
from a case where necessary’. 119 Unfortunately, as has been recognised by the courts, that 
‘it would be dangerous or futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may 
not give rise to judicial recusal’.120 
1.8 Legal transplantation 
The transplantation of laws is the taking of established laws and institutional structures 
from one country and replicating it in another. It is something that has been done since 
Roman times during which Roman jurists equated ius gentium (which applied to colonised 
people) with ius natural (law that should be observed by humanity).121 The Romans 
considered universal laws of nature capable of linguistic expression through universal legal 
codes, and that differences between legal systems denied universal human attributes. 
Natural law codes based on Roman morality were superimposed over indigenous cultural 
beliefs and practices.122 
Large scale transplantation also occurred, without colonialism or reunification during the 
Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union used legal transfers as a weapon in 
their struggle for military and political supremacy in the world. It also occurred in the 
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reunification of East and West Germany at the end of the Cold War.123 It can be done 
voluntarily, it can be imposed, or it can be part of an international legal harmonisation 
project.124 Prior to its displacement by rights-based law over the last two centuries, natural 
law legitimised European colonisation. According to the natural law doctrine, all people 
had a right to salvation and colonial laws were in theory not permitted to abrogate 
indigenous cultural practices and laws.125 However France’s transplantation of laws to 
Vietnam, as noted by Ashgate, ‘frequently ignored this tolerant formulation and invested 
central authorities with power to regulate or prohibit local customs’.126 
The transplantation of laws can be done without any change to the wording used in laws, to 
state institutions, or to commercial legal models. Developing countries have, over the years, 
been urged by law and development scholars to copy the modern institutional features of 
Western countries, in particular judicial independence, legal education, the rule of law and 
rights-based commercial laws. By doing so, these scholars have ignored Weber’s caution 
that laws develop over time by interacting with local socioeconomic environments, 
processes that induce path dependent development.127 The desire to harmonise treaties, 
founded on the evolutionary convergence theory, is another motivator for countries or 
international bodies such as the World Trade Organisation to rely on the transplantation of 
laws.128 Examples of imposition on state institutions include the European conquest and 
colonisation of North Africa and Australia, which involved not only the displacement of 
indigenous populations but also the transplanting of state institutions, religious orders, 
mercantile economies and architectural preferences.129 There is also a growing body of 
literature that indicates difficulties in transferring commercial legal models beyond 
cultural, political and economic borders. For example, attempts to transplant US corporate 
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governance laws to the Russian Federation failed to induce corporate governance 
accountability and other anticipated benefits.130 
It can be done with minor cosmetic change, altering the wording but leaving the intent of 
the laws undisturbed, or after major changes, thereby adapting or naturalising the law so 
that it fits within the new country’s culture and statute book. 
Various terms and metaphors have been used in attempts to describe and explain the 
process of transplantation, including legal harmonisation, unification, borrowing and 
convergence, which emphasise a compatibility and co-evolution of legal systems131 and the 
transfer of law or legal systems into host countries.132 As Ashgate acknowledges, 
metaphors are only suggestive and this makes it difficult to find or use one absolute term to 
describe all types of legal transfer.133  Here, too, words such as 'reception', (usually used in 
relation to the receipt of treaties by countries from entities such the United Nations) 
denote the last leg of the transplantation process (i.e. the law or rule is received at the 
other end of the transplantation process by Bermuda). However, these metaphors are 
symbolic of the the transplantation process. For example: 
a. A to B (A equals Canada or any country Bermuda seeks to transplant a law or rule 
from to Bermuda; and B equals Bermuda)= the law or rule is equally borrowed, 
received by or transplanted to Bermuda as all of these metaphors are symbolic of 
the sending, moving or taking of a rule or law from one location and placing it in 
another; 
b. A to B to C, in relation to treaties,: (A equals the United Nations or any entity that 
creates a treaty for dual or multi-party use or application; B equals the UK being the 
parent country responsible for its own treaty obligations as well as that of Bermuda 
(it being a colony of the UK) by way of the colonial relationship that exists between 
Bermuda and the UK; C  equals Bermuda) = the treaty/ the rule is received by the 
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UK and, by way of enabling rules [an enabling Act and an Order in Council which is 
created by way of the enabling Act), is transplanted to Bermuda  where Bermuda 
receives the Treaty as part of its domestic law.  
Accordingly, all of these metaphors speak to or are a part of the same thing- the 
transplantation of a law or rule from one entity to a country/ Bermuda. Therefore, 
whenever the words borrow(ed), received (receptionion) is used , they are to be read as 




1.8.1 Transplants in private and public law 
The transplant debate is limited to western private law which makes its relevance to 
comparative law uncertain (NB. This thesis is not about the comparative law. It only deals 
with the subject of the transplantation of law, a subject that is affiliated with comparative 
law). Also uncertain is whether or not there is or is not a distinction between public law 
and private law. With the exception of Watson,134 none of the other legal theorist 
acknowledge the following points:  
1. that there is a distinction between public law and private law; 
2. that there is no distinction between public law and private law; or 
3. that in either case, the extent the public law and private law debate serves to 
buttress or to undermine their respective legal transplant theories, if at all. 
It is therefore questionable as to whether or not the subject legal theories are valid tools for 
determining whether a law or rule has been effectively transplanted, especially where 
public is concerned.  
                                                        
 




1.8.2 Illustration of a distinction between public and private law 
The law of contract and of tort determine the ways in which people that follow the common 
law tradition (including Bermuda and the United Kingdom) interact with each other. In 
contrast, constitutional law not only determines that ways in which people that follow the 
common law tradition interact, it also represents the ultimate will of the ultimate 





1.8.3 Illustration that there is no distinction between public and private law 
The making of a distinction,135 between public and private law is wholly irrelevant to the 
organisation of modern society. The problem in trying to make such a distinction can be 
best illustrated thus: 
‘The major sphere of social life passes from the private to the public, not 
merely in the sense that more and more activity is state activity, but in the 
sense that more and more private activity becomes public in its scale and its 
effect, in the sense that the oil company is felt to be as public as the state 
electric utility, the private hospital and the private school, with their growing 
need for massive state subsidies, as public as the municipal hospital and the 
state school‘.136  
1.8.4 Distinction between public and private law, Judicial interpretations 
In an attempt to tackle what appears to be a fluid distinction between public and private 
law, Lord Wilberforce has concluded that: 
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‘The Attorney General’s right to seek, in the civil courts, anticipatory 
prevention of a breach of the law, is a part or aspect of his general power to 
enforce, in the public interest, public rights. The distinction between public 
rights, which the Attorney-General can and the individual (absent special 
interest) cannot seek to enforce, and private, is fundamental in our law. To 
break it, as the plaintiff’s counsel frankly intended us to do, is not a 
development of the law but a destruction of one of its pillars. Nor in my 
opinion, at least in this particular field, would removal of the distinction be 
desirable. More than in any other field of public rights, the decision to be 
taken before embarking on a claim for injunctive relief, involving as it does 
the interests of the public over a broad horison, is a decision which the 
Attorney-General alone is suited to make’.137 
In the same case, Lord Diplock concluded that: 
‘My Lords, at the heart of the issues in these appeals lies the difference 
between private law and public law. It is the failure to recognise this 
distinction that has in my view led to some confusion and an unaccustomed 
degree of rhetoric in this case’. 
Due to the existence of conflicting statements or dicta, that there is and that there is not a 
distinction between public law and private law, it is not possible to determine whether or 
not the subject legal theories have been undermined or if they are of no relevance to 
subject of transplantation at all, with the latter statement potentially having some gravitas 
because, in the English common law tradition, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
distinguish a difference. 
1.9 The Reception of laws or rules by Bermuda 
The reception of laws or rules by Bermuda takes place in four ways: common law 
reception; voluntary reception; veneration reception; and necessity reception. Reception 
means 'those instances where legal phenomina of one legal culture or system are 
consciously and wilingly adopted into another legal system'.138 'Legal phenomina' means 
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instances where 'human interactions result in legal regulation'- the creation of laws or 
rules.139    
Common Law reception 
Common Law Reception or the 'Doctrine of reception' in common law means the process 
by which the English Common Law is applied to a British Colony. The doctrine is best 
described as follows: 
'Plantations or colonies, in distant countries, are either such where the lands are 
claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and uncultivated, and 
peopling them from the mother-country; or where, when already cultivated, they 
have been either gained by conquest, or ceded to us by treaties. And both these 
rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at least upon that of nations. But there 
is a difference between these two species of colonies, with respect to the laws by 
which they are bound. For it hath been held, that if an uninhabited country be 
discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws then in being, which 
are the birthright of every subject, are immediately there in force... But in conquered 
or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter 
and change those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of the 
country remain, unless such as are against the law of God, as in the case of an infidel 
country'.140   
Bermuda was discovered by the Spanish in 1505 but from 1615 to 1684 Bermuda was 
colonized by English colonist and administered  by the Somers Isles Company- an English 
incorporated company. As a result of the colonization of Bermuda by the English they, in 
accordance with doctrine of reception in common law, brought with them  the English 
common law. Section 5 of the Bermuda Constitution codifies the common law doctrine by 
making all laws existing at the time Constitution  came into effect (i.e. English Common 
Law, UK statute law applicable to Bermuda, and Bermuda common law and statute law), 
Bermuda's law.141 Today, Bermuda remains a common law jurisdiction. 
                                                        
 
139 Ronald J. Allen, LEGAL PHENOMENA, KNOWLEDGE, AND THEORY, p.731 
140 Lord Blackstone, 'Commontaries on the Laws of England, Book I , chapter 4, pp. 106-108. 





Voluntariness of the process ‘is considered an essential condition for reception. This is to 
say that ‘no genuine reception occurs if a legal phenomenon is imposed upon another 
nation (or country in the case of colonies) by force’.142 An example of voluntary reception, 
in the case of Bermuda, is Bermuda’s adoption of the unlawful gangs rules from Canada. 
However, under certain conditions ‘imposed reception may transform into a voluntary 
process and become genuine reception’143. This ‘does not mean that the transformation of 
imposed reception into voluntary reception should be an inevitable historical reality 
everywhere at any time’144. 
Veneration reception 
Veneration reception is one example ‘which occurs if alien norms, institutes or a whole 
system is adopted for their venerated position and prestige of cultural background’.145  An 
example of veneration reception, in the case of Bermuda, can be found in the form of the 
anti-land mines treaty adopted by Bermuda by way of Order in Council. In this example, the 
prestige garnered would be the fact that Bermuda can be seen as one of the countries of the 
world who recognize the devastating effect that these weapons of war have on non-
combatant civilian populations- most notably in relation the maiming of children.   
Necessity Reception 
Moreover, in the case of necessity reception, ‘different motivation is the basis for necessity 
reception which occurs where there is an apparent need for a change of legal system in one 
culture and another existing culture provides an opportunity to satisfy the need’.146 An 
example of necessity reception, in the case of Bermuda, can be found in the form of the 
unlawful gangs rules transplanted from Canada to Bermuda by Bermuda. 
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The classifications of reception 
Still, it is important to indicate here that the ‘classification of reception into veneration 
reception and necessity reception ‘is somewhat contradictory’147. This is because ‘it is 
obvious that veneration reception can never occur if there is no need for it in the recipient 
culture and, in the case of necessity reception, it is only natural that legal phenomena of a 
prestigious origin would be adopted’148. Therefore, ‘these aspects do not constitute classes 
of reception in the strict sense of the word’. The ‘venerated status of and need for a transfer 
of a certain legal phenomenon should, accordingly, be considered essential conditions for 
reception like the awareness and voluntariness conditions of the process mentioned 
above’.149 
Distinction between reception and transplantation 
It is necessary, too, to recognize that there is a distinction between reception and 
transplantation.  Reception having already been defined, transplantation has been argued 
to be ‘a process whereby a legal phenomenon transfers to another geographic area or 
culture together with people’. Here, too, the ‘transfer of a law or rule from a  mother 
country to overseas lands during their colonisation could also be considered legal 
transplantation’150. However, such an interpretation of transplantation is ‘too restrictive’- 
as it excludes examples or definitions of what amounts to transplantation.151 
There are many other scenarios where one could argue to be examples of transplantation.  
For example there is the additional example where ‘a norm of another legal culture is 
established in a different legal climate by enacting legislation regardless of its original use 
background may also be interpreted as a mere transplantation of a legal phenomenon’.152 
Transplantation also occurs ‘where a legal theory is taken to another geographical area. As 
in the case of imposed reception or voluntary reception, an original transplantation may 











become true reception: of course not among the group or nation which is the carrier of 
transplantation but among the legal culture surrounding it in the new area’.153 
 
Marju Luts, Jurisprudential Reception as a Field of Study, JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL. LAW 
REVIEW, UNIVERSITY OF TARTU (1632), pp. 2-6. 
 
The laws of Bermuda come in two forms. The first are laws made for Bermuda by the UK as 
part of the UK’s colonial good governance obligations, or as a consequence of the UK’s 
membership of supranational bodies such as the EU or UN. The second are laws made for 
Bermuda by the local legislature. 
1.9.1 Laws made for Bermuda by the UK 
As Bermuda is an Overseas Territory of the UK, the UK has the authority to make laws for 
Bermuda, and yet Bermuda has never had a directly elected or nominated person in the 
House of Commons or the House of Lords. At best, Bermuda has had a former Governor sit 
in the House of Lords who, from time to time, has championed matters concerning 
Bermuda.154 
1.9.2 Treaty reception by Bermuda from the UK 
A Treaty, according to the Vienna Convention of the Law on Treaties, is: 
‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation’.155 
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The Convention serves to codify international law in relation to what is and is not a treaty, 
but only in regards to treaties entered into between nation states. Only a few treaties have 
within their text the word ‘treaty’, and words such as convention, protocol, and agreement 
are often used as alternatives.156  
In the UK, treaty making, is subject to the royal prerogative and so the sole responsibility of 
the Executive, and parliament plays no part.157 However, where a treaty requires 
amendments to be made to legislation or the use of public funds, that is subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny.158 Once a treaty to which the UK is a party has been made, it is 
frequently concluded without any need for ratification. Treaties are only ratified in 
instances where, within the text of the treaty, there is a requirement for ratification. That 
may happen where domestic legislation is needed or needs to be amended to give effect to 
the treaty, or where there is a strong political content that warrants the involvement of 
parliamentary scrutiny in the adoption of a treaty.159 
All treaties entered into by member nations of the United Nations, which includes the UK, 
must be registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United 
Nations Charter. This is to discourage member states from entering into secret treaties.160  
Bermuda, as an Overseas Territory of the UK and not an independent state, does not have 
the authority to enter into treaties unless expressly permitted to do so by the UK, which 
generally enters into treaties on Bermuda’s behalf. Where the UK intends to extend a treaty 
to Bermuda, it is the its general policy to consult Bermuda beforehand, giving Bermuda 
adequate time to consider the effect of the treaty’s extension. However, the UK is under no 
obligation to do so.161 
Orders in Council, which are a form of a statutory instrument, are often used to affect the 
UK’s constitutional obligations (which include the reception of treaty obligations) by 
extending UK legislation and treaties to overseas territories, including Bermuda. Where 
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legislation or treaties have been extended to Bermuda, notification is published in the 
Official Gazette of Bermuda unless there is a need to enact local legislation to give effect to 
the legislation or treaty being extended. If there is such a need, the Bermudian legislature 
will enact the legislation and present it to the Governor of Bermuda, asthe Sovereign’s 
representative in Bermuda, for assent. Once assent has been obtained, the legislation 
becomes law. 
1.9.3 Naturalisation 
Naturalisation of laws or rules may be either direct or indirect (see Section 1.7.1). By not 
having naturalised a law or rule  effectively, Bermuda may damage its reputation as a safe 
place to conduct international business. It may also, in the case of finance laws or rules, 
make it difficult to provide effective financial products and services as part of Bermuda’s 
contribution to the global financial market place. Naturalisation, or the modification of a 
tranplated law or rule so that it works effectively for domestic use, is necessary for 
ensuring that the modified law or rule is effective. For the purposes of this thesis, 
naturalisation incorporates the bench mark variable of the rule of law (i.e. in order for a 
transplanted rule or law to work effectively it must not be arbitrary).  
1.10 Cultural history, Bermuda’s predominantly black population 
This subchapter is relevant to the case-studies because the cultural history of the UK and 
Canada, specifically in relation to visible minorities, acted as a major indicator as to 
whether their criminal rules would work effectively (e.g. in relation to stop and search, 
unlawful gangs).  Bermuda's cultural history ironically played a similar role on par with 
that of Canada and the UK. This is inspite of the fact that black Bermudians are the majority 
race in Bermuda. In this thesis it has been determined that effectiveness is to be determine 
by how the rule of law is implemented and acted upon. See Chapter of this thesis on 
effectivess as it relates to the rule of law.  
Bermuda’s cultural history, and in particular the cultural history of its predominantly black 
population, has attracted little academic attention. As a result there are very few academic 
sources162 that record the slavery, racial segregation and racial unrest that have existed in 
                                                        
 




Bermuda. Other than a few works, one has to rely on archival records and news reports. As 
a result of the small number of academic sources, little is known about these chapters of 
Bermuda’s cultural history, and thus they are often overlooked by law makers for Bermuda 
such as the UK Government or OECD, or in Bermuda by successive Bermudian governments 
when transplanting laws to Bermuda from external sources. 
None of the inhabitants of Bermuda – black or white – are of indigenous origin. The 
minority white population came from Europe, mainly the UK, Portugal and the Azores. The 
ancestors of Bermuda’s white English speaking inhabitants first arrived in Bermuda, by 
accident, during the time of England’s colonisation of North America. The white Portuguese 
speaking inhabitants arrived in Bermuda rather later. Oddly enough, the Portuguese 
inhabitants were treated as a separate race of people and were not considered by the 
established English white minority as being of white European ancestry, and thus not on 
par with them as Europeans. Indication of such a disparity exists in the form of various 
census forms, where Portuguese was classified as a race and not as a place of origin,163 and 
Portuguese whites in Bermuda were, for many years, treated as second class citizens.  
The majority black inhabitants of Bermuda have their origins in the former British island 
colonies in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and St. Kitts, having been brought to the 
Caribbean from Africa by the British as slaves to harvest agricultural goods and (unique to 
Bermuda) to build ships, including warships for the Royal Navy, using lumber harvested 
from the very strong Bermudian cedar trees. 
Slavery ended in the British Empire in 1833 and officially in Bermuda in 1834,164 but racial 
segregation replaced it and did not officially end in Bermuda until 1968. Even then, 
economic disparity along racial lines replaced it, and exists in Bermuda to this day, with the 
white minority population remaining the greatest benefactors of Bermuda’s financial 
success in terms of buying power, employment, and post-secondary education, particularly 
in comparison to the black male population.165 
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This economic disparity, seen by a number of its black inhabitants as linked to Bermuda’s 
post-colonial status, has resulted in racial friction and unrest in Bermuda which led to 
rioting in 1953 and 1977. The recent outbreak of gang related violence is thought by many 
prominent people in Bermuda to be the result of a shrinking illicit drug trade market (a 
market valued at $1 million)166 resulting in a fight between gangs for control over the 
shrinking market. This same illicit drug trade has also been deemed to be the third (but 
unofficial) pillar to Bermuda’s economy, resorted to by which those who have been refused 
entry to the other two pillars, tourism and international business.167  
History and culture are embedded in laws, and it is these variables that help to determine if 
a law has been effectively naturalised for the purpose of transplantation. 
1.11 Globalisation 
The term ‘globalisation’ first emerged in the 1990s. It , globalisation,168 has been argued to 
be ‘the increasing worldwide integration of markets for goods, services and capital’. As part 
of globalisation, many financial centres including Bermuda have found themselves 
poaching finance laws from other financial centres as a means of resolving domestic fiscal 
problems, and to enable them at least try to remain one step ahead of other competing 
financial centres, or avoid having finance laws imposed on them by external entities. In the 
case of Bermuda, the main external entities responsible for imposing such laws on it are the 
UK, because of the colonial relationship it has with Bermuda, and the EU, due to the UK’s 
membership. By Bermuda willingly or unwillingly taking part in globalisation, the example 
of its participation in globalisation is very reminiscent of legal pluralism. Indeed, the 
example of Bermuda’s participation in globalisation may also be an example of globalised 
legal pluralism.169 Generally, the term legal pluralism is used to describe the distinctive 
nature or features of the interaction of between conflicting official legal systems or 
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between an official legal system and one or more of the normative systems. The interplay 
between these legal systems, according to Brian Tamanaha, ‘is complex and multisided’.170 
In an attempt illustrate the various elements of legal pluralism, and to avoid confusion, this 
study adopts Tamanaha’s five roughly-composed groupings in an attempt to bring some 
structure to the term of legal pluralism: 
1.11.1 Official or positive legal systems 
These systems are characteristically linked to an institutionalised legal apparatus of some 
kind; they are manifested in legislatures, enforcement agencies, tribunals; they give rise to 
powers, rights, agreements, criminal sanctions, and remedies. This category encompasses 
the entire panoply of whatever is typically regarded as law-related or legal, ranging from 
traffic laws to human rights. Citizens of the EU, for example, are subject to laws and 
regulations generated locally (municipality or township), at district or state levels, at 
national levels, at the level of the EU, and internationally. These versions of official law are 
not completely reconciled with one another, and many are based on separate institutional 
structures with potentially conflicting jurisdictions and norms.171 
In the Bermuda context, residents are subject to the laws and regulations generated locally 
(by way of the municipalities of the City of Hamilton172 and the Town of St. George173), at 
the domestic level (by way of Bermuda’s lower chamber the House of Assembly and its 
upper chamber the Senate), at the EU in terms of the EU directives that are extended to 
Bermuda by the UK by way of Orders in Council, and internationally by way of the treaties 
that are extended and made a part of Bermuda’s laws, also by way of Orders in Council. 
1.11.2 Customary normative systems 
These systems include shared social rules and customs, as well as social institutions and 
mechanisms, from reciprocity, to dispute resolution tribunals, to councils of traditional 
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leaders. In some locations the terms indigenous law or traditional law are also used. These 
terms (and their local translations) are labels usually invoked in post-colonial societies, and 
have limited application in other contexts. The notions of customary or traditional or 
indigenous societies were marked (for various purposes) as distinct from the transplanted 
norms and systems of the colonisers [...] these are not sociological notions, but rather 
constructed labels and categories created for specific purposes in the circumstances of 
colonisation and its aftermath. Once created, these labels have been carried over and 
continue to the present in some form of coexistence with (or within) official legal 
systems.174  
1.11.3 Religious normative systems 
These systems are in some societies an aspect of and inseparable from customary 
normative systems, and both can be considered aspects of culture (hence the term 
cultural), yet religion merits separate mention for the reason that it is often seen by people 
within a social arena as a special and distinct aspect of their existence. Religions typically 
are oriented toward the metaphysical realm, and religious precepts usually carry great 
weight and significance for believers within a social area. [FN p.399 Tamanaha] 
In Bermuda, although it is not a theocracy, religion does play a major part in its normative 
systems (e.g. the churches overwhelming opposition to same-sex marriage175 and to the 
admission of casino gaming).176  
1.11.4 Economic/ capitalist normative systems 
These systems consist of a range of norms and institutions that constitute and relate to 
capitalist production and market transactions within social arenas. This ranges from 
informal norms that govern continuing relations in business communities (including 
reciprocity, and norms that discourage resort to official legal institutions in situations of 
dispute), to norms governing instrumental relations, to standard contractual norms and 
practices, to private law-making in the form of codes of conduct, shared transnational 
                                                        
 
174 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, Sydney Law Review, 
2008 [Vol. 30:375], p. 397 
175 ‘Same-sex marriage referendum Bermuda facing legal challenge’, Caribbean 360 (Online), May 24, 2016 ed. 




commercial norms, arbitration institutions, and so forth, including shared beliefs about 
capitalism (such as market imperatives). Like customary and religious normative systems, 
many of these norms are not seen as legal norms; a subset of these economic or capitalist 
norms and institutions are recognised and incorporated by official legal systems; while 
others are independently recognised as having a legal status. The new lex mercatoria, the 
body of law and institutions relating to transnational commercial transactions, is 
illustrative of this category.177 
In the Bermuda context Bermuda’s international business sector (e.g. the financial sector 
and the international reinsurance sector), in particular the manner in which businesses 
within the international business sector relate to each other, would fall within this category 
of systems. 
1.11.5 Community/ cultural normative systems 
This system is, indeed, the vaguest of the five illustrated systems. This is because it is an 
imagined identification by a group of a common way of life, usually tied to a common 
language and history and contained within geographical boundaries of some kind, but 
there can be communities of interaction existing purely on the internet comprised of people 
from around the world. At the local level, communities consists of thick, shared norms of 
interaction that constitute and characterise a way of life, including customs, habits mores, 
but at the broader level of the nation (or beyond) the bonds that constitute a community 
can be much thinner and mainly defined by a perceived identity. In its thinnest 
manifestation (which can nonetheless exert a powerful influence), the norms that bind and 
define the community may not be definite or reiterated enough to be considered a system in 
the same sense that that applies to the other systems. The typical claim of community is to 
have some special connection (descriptive and prescriptive) to or entitlement to support 
by official state legal systems. Further, under certain circumstances communities can 
coincide with and be defined in religious or customary terms (or a combination of the 
three).178 
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These five groupings should not be viewed as complete, and there may be others that could 
be added to this list. 
1.11.6 Globalisation- The reason for the growth of legal transplants in the world 
economy 
Globalisation is 'often seen as the main reason to explain the egrowth of legal transplants in 
the world economy'.179 This is because globalisation serves to 'bring laws and legal cultures 
into a more direct, frequent, intimate, and often complicated and stressed contact. It 
influences what legal professionals want and need to know about foreign la, howthey 
transfer, acquire and process information, and how decisions are made'.180 
1.11.7 The newly emerging concept of global legal pluralism 
It has been argued that it now appears to be a newly emerging concept of global legal 
pluralism. Michaels, however, is uncertain as to whether the concept of global legal 
pluralism is simply: 
‘(a) a continuation of traditional legal pluralism; 
(b) the broadening of focus to include transnational, supranational, and 
international law in the collection of legal orders; or  
(c) something qualitatively new’.181 
1.11.8 Globalisation and why legal transplantation takes place 
Globalisation, often seen as the main reason to explain the growth of legal transplants in 
today’s world economy: 
‘brings laws/ rules and legal cultures into more direct, frequent, intimate, 
and often complicated and stressed contact. It ‘influences what legal 
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professionals want and need to know about foreign law, how they transfer, 
acquire and process information, and how decisions are made’.182  
Moreover Globalisation, as a phenomena, has been argued as creating:  
(a) as a result of the increasing cultural contact a number of traditional practices, 
whole ways of life and worldviews disappearing; and 
(b) at the same time globality leads to the emergence of new cultural 
forms…everywhere cultural traditions mix and create new practices and 
worldviews.183  
1.12 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has seven chapters.  
In Chapter 1, the overall framework of this thesis is formulated and presented. 
Chapter 2 provides the literature review for this study. 
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework which is woven throughout this thesis, 
thereby serving to strengthen its inner core. It will present the main argument of the thesis, 
exploring law reform and the four legal theories used to test the hypothesis of this thesis, 
and give an indication of the emergence of the concepts of ‘history’ and ‘legal culture’ as 
core variables. 
Chapter 4 seeks to test the validity of the four legal theories introduced in Chapter 2, 
pointing out their strengths and weaknesses, particularly in relation to s 315F of 
Bermuda’s Criminal Code Act 1907 and s 29A of Bermuda’s Firearms Act 1973. This 
chapter is also used to illustrate that a country’s history and culture are imbedded into its 
laws and can, perhaps unintentionally, cause the intent behind the creation of a countries 
laws to become lost, negatively affecting certain groups of a country’s people.  
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Chapter 5 continues to test the validity of the four legal theories, this time in relation to 
TEIAs between Bermuda and members of the OECD, particularly France, as well as those 
between Bermuda and the US. It also examines the appearance of economic intimidation 
exacted by a large country or countries against a smaller country, which arises because of 
the ill-defined and emotive concept of ‘tax haven’.  
Chapter 6 completes the testing, using the UK’s Landmines Act 1998 and Landmines Act 
1998 (Overseas Territories) Order 2001 (the vehicle for transplanting the Ottawa Treaty 
from the UK to Bermuda) as a tool. It also explores the problem of competing independent 
national, political and military interests in the relationship that exists between Bermuda 
and the UK, especially in relation to the competing independent national, political and 
military relationship that Bermuda and the UK have with the US. 
Chapter 7 proposes solutions for the specific cultural and historical economic, legal, and 
social problems that are at the crux of this thesis and that currently affect Bermuda. Using 
the Bermudian experience with gang culture, which is akin to a Bermudian version of 
terrorism, it also proposes solutions to solve the global phenomena of the male foreign 
terrorist fighter. In doing so, the author not only seeks to use this thesis as a means of 
assisting Bermuda in finding solutions to these problems, but also to put forward solutions 
for the world to use (including bodies such as the United Nations) for resolving the 
phenomenon of the foreign terrorist fighter, most notably in countries world such as 
Belgium and France. 
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions. It explores how laws are transplanted, the meaning of 
effectiveness, and the problems associated with trying to determine effectiveness and from 
whose perspective effectiveness is be to be observed and determined. It also explores 





Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The subject of legal transplantation has been the subject of continued debate since the 
1970s. Much of the academic debate has centred on the possibility of transplantation and 
not on its effectiveness, particularly from the perspective of the end-user. Many legal 
academics have written about the subject of legal transplantations, but the two most 
prominent are Professor Alan Watson and Professor Pierre Legrand. Other notable 
contributors are Professors Otto Kahn-Freud, Rudolf von Jering, Konrad Zweigert, and Hein 
Kotz. 
2.1 Watson’s theory 
Watson coined the term legal transplantation in the 1970s to refer to ‘the moving of a rule 
or a system of law from one country to another‘184 and has written extensively on this 
subject. He draws on examples of transplanted laws from the Roman era, as recorded by 
Louvain,185 the Saxon era,186 law from the 17th century,187 and the work of Johannis Voet, 
first published, 1698.188 He also uses feudal law to indicate that ‘borrowing’ need not be of 
statute law alone. He makes special mention of Boehmer (1715-1797) and his Principia 
Iuris Feudalis (Göttingen):  
‘The sources of common German feudal law are the feudal law of the 
Lombards received throughout Germany, universal German feudal customs, 
the common law of the empire contained in imperial sanctions, in Roman and 
in canon law’.  
Watson argued that this: 
‘indicates a strongly held belief that throughout the Empire feudal law was 
one and the same, even if not identical from one state to the next. The lesson 
must be that through transplants law becomes similar, even if not identical, 
in many jurisdictions: and that lawmakers rely heavily on foreign law for 
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their own changes, whether as legislators, judges or jurists’. Also under the 
heading of feudal law, Professor Watson refers to Thomas Craig who wrote 
‘Ius Feudale’, published in 1655. He asserts that Thomas Craig’s aim was to 
‘show the fundamental similarity of the subject in Scotland and England’.189 
He asserts that ‘feudal law may not have been , and it was not , the same throughout 
Western Europe, but it was much more alike because of the Libri Feudorum and the 
consequent legal transplants’.190 
The third example he uses in support of his legal transplant theory, is the early history of 
the French code civil in Belgium in which Belgium’s annexation to France in 1797 resulted 
in the French code civil coming into operation in 1804. He notes that after the French 
domination of Belgium ended, the code civil continued to be the law of Belgium. From this 
example he asks (for the purposes of challenging Professor Pierre Legrand’s assertion that 
‘legal transplants are impossible’) ‘how can that be, since before the imposition of the code 
civil Belgium was a land of numerous local customs?’191 
In support of his legal transplant theory, Professor Watson relies on the contents of the 
book published by the Belgian jurist, E. R. N. Arntz (published in Brussels in 1875) entitled 
Cours de Droit Civil Français. The book, meant for a Belgian readership, had ‘references to 
some new French law’. Also in spoort of his legal transplant theory, Professor Watson relies 
on the 1879 second edition publication by Arntz, this addition having references to all 
Belgian and French law because ‘of the success in France of the first edition’.192 
Drawing on the 20th century example of Turkey, Watson concludes that ‘until recently, 
Turkey was usually regarded as the most extreme example of a modern legal transplant’.193 
He draws on the writings of Turkish law professor Esin Örücü, who stated:  
‘What is regarded today as the theory of ‘competing legal systems’, albeit 
used mainly in the rhetoric of ‘law and economics’ analysis, was the basis of 
the reception of laws that formed the Turkish legal system in the years 1924 , 
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1930. The various Codes were chosen from what were seen to be ‘the best’ in 
their field for various reasons. No single legal system served as the model. 
The choice was driven in some cases by the perceived prestige of the model, 
in some by efficiency and in others by chance. Choosing a number of different 
models may have given the borrowings ‘cultural legitimacy’ as the desire to 
modernise and westernise was not beholden to any one dominant culture. It 
would have been possible to choose Switzerland or Germany and borrow 
solely from one of these jurisdictions. It was instead the civil law, the law of 
obligations and civil procedure from Switzerland, commercial law, maritime 
law and criminal procedure from Germany, criminal law from Italy and 
administrative law from France that were chosen, translated, adapted and 
adjusted to solve the social and legal problems of Turkey and to fit together. 
Choice means taking one option as opposed to another, and the existence of 
choice is what differentiates a reception from an imposition. Thus, the 
difference between reception and imposition is related to the existence or 
absence of choice. On this criterion alone, the Turkish experience. is a 
substantial and thorough experience in ‘reception’.194 
Watson notes that, historically, ‘Turkish academics had most of their training in 
universities in the countries from where the receptions came and that [...] the fitting of all 
models to the Turkish situation was indeed undertaken by academics so trained’. Language 
training and translations, Watson asserts, were extensive. In the early years of Turkey’s 
existence, Watson notes that ‘Swiss, Austrian and German academics also contributed to 
the new legal system as a consequence of historical accident and thus greatly helped the 
imported system to take root’.195 In conclusion, and in support of his legal transplant 
theory, he notes that:  
‘(a) The main draftsman of the civil code, Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, had studied 
law in Switzerland. That was the law he knew. The general opinion of 
scholars is that this fact is the main reason for the choice of Swiss law for the 
base of the Turkish civil code; 
(b) What was borrowed was not just the Swiss codes, but their court 
decisions and academic opinion. What can be, and is, borrowed is not just 
statutory rules; and 
                                                        
 





(c) As Örücü has indicated, there was a continuing relationship between 
Turkish law and European codes: European professors were appointed to 
teach Turkish law (through interpreters); prospective Turkish legal 
academics (and others) studied law in continental Europe’.196 
Turning to the states of the former Soviet Union, Watson examines the civil codes or drafts 
of the states of that former country. He states that ‘ninety seven percent of the draft of book 
2 of the new Armenian civil code, Obligations, is taken straight from the Russian civil code 
and makes special reference to the fact that the drafts were written in Russian – not in 
Armenian.197 The code was to come into effect only after the publication of a commentary 
and that Armenian commentary would be based on the Russian. 
Finally, Watson considers a type of legal transplant, in relation to the international sale of 
goods – the 1988 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. He 
argues that ‘it was long felt that transnational mercantile transactions would be greatly 
helped if there was a uniform contract law that crossed national borders’. Watson argues 
that: 
‘…the Convention when it came into force did not represent the law of any 
nation state. But since 1988 it has been enacted as law in 54 countries: an 
enormous example of a legal transplant. Of course, it may be argued that the 
needs of transnational business make this a special case. Of course I agree. 
But that does not alter the fact that ‘foreign’ law could be accepted in many 
countries. Naturally enough, it was noticed that judicial interpretation in 
different countries could result in different results. (I would point out 
though, that even by accepting the Convention the 54 countries bring their 
national law on the subject much closer together). A first step in harmonising 
the law is to hold that domestic proceedings do not transform this 
Convention (and others) into domestic law, hence the domestic 
interpretative techniques are not applicable. This approach has been widely 
successful, but as yet with notable exceptions.18 The interpretation of the 







Convention is not uniform within the 54 countries but there is a wide 
measure of agreement’.198 
Watson’s argument is strong, but none of the examples he uses deals with the issue of 
reception by the respective end-users, especially in relation to the laws and rules that were 
imposed by way of conquest (e.g. Roman Law, the imposition of French Law on the people 
of Belgium). He also offers no indication of how effective these laws or rules were for the 
people on which they were applied. His indication can be interpreted to mean that because 
there is indication that legal transplants have taken place that there is no need to consider 
the issue of reception by the actual end-users (i.e. for the purposes of determining if a legal 
transplant has been effective).  
Watson’s theoretical framework appears to be developmental. Developing countries have, over the 
years, been urged by law and development scholars to copy the modern institutional features of 
Western countries, in particular judicial independence, legal education, the rule of law and rights 
based commercial laws. By doing so, these law and development scholars have ignored 
Weber’s caution that laws develop over time by interacting with local socioeconomic 
environments, processes that induce path dependent development.199  
The relationship assumed by Watson between theory and practice is that the laws and 
rules can easily be transplanted from one jurisdiction to another. His statements that ‘law 
is different from bread because in all its manifestations it is an element of the state‘ and ‘the 
state is responsible for its coming into being, for its application and for its efficacy’ takes 
into account to the role of one end-user (the state) but completely ignores the role the 
ultimate end-user (the people that live within the jurisdiction of the state), resulting in a 
very simplistic view of legal transplants. 
Watson does review other writers’ theories but in over simplifying them he minimises the 
practical side effects associated with transplantation, inferring that they are immaterial. He also 
refers to literature that opposes his view point, primarily that of Legrand.  
                                                        
 
198 Ibid. 
199 See: David Trubek (1972), ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and 
Development’, 82 Yale Law Journal. ‘Basic Needs’ theorist have determined that neoliberal markets produced 
harsh outcomes in that states did not redirect welfare income to their poor inhabitants. See also Gunnar 




Watson’s conclusion that laws and rules can be transplanted is a valid assertion insofar as 
the act of transplantation has been demonstrated as possible, but fails to address regional 
variations and other factors, and makes no assessment of whether the transfer can be 
efficient and effective. The strengths of his approach is founded on the fact that he is able to 
give examples of successfully transplanted rules and laws. Its weakness is that it does not 
take into account whether they were done successfully with specific reference to the end-
users. The strength of this theory is also weakened because it doesn’t consider the ‘better 
solutions theory’, which is founded on functionality; ‘the legal system of every society faces 
essentially the same problems’,200 and therefore the objects for comparison should be 
diverse legal solutions to those societal problems.201 Inherent in functionalist analysis are 
two primary elements; problem definition and solution identification. 
In contrast and according to Zweigert and Kotz, this means that only rules which perform 
the same function and address the same real problems can profitably be compared, causing 
functionality to be: 
‘…the basic methodological principle of all comparative law….From this basic 
principle stem all other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, 
the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparison and so 
on’.202  
From this principle is derived comparative law,203 allowing functionalism to provide advice 
on legal policy by suggesting how a specific problem can best be solved under given social 
and economic circumstances.204 They see comparative law as a means by which to discover 
models for preventing or resolving social conflicts, and: 
‘providing a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world 
                                                        
 








can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a lifetime 
by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his own system’.205 
The first argument against the functionalist theory is from Whitman, who believes that it is 
unreliable because of the proposition that all societies view life as presenting the same 
social problems.206 Hyland, also finding the functionalist theory wanting, challenges the 
idea that the social issues the law is asked to resolve are so similar as to present a constant 
across legal systems.207 Hill questions the basis on which comparative lawyers are qualified 
to make evaluations of different legal systems.208 He believes that functionalists think they 
can make such judgments because the method used is an objective one, but Hill argues that 
different legal solutions require value judgments about fairness and justice, and that 
functionalism cannot provide a basis for making these kinds of judgments.209 
There is also the issue of for whom a legal rule is functional. This is to say that: 
‘Societies are not monolithic; they are composed of diverse individuals and 
groups. Thus it is difficult to speak of societal functions per se. Instead we 
must speak in terms of which individuals and groups define the intended 
consequences of a legal institution. Functionalism proposes neither an 
answer nor a general approach’.210 
Abrahamson cautions against using the functionalist theory because there is a tendency to 
assume that different societies face similar problems and a tendency to imply the ability to 
make objective claims about which legal solutions to those problems are superior.211  
Functionalism has been argued to be the mirror image of Watson's theory- something that 
Watson disagrees with.212 The drawbacks to functionalism or the functionalist approach 
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are best illustrated by Ralf Michaels.  The functionalist approach, arguably,  has three 
elements. First, “law matters”: law has predictable consequences on society. Second, those 
effects are, in principle, the same in any society. Third, based on this knowledge, law 
reformers can pick the best laws in order to bring such consequences about.213 
Among the three elements of this approach, Michaels argues that  ‘the first and the last 
elements ‘are less controversial than the second’. However he asserts that ‘the first 
element, namely that law has an impact on society, can hardly be denied in general214 The 
third, ‘namely that law reformers can pick the best laws in order to bring about the best 
consequences, Ralf Michaels argues is more contentions, but still widely supported. 
Without this assumption, law reform would be futile. It is the second step—the idea that 
laws yield the same outcomes anywhere, and that therefore one solution is the best for any 
society, that is the most problematic’.215 
This, Ralf Michaels argues, ‘is a kind of legal functionalism, even if that is not always said 
openly.’216 But it is a very peculiar kind of functionalism.217 First, ‘in insisting that one 
solution fits the problems found in every legal situation, it ignores one core element of 
functionalism in comparative law, namely functional equivalence—the insight that, in 
different systems, different legal solutions may respond to similar problems’.218 Second, ‘in 
viewing law as a tool, it represents a specific kind of functionalism, namely 
instrumentalism’.219 ‘Functionalism takes an observer’s perspective on the relation 
between institutions and societal needs; it incorporates also unrealized needs and 
unrealized (“latent”) functions’.220 Instrumentalism, Ralf Michaels contends, ‘adopts a 
participant’s need: here, the societal need is necessarily known, and a legal rule is aimed at 
responding to this need—whether successfully, or not’.221 Third, ‘although instrumentalism 
could develop different solutions for different societies, the one size- fits-all approach, in 
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proposing one solution for every society, must deny the relevance of context, or of the 
specific character of the legal problem to respond to’.222 Ralf Michaels concludes that ‘this is 
sometimes called the law of the hammer (“If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like 
a nail”)’.223 
The Watson theory also fails to consider 'casual inference theory'. This is founded on the 
proposition that: 
‘Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution, which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the 
country where it is proposed to adopt it’.224 
Indeed, Watson fails to offer any guidance on how, unlike the casual inference theory, is it 
to be implemented or by what means 
Whytock contends that the first question can only be answered ‘by having an 
understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified outcome in the country 
of origin’. And to answer the second question, he contends that ‘one must have some 
understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal institution in a country that adopts 
it’.225 As a legal theory for use as a tool of legal reform, Whytock cautions that: 
‘…when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to attempting to 
establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars should be wary. 
Moreover, functionalist comparative legal scholarship would benefit from 
more methodological diversity than legal origins scholarship in its quest to 
take causality seriously. None of this is to suggest that all comparative legal 
scholars should ask causal questions or make causal claims about legal 
institutions; but when they do, they should be explicit about the process by 
which they make their causal inferences’.226 
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Watson’s theory is also weakened by its failure to consider the context in which a law 
exists. Whytock suggests that, of the functionalist theories, the ‘laws context theory’ should 
be taken seriously because, and as Tushnet has noted: 
‘Every society’s law is tied to so many aspects of that society, its particular 
history, its intellectual life, the institutional forms in which its activities are 
conducted, and many more, that no functionalist account can identify and 
take into account all the variables that might affect the degree to which 
participants in one system can learn from the experience of others’.227 
It is uncertain whether there is a distinction between public and private law. Watson is the 
only theorist who acknowledges, albeit in a glossed over manner, the existence of such a 
distinction, but does not fully address whether or not there is a distinction between public 
and private law, or whether the debate serves to enhance legal transplant theories.228 It is 
therefore questionable whether the legal theories are valid tools for determining whether a 
law has been effectively transplanted. 
Again, and unfortunately,  Watson's theory does not appear to specify how or when a law 
or rule can transplanted- effectively or otherwise. 
2.2 Legrand’s theory 
Legrand’s assertion, that legal transplants are impossible, is clearly defined. He asserts 
that: 
‘(1) if one agrees that, in significant ways, a rule receives its meaning from 
without and if one accepts that such investment of meaning by an 
interpretive community effectively partakes in the ruleness of the rule, 
indeed, of the nucleus of ruleness, it must follow that there could only occur a 
meaningful ‘legal transplant’ when both the propositional statement as such 
and its invested meaning , which jointly constitute the rule , are transported 
from one culture to another; and 
                                                        
 
227 Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’, (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1225, 1265. 




(2) given that the meaning invested into the rule is itself culture-specific, it is 
difficult to conceive, however, how this could ever happen’.229 
Legrand argues that: 
‘in linguistic terms, one could say that the signified (meaning the idea content 
of the word) is never displaced because it always refers to an idiosyncratic 
semi cultural situation. Rather, the propositional statement, as it finds itself 
technically integrated into another legal order, is understood differently by 
the host culture and is, therefore, invested with a culture-specific meaning at 
variance with the earlier one (not least because the very understanding of 
the notion of ‘rule’ may differ). Accordingly, a crucial element of the ruleness 
of the rule , its meaning , does not survive the journey from one legal system 
to another’.230 
Legrand, in support of his assertion, asks ‘could law travel if it was not segregated from 
society?’ To answer this question Legrand turns to the writings of Max Weber who asserts:  
‘A comparative study should not aim at finding ‘analogies’ and ‘parallels’, 
engrossed in the currently fashionable enterprise of constructing general 
schemes of development. The aim should, rather, be precisely the opposite: 
to identify and define the individuality of each development, the 
characteristics which made the one conclude in a manner so different from 
that of the other. This done, one can then determine the causes which led to 
these differences’.231 
He also relies on Eva Hoffman, who concludes: 
‘you can’t transport human meanings whole from one culture to another 
anymore than you can transliterate a text […because] in order to transport a 
single word without distortion, one would have to transport the entire 
language around it’. Indeed, ‘in order to translate a language, or a text, 
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without changing its meaning, one would have to transport its audience as 
well’.232  
The relationship between the words that constitute the rule in its bare propositional form 
and the idea to which they are connected is arbitrary in that it is culturally determined. 
Thus, there is nothing to show that the same inscribed words will generate the same idea in 
a different culture, particularly if the words are themselves different because they are in 
another language. As the words cross boundaries there is a different rationality and 
morality to underwrite and affect the borrowed words: the host culture continues to 
articulate its moral inquiry according to traditional standards of justification. The imported 
form of words, therefore, is inevitably ascribed a different, local meaning which makes it a 
different rule. As the understanding of a rule changes, so does its meaning, and as the 
meaning of the rule changes, the rule itself changes.233  
To illustrate his point that laws or rules cannot be transplanted, Legrand, paraphrasing J.A. 
Jolowicz, states: 
‘the addition of a litre of green paint to four litres of yellow does not give us 
the same colour as the addition of a litre of red paint to four litres of yellow’. 
Legrand’s focus on the role of the end-user results in a very convincing argument. Due to 
his assertion that legal transplants are impossible and the existing empirical indication  
that support a contrary argument, his assertion does not appear convincing.  
Legrand’s theoretical framework is developmental. By way of his assertion that ‘legal 
transplants are impossible’, and calling for the need to consider the end-user in assessing 
effective transplantation, this lends itself well to the process of drafting legislation, 
especially in regards to drafting legislation for developing countries. 
In reaching his conclusions, Legrand evaluates the literature in the field, in particular that 
by Alan Watson, but concludes that ‘legal transplants are impossible’. His research, in so far 
as it examines the impact that history and culture has on the effectiveness of a transplanted 
law or rule, is accurate, but does not recognise that there are exceptions to his assertion.  
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The strength of Legrand’s study is that it takes into account the role that end-users play in 
the reception or rejection of laws or rules within any given society. It is, however, limited 
because it does not consider Zweigert and Kotz ‘better solutions’ theory. 
Like the Jhering theory, the best solutions theory is founded on the functional or 
functionality. This is to say that ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same 
problems’234 and, therefore, the objects for comparison (by way of the comparative 
method) should be diverse legal solutions to those societal problems.235 Inherent in 
functionalist analysis are two primary elements: 
1. problem definition; and 
2. solution identification. 
What does this mean? Arguably, this means that only rules which perform the same 
function and address the same real problems can profitably be compared, causing 
functionality to be: 
‘…the basic methodological principle of all comparative law….From this basic 
principle stem all other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, 
the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparison and so 
on’.236  
From this principle is derived what is called applied comparative law,237 allowing 
functionalism to provide advice on legal policy by suggesting how a specific problem can 
most appropriately be solved under given social and economic circumstances.238 In using 
comparative law, Zweigert and Kotz see comparative law as a means by which to discover 
models for preventing or resolving social conflicts, and: 
‘providing a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world 
                                                        
 








can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a lifetime 
by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled in his own system’.239 
Abrahamson cautions against using the functionalist theory because there is a tendency to 
assume that different societies face similar problems and a tendency to imply the ability to 
make objective claims about which legal solutions to those problems are superior.240  
The Legrand theory also fails to consider, in tandem with the ‘best solutions theory, the 
casual inference theory. This is founded on the proposition that: 
‘Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution, which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the 
country where it is proposed to adopt it’.241 
Whytock contends that the first question can only be answered ‘by having an 
understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified outcome in the country 
of origin’. And to answer the second question, he contends that ‘one must have some 
understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal institution in a country that adopts 
it’.242  
As a legal theory, for use as a tool of legal reform, Whytock raises the caution that: 
‘…when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to attempting to 
establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars should be wary. 
Moreover, functionalist comparative legal scholarship would benefit from 
more methodological diversity than legal origins scholarship in its quest to 
take causality seriously. None of this is to suggest that all comparative legal 
scholars should ask causal questions or make causal claims about legal 
institutions; but when they do, they should be explicit about the process by 
which they make their causal inferences’.243 
                                                        
 
239 Ibid, 15. Schlesinger, von Mehren and Merryman, all espouse the same ‘better solutions’ impulse theory. 
240 Ibid, 1889. 
241 John Henry Merryman, The Loneliness of the Comparative Lawyer 486 (1999). 
242 Christopher A. Whytock, Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law (2010), 1893. 




Another waekness of Legrand’s theory is that it does not indicate if the theory is: 
(a) applicbale to private law; 
(b) applicable to public law; or 
(c) applicable to public and private law. 
Further, Legrand’s theory fails to indicate whether: 
1. there is a distinction between public law and private law; 
2. there is no distinction between public law and private law; or 
3. in either case, the extent the public law and private law debate serves to buttress 
or to undermine their respective legal transplant theories, if at all. 
It is therefore questionable as to whether or not the Legrand theory is a valid tool for 
determining whether a law or rule has been effectively transplanted, especially in the 
instance where public is the subject of examination.244  
2.3 Legrand: The role of judges in the transplantation of rules 
In regards to the role of judges, specifically in relation to their function in the interpretation 
and transplantation of a rule, Legrand appears to be adverse to judges being allowed to use 
their discretionary powers (afforded to them by way of statute and the common law) to 
determine how best to determine issues of interpretation and transplantation of a rule- in 
this case a French rule. Although he provides a best ways example by which future judges 
can interpret foreign rules,245 he is dismissive of the judges that do not align with his 
methodology. The detailed analysis of the cases studies, as read with the subchaters on the 
role of judges, show that ultimately it will be the judges (assisted by lawyers) who will be 
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responsible for the effective transplantation of rules to Bermuda- in those instances where 
there is ambiguity concerning the purpose of a rule and its provisions. 
2.3.1 The case of Bodum 
Legrand’s aversion is evident in his critique246 of the majority decision of Bodum v La 
Cafetière.247 Bodum was a case decision regarding proof of foreign law. Two out of the three 
judges: 
‘took the view that they ought to forgo expert testimony and proceed to 
ascertain French law themselves by reference to English-language materials 
available to them in the United States and on the basis of these texts only’ 
with the third judge of the panel disagreeing with the approach being taken by his fellow 
judges. In his critique, Legrand stated his goal to be one where he provides: 
‘a mapping of the judgment from the standpoint of its epistemological 
commitments as it deems itself able to identify the relevant foreign law while 
perplexingly confining itself strictly to publications in the local language 
available locally’.248  
By way of his critique he inferred that the judges involved in the decision appeared to have 
‘judicial disdain for expert testimony on foreign law’249 and suggested that this was perhaps 
‘striking a welcome democratic chord in reaction to the elitism that can be said to animate 
the cult of the expert’ but went on to claim that ‘the majority of the court in effect 
succumbed to truculent theoretical banalisation in the form of an empiricism that proves as 
naïve as it is reductionist, as mechanical as it is ethnocentric’. Legrand then went on to 
determine that ‘the salient epistemological stakes of the case at issue manifested 
themselves‘ in at least five guises. 
There being no thoroughly depersonalised gaze – no ‘raw’ descriptivism, then, being 
possible — the court’s election to follow a particular approach in order to ascertain foreign 
law must be expected to have an impact on what foreign law is finally held to be stating on 
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any given issue. In other words, one always reads foreign law pursuant to identifiable 
epistemic circumstances such that no enunciation of it can happen independently of the 
interpretive scenario being staged to achieve a formulation of it. To describe is to inscribe. 
Now, the identification of foreign law as positing ‘this’ rather than ‘that’ can be assumed to 
play a key role in the actual outcome of the case. 
Meanwhile, a decision to retain one approach towards the articulation of foreign law rather 
than another reveals assumptions pertaining to the judge’s disposition vis-à-vis the foreign. 
Specifically, the selection of given interpretive protocols points to a certain attitude in 
terms of how much recognition of the foreign and how much respect for the foreign one is 
prepared to concede. 
The majority view is to be located within a series of judicial decisions epitomising the 
vexed political relationship that US courts, including the US Supreme Court, have been 
experiencing with foreign law, as judges have oscillated between motions of introjection 
into the local polity and strategies of rejection, between the motifs of mutation and 
repulsion. Though judgments like Atkins v Virginia, Lawrence v Texas and Roper v Simmons 
have been amenable to the ascription of normative value to foreign law as persuasive 
authority (thus in Roper, the court expressly referred to the corroborative character of 
foreign law), Bodum is operating a retrenchment in as much as a majority of the court is 
only prepared to countenance a heavily ‘Americanised’ rendition of the foreign. 
Somewhat more philosophically, the recognition and respect a court proves willing to grant 
foreign law – or the measure of validation of the foreign a court is prepared to defend – is 
revealing of the views a judge holds as regards the fraught boundary between the self and 
the other (or, at the minimum, between the self-in-the-law and the other-in-the-law). Is one 
disposed to treat foreign law on par with local law (that is, as an alter ego)? Or will one 
approach the foreign in a way that suggests a susceptibility to the hierarchisation 
temptation, or perhaps to an imperialist haunting, such that local law is deemed superior or 
exceptional vis-à-vis foreign law? 
Ultimately, and once more from a predominantly philosophical perspective, a judge’s 
attitude concerning foreign law tells about the fashioning of self-definition. How one 




meaningful that as the circuit court in Bodum is asked to ascertain French law, it gives 
effect to its understanding of it based strictly on English language materials at hand in the 
United States rather than strive to realise a French lawyer’s vision of French law’.250  
In order to support his assertions, Legrand relied on the American decision, in particular 
the method by which the court reached its decision, of Mastercard International v FIFA, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
2.3.2 Mastercard International v FIFA: Legrand’s prescribed solution on how 
things ought to be done 
In the case of Mastercard International v FIFA, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, the Judge also addressed the issue of expert testimony 
concerning the interpretation and application of a foreign rule law in the State of New York, 
albeit dealing with the example of Swiss law which governed the contract being 
determined by the court. In this case, according to Legrand, Judge Preska’s approach to the 
matter was ‘exemplary’. Legrand found it to be ‘a good illustration of how things are done 
and a fine model of how they ought to be done’ and, by inference, an indicator of how 
courts should approach the issue of using expert witnesses in relation to interpreting 
foreign laws. Specifically he cites the following passage of the Judge’s judgment to support 
his thesis: 
‘The key passage is well worth reproducing at length: The Court’s 
interpretation of Swiss law […] is based on the expert declarations submitted 
by both parties. Upon review, the conclusions of Dr Franz HG Werro are 
found to be the most persuasive and informative, and it is the ‘persuasive 
force of the opinions’ expressed that is conclusive under Rule 44.1. […] Dr 
Werro has published numerous articles on contract law and is a professor at 
the Faculté de droit, University of Fribourg, as well as a tenured professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center and, as demonstrated by his curriculum 
vitae, is eminently qualified to opine on the issues presented. His opinions 
and conclusions are adopted in their entirety. In addition, the opinions and 
conclusions of Dr Hans Caspar von der Crone are persuasive and thus are 
adopted in their entirety. D Caspar von der Crone is a professor of private, 
                                                        
 




commercial, and corporate law at the University of Zurich, has numerous 
publications in these areas, and is similarly qualified to opine on the issues 
presented. […] One of FIFA’s Swiss law experts, Dr Wolfgang Wiegand, who 
does have a background in contract law, agrees with Professor Werro on 
many of the governing principles of Swiss law, even though he comes to 
different conclusions. To the extent that Dr Weigand agrees with Professor 
Werro as to the law, his conclusions are accepted. His conclusions and his 
plentiful advocacy – as opposed to expert opinion – are rejected as 
unpersuasive. […] Another of FIFA’s Swiss law experts [is] Professor [Carl] 
Baudenbacher (an apparent expert on competition law with little, if any, 
known expertise on contract law) […]. […]Professor Baudenbacher’s opinions 
are rejected for lack of apparent expertise in contract law and because they 
are not persuasive. […] Another FIFA expert [is] Dr Alfons Burge, a professor 
of ‘Roman law’ (the historical underpinning for civil law) in Germany with no 
apparent credentials as an expert on Swiss contract law […]. […] Professor 
Burge’s opinions are rejected for lack of apparent expertise in contract law 
and because they are not persuasive. […] Another of FIFA’s experts [is] Dr 
François Dessemontet […]. […] Professor Dessemontet’s opinions are 
rejected as wholly unpersuasive’.251 
In this instance, the judge was satisfied that, on the basis of the various affidavits filed with 
the Court, she had been able to reach the requisite understanding of Swiss law. Even 
allowing for the fact that the various experts had been retained by the parties and that they 
were therefore presumably interpreting Swiss law in a way not unduly unfavourable to 
their clients, Judge Preska felt competent to pronounce that some interpretations offered 
were more convincing in interpretive yield than others. She claimed with confidence that 
one reading of Swiss law in particular, that of a Professor Franz Werro, was especially 
helpful. Meanwhile, she did not hesitate to reject expert testimony she found inadequate – 
and to state her dissatisfaction. 
Legrand points out that: ‘all along, Judge Preska is not so much engaging in dialogue with 
Professor Werro as she is negotiating or transacting with him. Each of the two protagonists 
speaks a specific language (I use the word in the broadest sense). Indeed, each is pursuing a 
monologue. Legrand was even prepared to surmise that at no point did Judge Preska 
                                                        
 




presume that she eliminated the knowledge gap between Professor Werro and herself. 
Legrand asserted that it: 
‘cannot but be clear to Judge Preska that try as she may, she can never make 
it such that she will somehow turn herself into a Swiss-educated, French-
speaking and Schwyzerdütschspeaking law professor and lawyer like 
Professor Werro – who, in addition to his eminence as a Swiss academic 
regularly cited by the Swiss supreme court (‘Tribunal fédéral’), also enjoys an 
enviable reputation as a foremost comparatist both on the European and 
North- American scenes’. 
Legrand postulated that ‘Judge Preska realised that the two horizons would never merge, 
that any reaching of Professor Werro’s position on her part would always have to be 
postponed or infinitely deferred’. Indeed, there is the radical privacy of Professor Werro’s 
act of mental understanding of Swiss-law-as-it-is-lived-in-Switzerland so that his 
appreciation can never be found as such in Judge Preska’s mind’. Again, he asserts that 
Judge Preska is ‘inevitably coming to Swiss law as a comparatist, that is, as a ‘second 
perso[n]’. These interlocutors, Legrand contends, must therefore fail to make complete 
contact with each other: between them, ‘there is initially the space and the time of an 
infinite difference, of an interruption incommensurable with all the attempts at passage, at 
bridge, at isthmus, at communication, at translation, at trope, and at transfer’. Legrand 
asserts further that a realisation of the limits of the decoding or deciphering she could 
bring to bear on the matter (of interpreting Swiss law) at issue must in fact have become 
clearer to Judge Preska the more she delved into Swiss law’. This was to say that, as the 
saying goes, the more she understood the less she understood. Legrand believed that, 
because there can never be interpretive closure, a gap will thus remain – an ever-so-slight 
misunderstanding, perhaps – such that the re-presentation of Swiss law Judge Preska is 
able to iterate will inevitably disclose a US inflection, an autobiographical touch. In other 
words, according to Legrand, Judge Preska’s Swiss law is ultimately Swiss-law-as-it-is-
apprehended-in-the-United-States, a different construct from Professor Werro’s Swiss-law-
as-it-is-lived-in-Switzerland. ‘In effect, Judge Preska’s opinion offers what anthropologists 
might call ‘accultured’ Swiss law’. 
On Legrand’s interpretation of her judgment, Judge Preska is making her living decision, 
being aware of the options, antinomies and paradoxes before her and she feels that she has 
to let Swiss-law-as-it-is-lived-in-Switzerland speak in the clearest voice possible, which he 
contends obviously is not to be found in occasional English-language texts available on the 
US scholarly market’. Legrand goes on to assert that in her view, recourse to expert 
testimony allows her significantly to reduce the knowledge gap separating her law-world 
from Professor Werro’s to the point where she can eventually regard herself as sufficiently 




argues she takes to be a workable approximation of Swiss-law-as-it-is-lived-in-Switzerland. 
To her credit, Legrand contends, Judge Preska seeks to edge her way nearer to that Swiss 
law, which is the Swiss law that governed the litigants’ contract’. Appreciating, on 
Legrand’s reading of her judgment, that the parties did not want a US judge to gloze Swiss 
law – or, at least, that they would have expected her to do so as little as possible – Judge 
Preska uses Professor Werro’s expert testimony to transport herself, metaphorically 
speaking, to the verge of Swiss-law-as-itis-lived-in-Switzerland so as to put herself in a 
position to apply that law, as much as is possible from her vantage, to the contract before 
her. Throughout the proceedings, Legrand considered that Judge Preska remained keenly 
aware how an integral feature of the Swiss law Professor Werro stages in her courtroom is 
its relation to absence: the fact is that Swiss-law-as-it-lived-in- Switzerland is not present in 
New York State. 
Returning his analysis of the ruling of Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner, Legrand 
contends asserts that their alternative course of action to Judge Preska’s decision involves 
the collection by their law clerks – not, obviously, by they themselves – of whatever 
publications in English available in the United States can be garnered regarding the point of 
foreign law at hand. Legrand argues that, problematically, however, that: 
‘this gathering can be expected to reveal undue circumvention of foreign law 
in some regards and excessive indiscriminateness in other ways’. In both 
senses, Legrand asserts, ‘the law clerks’ motion ‘yok[es] [foreign law] by 
force into a frame of reference alien to [it]’’. The first difficulty is that ‘the 
assemblage of material is bound to be limited’.  
Further, Legrand contends that: 
‘since Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner insist that accounts of 
foreign law must remain nonpartisan, their law clerks will presumably have 
proven reluctant simply to track references from the parties’ self-serving 
briefs, an avoidance strategy which will, in effect, have left them to conduct 
their own inquiry very much in the light of the research patterns familiar to 
them since law school (and, in particular, since their law-review years)’.  
Again in reference to the judicial law clerks and their functions, Legrand asserts that ‘the 
clerks will have been searching the usual US databases and the habitual electronic library 
catalogues’ and argues that ‘for a law-review article or a book to be identified as relevant, it 
will therefore first have had to appear on the clerks’ computer screens as the search was 
being conducted’. Legrand then goes on to argue that, with the possible exception of some 
Canadian (or Puerto Rican?) content, all non-English material will have found itself 




Legrand further asserts that ‘a number of non-US publications, though available in English, 
will similarly have been ignored (by the law clerks) if they do not happen to be registered 
in leading US databases’. As examples, Legrand cites ‘the London-based Journal of 
Comparative Law which, at the time of the Bodum judgment he argues, was still more than 
two years away from being accessible through the retrieval systems known to US law 
clerks’. Legrand contends that ‘Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner’s sources on the 
French law of contractual interpretation confirm my assumptions’ as ‘their references 
include three law journals, all three published in the United States’. Moreover he asserts 
that ‘they feature four books, all of them released by English-language publishers with a 
strong commercial presence in the United States whose texts can therefore reasonably be 
expected to be available in US law libraries’. Because of this, Legrand asserts that ‘whatever 
research is conducted by law clerks is (therefore) constrained’. ‘With the possible 
exception of an English-language publication available in the United States written by a US 
lawyer claiming experience in the practice of law in France’, Legrand contends that 
‘French-law-as-it-is-lived-in-France can be expected to be absent from the law clerks’ 
databases’. In other words, Legrand asserts, ‘the bulk of the material generated out of their 
electronic searches is bound to qualify as French-law-as-it-is-apprehended-in-the-United-
States – at best, therefore, to register as epiphenomenal French law’. On account of the 
normative implications mentioned by Legrand, he asserts that ‘the court’s goal must be to 
ascertain French law- as-it-is-lived-in-France, and that these restrictions cannot but give 
serious cause for concern’.  
Legrand notes what he finds to be a second difficulty ‘for in a manner that is at least as 
troublesome, the law clerks’ investigations also reveal themselves as in discerning’. For 
example, Legrand asserts that ‘in Bodum the clerks seem prepared to collapse all the 
authors they had found to have written in English regarding the matter of French law at 
hand whoever happened to be available in the United States, without any apparent 
willingness or ability to organise them according to what Legrand calls ‘merit’. Legrand 
asserts here that ‘not all authors command equal intellectual authority’ and argues, too, 




2.3.3 The standing of legal publications 
Legrand argues that while it would be silly to dismiss a contribution simply because it 
appeared in a lesser-known journal, he argues that that it ‘remains the case – as every 
academic must know – that the editorial bar is higher in certain venues than in others, an 
assertion one can easily test empirically’. Legal publications are important  as a tool from 
which judges can determine a law or rules intent. However they are not slavishly bound to 
adhere to a legal publication's content. 252 
2.3.3.1 The standing and quality of legal publications 
Legrand presents the question, for rhetorical consideration, whether or not there is ‘a 
threshold level of quality – a basic standard of credibility – that a text ought to meet before 
a law clerk undertakes to treat it as a source worthy of reference by the court’ and queries 
as ‘to what signals of reliability will the clerk retain in the course of assessment’; ‘by what 
yardstick will she (the law clerk) evaluate such signals’; ‘what specific competence do law 
clerks bring to bear on the matter’; ‘do they know the writers writing in English on French 
contract law who happen to be available in the United States’; ‘are they familiar with the 
reputation these authors enjoy amongst their peers (i.e. in the case of other foreign 
specialists on French law) or possibly with the standing in which they are held in France’; 
‘do law clerks know the French writers having been translated into English’; ‘can they 
vouch for the translators’; ‘and how much ‘French law’ or ‘French contract law’ content 
must there be to a text on ‘civil-law culture’ (referring to Judge Posers dicta) before it is 
deemed to warrant selection?’  
2.3.3.2 Knowledge of French law as it is lived 
More significantly, Legrand queries, how much knowledge of French-law-as it- is-lived-in-
France can the law clerks muster in order to bridge the potential gap between the law as it 
is described in print and as it unfolds in practice in France?’  
                                                        
 





2.3.3.3 Are the legal resources current or dated? 
In order to reassert his concerns about the role of the law clerks, Legrand raises concern 
about the publication dates of the texts used by the law clerks. Legrand asserts that ‘in 
Bodum, a 2010 case, some references were to texts published in 1986, 1992 and 1997’ and 
argues that If the statements deemed pertinent in these publications were pitched at a 
certain level of generality, one can understand how they could reasonably be found to have 
stood the test of time’. However, Legrand argues that ‘such assertions would also be 
susceptible of proving less useful in terms of the concrete needs of the court in the case 
being litigated. It is simply unclear in the light of what criteria the Chicago [sic. New York] 
law clerks addressed this tension’. 
2.3.3.4 Matters considered by the Judge 
Legrand went on to argue that ‘though this be ‘the age of the law clerk’, he was ‘prepared to 
accept that judges may themselves sift through the material submitted by their clerks – a 
parsing, however, that can only take place within limits given the size of the judicial 
docket’. Still, Legrand went on to argue that some of the questions he’s raised herein ‘are 
bound to confront judges not unlike the way in which they will have challenged their 
clerks:  
1. Does a US judge know the authors writing in English on French contract law;  
2. Is a US judge familiar with the reputation these individuals enjoy amongst 
foreign specialists in French law or in France;  
3. Does a US judge know the standing in France of the French writers being 
translated into English;  
4. Is a US judge aware of French legal practice in a way that would allow for the 
law in print to be put into perspective?’  
In addition to these questions raised, Legrand raised concern over the matter of 
indiscriminateness that he contends ‘cannot be underestimated. Without wanting to 
designate any of the English-language references in Bodum in particular, he found that ‘the 
normative force injected into some of texts by the court to be unwarranted’. To buttress 
this assertion, Legrand does so by way of the following analogy:  
‘In the course of their surveys, some of the overrated books and articles I 
have been discussing also address US law. Now, assume Chief Judge 
Easterbrook and Judge Posner had been adjudicating on a matter of US 
rather than French law. Would it have occurred to them, or to their law 
clerks, to refer to any of these texts as authority on US law? The answer, it 
seems to me, must be that it is extremely unlikely that those texts would have 




same writings to be regarded as authoritative on French law? On what basis 
are they deemed adequate to the task of speaking for French law? 
2.3.4 Theoretical versus practical application 
It must be noted here that although Legrand presents these questions for consideration, 
these questions, and in particular the answers to them, ought to be considered to be 
rhetorical in nature and, therefore, not capable of being used as absolutes for the purposes 
of determining with certainty how or when judges should rely on certain legal experts or 
legal journals- for the purposes of interpreting transplanted foreign rules. As the common 
law and administrative law legal maxim states, ‘each case must turn on its own facts’.253 
This is to say that there may be occasions when the questions raised by Legrand (and the 
resulting answers) can be used as bench marks by judges. Still they should not, for the 
reasons stated, be referred to as absolutes.  
2.3.5 Legrand: further suggestions on how best to interpret foreign rules 
On his reading of the case of Bodum, Legrand surmises ‘that the judges in the majority 
‘appear genuinely to believe that the reading of a handful of law-review texts and 
summaries in English – some approximately twenty years old, others not directly 
concerned with France – will have allowed them to understand enough French contract law 
to be in a position to make a judicious application of it to the matter at issue and that as 
they are deciding the case while acting on that conviction, irrespective of how much sense 
of rectitude they bring to bear to their the atricalisation of French law’ that they are 
‘courting, at the very least, a perception of arrogance’.254 He argues that ‘at their hands, it 
seems, French law is falling prey to a form of cultural hegemony one might style 
‘anglobalisation’ (the domination of a certain Anglo-American configuration of thought and 
technology) pursuant to which US law journals, US databases and English-language books 
available in the United States are anointed as the exclusive vehicles through which French 
law must manifest itself in order to acquire its badge of legitimacy in the eyes of the 
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court’.255 This is to say, according to Legrand, ‘French law finds itself having to meet US 
expectations’ and that ‘it must become commodified, so to speak, as a US product and can 
only be allowed to exist pursuant to that specific design’.256 He argues, in effect: 
‘that the court’s encounter with French law is unfolding well within the US 
legal episteme: it remains intracultural, the familiar language and the 
congenial publications being hypostatized as the canon of relevance within 
which the negotiation with otherness-in-the-law is to occur. But to compel 
French law to express itself only through English-language, US-based, 
materials – to force it within that regulatory structure, which becomes an 
exclusive framework of preponderance – is necessarily to engage in a 
misrecognition of it. It is inevitably to perpetrate an act of interpretive 
violence against it. In sum, it is undeniably to appropriate it and compel it to 
become a stranger to itself’.257  
Legrand, however, seems to be suggesting here that the majority judges in the case of 
Bodum ought to have adopted similar procedural rules, that exist in France or the within 
the Civil law system for the purposes of determining what evidence can and cannot be 
allowed by the court for the purposes of determining the matter to be decided by the court. 
Proceedural rules are intended to be used by judges as a means of giving them guidance on 
how best to deal with certain legal situations. because procedural rules do not match those 
in existence in jurisdiction a rule has been transplaned does not mean they are defective. It 
does mean that judges are able to use their own courts rules as a means by which they can 
try and give effect to thow now transplanted rule (in the current case, within the United 
States and the State of new York).258  
2.3.5.1 Procedural rules 
Yes, in the case of Bodum the judges in the majority did rely on various English text, 
articles, etc. for the purposes of interpreting French law. Moreover, they exercised their 
discretion to determine whether to rely on these English text translations of French law 
                                                        
 
255 Ibid. 
256 Alan Watson, Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity, Penn. State Press. (Ebook) 2016 
257 Ibid.  




and or to rely on expert evidence of French law experts. They were given the latitude to do 
so using the dual existence of decided case law and procedural rules.  
As the learned Chief Justice explained in his judgment in Bodum: 
‘although Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (the first procedural used by the court) provides 
that courts may consider expert testimony when deciding questions of 
foreign law, it does not compel them to do so—for the Rule says that judges 
‘may’ rather than ‘must’ receive expert testimony and adds that courts may 
consider ‘any relevant material or source’. Judges should use the best of the 
available sources’.259  
2.3.5.2 Use of the American Rule 44.1 
The Chief Justice states further that the Committee Note in 1966, when Rule 44.1 (the rule 
used for determining whether to admit expert evidence and other forms of evidence) was 
adopted, explains that a court ‘may engage in its own research and consider any relevant 
material thus found. The court may, the Chief Justice asserts, ‘have at its disposal better 
foreign law materials than counsel have presented, or may wish to re-examine and amplify 
material that has been presented by counsel in partisan fashion or in insufficient detail’.260 
He further states that sometimes federal courts must interpret foreign statutes or decisions 
that have not been translated into English or glossed in treatises or other sources. Then 
experts’ declarations and testimony may be essential’.261 
The Chief Justice states further that: 
‘French law, and the law of most other nations that engage in extensive 
international commerce, is widely available in English. Judges can use not 
only accepted (sometimes official) translations of statutes and decisions but 
also ample secondary literature, such as treatises and scholarly commentary. 
It is no more necessary to resort to expert declarations about the law of 
France than about the law of Louisiana, which had its origins in the French 
civil code, or the law of Puerto Rico, whose origins are in the Spanish civil 
                                                        
 
259 Ibid. 





code. No federal judge would admit ‘expert’ declarations about the meaning 
of Louisiana law in a commercial case’.262 
When determining what forms of evidence are to be or can be admitted into evidence, the 
courts also have to consider matters such as cost implications. Trying to establish foreign 
law through experts’ declarations, according to the Chief Justice: 
‘is not only is expensive (experts must be located and paid) but also adds an 
adversary’s spin, which the court then must discount. Published sources such 
as treatises do not have the slant that characterises the warring declarations 
presented in this case. Because objective, English-language descriptions of 
French law are readily available, we prefer them to the parties’ 
declarations’.263 
2.3.5.3 Reference to Article 1156 of the French Code Civil 
According to the Chief justice, ‘Article 1156 says that courts must seek the parties’ 
‘common intention’, which means their joint intent, not one side’s unilateral version. As a 
means of satisfying himself in this regard the Chief Justice took into account evidence of the 
Defendant whereby he ‘offered the contract’s negotiating history, which French law takes 
to be a more reliable indicator of intent than the litigants’ self -serving declarations. 264 
2.3.5.4 Reference to Article 1341 of the French Code Civil 
Further, the Chief Justice, for the purposes of deciding the case and giving effect to the 
intent of the parties to the contract, referred to Article 1341 of the (French) Civil Code 
which ‘forbids evidence about what negotiators said to one another—often called parol 
evidence in the United States—when the value of the dispute exceeds 5,000 francs (roughly 
800 euros). The value of the dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendant exceeded 5,000 
francs, so what the negotiators said to each other, according to the Chief Justice, is 
irrelevant under Art. 1341. This constraint illustrates the proposition that although 
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‘as a general rule, French and German law do not limit the admissibility of 
relevant external materials in the process of interpretation . . . this does not 
mean that it is easy for a party to induce a court to rely on extrinsic evidence 
in order to ‘add to, vary or contradict a deed or other written instrument’. On 
the contrary, civilian systems are acutely aware of the need to strike a 
balance between the desire to achieve a materially ‘right’ outcome on the one 
hand, and the struggle for legal certainty on the other. As a consequence, they 
are extremely reluctant to admit that the wording of a contract concluded in 
writing might be overridden by other factors . . . . Extrinsic evidence can, 
however, be used for the purposes of interpreting a written document that 
contains internal contradictions or is otherwise unclear’.265 
2.3.6 Kahn Freund: Procedural rules and transplants 
On reading Legrand’s interpretation of the case at issue, he appears to be trying to import 
French procedural rules into the American legal system. However, It should be noted here 
that, in contrast, Kahn Freund recognised that procedural rules are extremely difficult to 
transplant. He saw such rules as ‘the spinal column to a legal system’ and something 
difficult to displace’.266 He argued further that procedural law constitutes: 
‘a highly organic species of law, whose enduring force results not from a 
broad constituency among the population, but from a highly committed, 
albeit relatively small elite group of stakeholders comprised of judges and 
lawyers’.267 
Reference to and consideration of Articles 1156 and 1341 by the American Chief Justice in 
the case of Bodum was arguably his attempt to transplant these rules from France to the 
State of New York which, based on Kahn-Freund’s arguments, would have been extremely 
difficult. 
Legrand’s theory contributes to this study by its strong emphasis on the role that end-users 
play in regards to the acceptance or rejection of laws and rules. His assertion that legal 
transplants are impossible also contributes to this study because such a bold assertion 
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prompts examination of the veracity of the assertion. By way of this study it has been 
determined that Legrand’s assertion, that legal transplants are impossible, is incorrect, 
illustrated by way of the exceptions to the same found within this study.  
2.4 Kahn-Freud’s theory 
The third legal theorist is Otto Kahn-Freud. He concludes that a transplanted law or rule 
will always be liable to rejection by a recipient jurisdiction, and equates the act of 
transplanting a law or rule to the act of transplanting an organ from one human body to 
another. In particular he stated: 
‘legal transplants like surgical transplants have the risk of being rejected and 
that it is dangerous to transplant a law (or rule) that is culturally and vitally 
attached to a particular society because all jurisdictions have a unique and 
different social construction’.268 
His focus on the issues of unknown variables (specifically in relation to the role the end-
user may play in determining whether a law or rule has been transplanted effectively) is 
convincing. This is because any known and unknown factor can cause borrowed or 
transplanted legislation to work or not work successfully.  
Kahn-Freud’s theoretical framework is developmental. In recommending that the makers 
of legislation exercise caution before they borrow a law or rule from another country, while 
collectively calling for a need to consider the end-user, it lends itself well to the process of 
drafting legislation, especially for developing countries. 
The relationship assumed by Kahn-Freud, between theory and practice, is that they are one 
and the same, each demanding the exercise of caution by the makers of legislation before 
they decide to transplant a law or rule.  
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Kahn-Freud has critically evaluates literature in the field, in particular literature written by 
Alan Watson. However, while doing so, he gives great deference to the dated legal theory of 
the legal scholar Montesquieu, which in turn causes Kahn-Freud’s theory to appear dated 
as well.  
Current views or interpretations of Kahn-Freud's theory 
The more current views, post Kahn-Freud, can be found in academic writings of,  Milhaupt 
and Pistor, Orucu, Cotterrell, Dolowitz and Marsh, and Rose. 
Milhaupt and Pistor 
This ‘represents the new and  more sociologically oriented, scholarship on legal 
transplants’.269 She argues further that ‘the nature of legal demand for the transplanted law 
and the process by which it is incorporated into the host country’s institutional structure 
are important for how the legal transplant will function in future’.270 She therefore argues 
that ‘they move even further than Kahn-Freund in their vision of what the result of legal 
transplantation is’. She also asserts that ‘these authors assumed that effectiveness of legal 
transplants will vary depending on how well the local interests adapt transplanted rules, 
norms, or institutions to local circumstances’.271 
Orucu 
Here, too, ‘the local interests are also important for Orucu. She suggested that the role of 
domestic actors in ‘tuning’ of the legal transplants after their transposition is the key for 
success together with other conditions, such as extensive similarities in structure, 
substance and culture. Her argument is distinct in the emphasis she placed on the 
importance of social action after the transposition’.272 Different from other scholars, Orucu 
appears to have ‘a more nuanced view on a so-called non-acceptance or rejection of legal 
transplants. She distinguished two kinds of possible mismatch between the recipient 
                                                        
 







system and legal transplants, a socio-cultural and a legal-cultural, which in turn produce a 
variety of ‘semi-acceptance’.273 
Cotterrell 
Cotterrell, similar to Orucu, legal scholarship in this area focuses ‘on actors and argues that 
legal transplantation is facilitated or deterred by action of particular ‘communities’ (ideal 
types): community based on affective ties; community based on common location, 
experience or traditions; community based on shared values and beliefs; and instrumental 
community.274 Therefore, ‘the influence of traditional community (the so called community 
based on common location, experience or traditions) on law should be at its strongest, 
when other types of community are least involved – ‘when beliefs, interests or emotions 
are not engaged, all that remains is the legal rule’.275 This clearly demonstrates that 
‘Cotterrell looked at the whole process of legal transplantation and not just the results of 
the transfer’.276 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh 
Dolowitz and Marsh, being ‘the proponents of the policy transfer approach, listed a number 
of possible sources that can produce restrictions or, on the contrary, facilitate the adoption 
of legal transplants. They identified past policies, which interact with existing and new 
policies, and structural and institutional conditions as conditions constraining the adoption 
of legal transplants’277. In varied ways, ‘similarities in ideology cultural proximity, 
availability of economic resources, bureaucracy were identified as conditions that increase 
a feasibility of the transplantation’. 278 She further asserts that ‘the identified conditions 
refer to the different phases of a broadly defined transplantation process and vary from 











‘the motives for engaging into policy transfer’ to ‘institutional and structural characteristics 
of the recipient country’.279 
Rose 
According to Kviatek Rose, who ‘introduced the lesson drawing approach, provided, 
probably, the most elaborated list of conditions that shape the legal transplantation 
process’.280 These conditions, according to Kviatek, ‘fall into three groups: transferability, 
adoptability, and applicability’.281 She therefore argues that ‘transplantation is easier, 
when: (1) policy programmes [legal transplants] are less context dependent, (2) 
organisations for service delivery in the recipient country are substitutable, (3) resources 
available to develop the programmes are similar in the recipient country and the country of 
origin, (4) ‘cause and effect structure’ of the programme [legal transplant] covers areas of 
interdependence between the transplant exporting and the transplant importing countries, 
(5) programme [legal transplant] is likely to produce a small change, (6) there is a 
consensual political culture’.282 Kviatek contends further that the ‘adoption of policy 
programmes [legal transplants] is easier, when: (1) there are no conflicts about the ends of 
the programme and the means used to achieve these ends, (2) there is mobilised support 
for the lesson to be drawn, but there is no opposition, (3) there are conditions under which 
political opposition to a lesson can change’.283 Finally, ‘six conditions increase the 
applicability of policy programmes [legal transplant]: (1) a clearly defined objective of the 
programme to be transplanted, (2) existence of a single goal of the programme to be 
transplanted, (3) the programme to be transplanted has a single design, (4) it is based on 
tested social, political, and technical knowledge, (5) there is flexibility in relating the 
elements of a programme to be transplanted, (6) political leaders are committed.284 
Hall 
                                                        
 









Hall, an advocate of social learning approach, distinguished two key conditions that, 
according to him, shape the learning outcome: (1) past experience and (2) policy-relevant 
knowledge. The latter is deeply influenced by the policy discourse, which is constructed out 
of a dialogue among different political and social actors – politicians, officials, the media, 
organised interests, and experts. p.110 
 
Does Otto Kahn-Freud include literature opposing his point of view?  
Kahn-Freud does include in his study literature opposing his point of view. This may be 
because his theory is a response to the legal theories put forward by Professors Watson 
and Legrand, whereby Kahn-Freud finds himself neither agreeing or disagreeing with 
theories of these Professors.  
Is the research data valid– i.e. based on a reliable method and accurate information?  
Kahn-Freud’s research data is primarily founded on academic theory and not much in 
terms of practical examples (i.e. by giving examples of laws or rules that have been 
accepted or rejected on being transplanted to a recipient country.  
Can one ‘deconstruct‘ Otto Kahn-Freud’s argument – identifying gaps or jumps in logic?  
Kahn-Freud’s theory is easy to deconstruct. However, unlike the theories of Professors 
Watson and Legrand, is a conservative theory, which avoids making any bold theory 
assertions. The theory recommends that legislation makers exercise caution before the 
decide to transplant a law or rule, in recognition of the fact that multiple variable (known 
and unknown) may cause transplanted legislation to fail to satisfy its intended purpose. 
What are the strengths and limitations of Otto Kahn-Freud ‘s theory?  
The strength of Kahn-Freud’s study is that it takes into account the role that end-users 
plays in the reception or rejection of laws or rules within any given society. His theory is 
limited because it is a centrist theory, prohibiting one from reaching any definitive 




Kahn-Freund’s theory may also, according to  Basil Bitas, be limited ‘to rules that are used 
within the commercial law  ‘that may lay somewhere on the periphery of a system 
involving the acquiescence of only a few key stakeholders in order to become effective to 
public or constitutional law which may require  broader acceptance from the public at large 
in order to take root in the soil of the recipient country’.285   
Oddly, Kahn-Freud’s theory is capable of standing on its own or serving as an extension of 
Legrand’s theory, as both theories promote the end-user as a determing factor of effective 
transplantation. 
A weakness of Kahn-Freud’s theory is that it does not indicate if the theory is: 
(a) applicable to private law; 
(b) applicable to public law; or 
(c) applicable to public and private law. 
Further, Kahn-Freud’s theory fails to indicate whether: 
1. there is a distinction between public law and private law; 
2. there is no distinction between public law and private law; or 
3. in either case, the extent the public law and private law debate serves to buttress 
or to undermine their respective legal transplant theories, if at all. 
It is therefore questionable as to whether or not the Legrand theory is a valid tool for 
determining whether a law or rule has been effectively transplanted, especially in the 
instance where public is the subject of examination.286  
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 What does Otto Kahn-Freud’s theory contribute to the current study?  
Kahn-Freud’s theory contributes to this study by way of its recognition that that a 
transplanted law or rule will always be liable to rejection by a recipient jurisdiction.  
2.5 Von Jhering’s theory 
The fourth legal theorist, on the subject of legal transplants by way of this thesis literature 
review is Rudolf von Jhering.  
The key point discussed by Rudolf von Jhering: is this clearly defined?  
Jhering’s assertion that to determine successful transplantation, the focus ought to be one 
of utility, is clearly defined. 
What indication has Jhering produced to support this central idea? 
Jhering, in support of his theory, has concluded:  
‘the reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of 
usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has 
one as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just 
because it didn’t grow in his back garden’. 
How convincing are the reasons given for Profesor Jhering’s point of view? 
Jhering’s, in light of the existence of the Kahn-Freud theory, is not overly convincing. This is 
because the Jhering theory does not consider the variable of unknow events and the 
possible impact that end-users can have on the succes or failure on the effective 
transplantation of a law or rule.  
Could such an indication be interpreted in other ways? 
The indication put forward by Jhering can be interpreted to mean that there are no other 
factors that need to be considered for the purposes of effectively transplanting a law or rule 
(i.e. the variable of unknow events and the possible impact that end-users can have on the 
succes or failure on the effective transplantation of a law or rule).  
What is Profesor Jhering’s theoretical framework?  
Jhering’s theoretical framework is developmental. By way of his assertion that to 




well (as a set of ctiteria to consider or to follow) to the development of laws or rules for 
countries, in particular developing countries. 
What is the relationship assumed by Profesor Jhering between theory and practice?  
Jhering assumes that the theory and practice associated with his theory reach the same 
conclusion, that to determine successful transplantation, the focus ought to be one of 
utility.  
Has Profesor Jhering critically evaluated the other literature in the field?  
Jhering has critically evaluated the literature in the field, particularly in answer to the 
literature written by Alan Watson. 
Does Jhering include literature opposing his point of view?  
Jhering has critically evaluated the literature in the field, in particular literature written in 
opposition to the literature written by Professors Alan Watson and Pierre Legrand, but 
holds firm to his assertion that to determine successful transplantation, the focus ought to 
be one of utility. 
Is the research data valid– i.e. based on a reliable method and accurate information?  
Jhering’s research, in so far as it offers an alternative to the hardened legal theories of 
Professors Watson and Legrand, is valid. However its validity is undermined by the 
existence of Legrand’s theory (which emphasis the need to take into acount a recipent 
country’s history, culture) and Kahn-Freud’s end-user variable.  
Can one ‘deconstruct‘ Jhering’s argument – identifying gaps or jumps in logic?  
It is possible to deconstruct Jhering’s argument. The fact that Jhering does not recognise 
that there are exceptions to his theory represents a gap and a jump in logic, to the exclusion 
of the Legrand and Kahn-Freud’s theories. 
What are the strengths and limitations of Jhering’s theory?  
The strength of Jhering’s theory is that it offers a variable for the makers of legislation to 
consider before they transplant a law or rule from another country. However its strength is 
limited by virtue of the existence of Legrand’s theory (which emphasis the need to take into 
acount a recipent country’s history, culture) and Kahn-Freud’s end-user theory. 




(a) applicbale to private law; 
(b) applicable to public law; or 
(c) applicable to public and private law. 
Further, Jhering’s theory fails to indicate whether: 
1. there is a distinction between public law and private law; 
2. there is no distinction between public law and private law; or 
3. in either case, the extent the public law and private law debate serves to buttress or to 
undermine their respective legal transplant theories, if at all. 
It is therefore questionable as to whether or not the Legrand theory is a valid tool for 
determining whether a law or rule has been effectively transplanted, especially in the 
instance where public is the subject of examination.287  
What does Jhering’s theory contribute to the current study?  
Jhering’s theory contributes to the current study by way of its strong emphasis on the 
variable of usefulness, thereby offering another option for consideration when deciding 
whether or not a law or rule ought to be transplanted. Jhering’s theory also acts as a means 
for testing the validity of the hypothesis of this study. 
2.6 Zweigert and Kotz’s theory 
The fifth legal theorist, on the subject of legal transplants by way of this thesis literature 
review are Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz.  
The key point discussed by Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz: is this clearly 
defined?  
                                                        
 





Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s ‘better solutions theory‘ is clearly defined. 
Like the Jhering theory, it is founded on the functional or functionality. Inherent in 
functionalist analysis are two primary elements: 
1. problem definition; and 
2. solution identification. 
What indications  have Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz produced to support this 
central idea? 
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, in support of his theory, have concluded that 
‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems’288 and, therefore, the 
objects for comparison (by way of the comparative method) should be diverse legal 
solutions to those societal problems.289 
Could such inications be interpreted in other ways? 
The indications put forward by Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz can be 
interpreted to mean that there are no other factors that need to be considered for the 
purposes of effectively transplanting a law or rule (i.e. Kahn-Freud’s variable of unknow 
events) and the possible impact that end-users/ history and culture can have on the succes 
or failure on the effective transplantation of a law or rule (i.e. based on Legrands variables 
of history and culture).  
What is Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s theoretical framework?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s theoretical framework is developmental. By 
way of their assertion that ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same 
problems’290 and, therefore, the objects for comparison (by way of the comparative 
method) should be diverse legal solutions to those societal problems,291 this lends itself 
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well (as a set of ctiteria to consider or to follow) to the development of laws or rules for 
countries, in particular developing countries. 
What is the relationship assumed by Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz between 
theory and practice?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz assume that the theory and practice associated 
with their theory reach the same conclusion, to determine successful transplantation, the 
focus ought to be one of identifying the problem to be solved and coming up with the best 
solution for solving the problem.  
Have Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz critically evaluated the other literature in 
the field?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz have critically evaluated the literature in the 
field, albeit in answer to the theories of Professors Alan Watson and Legrand. 
Have Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz included literature opposing their point of 
view?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz have critically evaluated the literature in the 
field, in particular literature written by Alan Watson, but holds firm to his assertion that 
‘the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems and, therefore, the 
objects for comparison (by way of the comparitive method) should be diverse legal 
solutiions to those societal problems determine successful transplantation, the focus ought 
to be one of utility’. 
Is the research data valid– i.e. based on a reliable method and accurate information?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz ‘s research data is not reliable. The first 
argument against the functionalist theory is from James Whitman, who is of the view that 
the reliability of this theory is doubtful because inherent in this theory is the dubious 
proposition that all societies view life as presenting the same social problems.292 Richard 
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Hyland, also finding the functionalist theory wanting, finds that the idea that the social 
issues the law is asked to resolve are so similar as to present a constant across legal 
systems is highly questionable.293  
Hill questions the basis on which comparative lawyers are qualified (or at any rate better 
qualified than lawyers whose studies are limited to their own countries) to make 
evaluations of different legal systems.294 He is of the view that functionalists believe that 
they can make such judgments because the method used is an objective one, but Hill argues 
that different legal solutions require value judgments, such as about fairness and justice 
and that functionalism cannot provide a basis for making judgments.295 
Can one ‘deconstruct‘ Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s argument – identifying 
gaps or jumps in logic?  
It is possible to deconstruct Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s argument. The 
fact that Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz do not recognise that there are 
exceptions to their theory represents a gap and a jump in logic.  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Kotz’s theory also fails to consider the concept of casual 
inference. This is founded on the proposition that: 
‘Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution, which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the 
country where it is proposed to adopt it’.296 
Whytock contends that the first question can only be answered ‘by having an 
understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified outcome in the country 
of origin’. And to answer the second question, he contends that ‘one must have some 
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understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal institution in a country that adopts 
it’.297  
As a legal theory, for use as a tool of legal reform, Whytock raises the caution that: 
‘…when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to attempting to 
establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars should be wary. 
Moreover, functionalist comparative legal scholarship would benefit from 
more methodological diversity than legal origins scholarship in its quest to 
take causality seriously. None of this is to suggest that all comparative legal 
scholars should ask causal questions or make causal claims about legal 
institutions; but when they do, they should be explicit about the process by 
which they make their causal inferences’.298 
What are the strengths and limitations of Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz ‘s 
theory?  
The strength of Professors Konrad Zweigert and Kotz’s theory is that it offers a variable for 
the makers of legislation to consider before they transplant a law or rule from another 
country. However its strength is limited by virtue of the fact that it does not warn of 
arguments that may negatively affect the practical application of Professors Konrad 
Zweigert and Kotz’s theory. 
The first argument against the functionalist theory is from James Whitman, who is of the 
view that the reliability of this theory is doubtful because inherent in this theory is the 
dubious proposition that all societies view life as presenting the same social problems.299 
Richard Hyland, also finding the functionalist theory wanting, finds that the idea that the 
social issues the law is asked to resolve are so similar as to present a constant across legal 
systems is highly questionable.300  
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Hill questions the basis on which comparative lawyers are qualified (or at any rate better 
qualified than lawyers whose studies are limited to their own countries) to make 
evaluations of different legal systems.301 He is of the view that functionalists believe that 
they can make such judgments because the method used is an objective one, but Hill argues 
that different legal solutions require value judgments, such as about fairness and justice 
and that functionalism cannot provide a basis for making these kinds of judgments.302 
There is also the issue of for whom a legal rule is functional. According to Christopher 
Whytock: 
‘Societies are not monolithic; they are composed of diverse individuals and 
groups. Thus it is difficult to speak of societal functions per se. Instead we 
must speak in terms of which individuals and groups define the intended 
consequences of a legal institution. Functionalism proposes neither an 
answer nor a general approach’.303 
Abrahamson cautions against using the functionalist theory because there is a tendency to 
assume that different societies face similar problems and a tendency to imply the ability to 
make objective claims about which legal solutions to those problems are superior.304 
Also absent from consideration by this theory is the casual inference theory. This is 
founded on the proposition that: 
‘Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution, which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the 
country where it is proposed to adopt it’.305 
Whytock contends that the first question can only be answered ‘by having an 
understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified outcome in the country 
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of origin’. And to answer the second question, he contends that ‘one must have some 
understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal institution in a country that adopts 
it’.306  
As a legal theory, for use as a tool of legal reform, Whytock raises the caution that: 
‘…when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to attempting to 
establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars should be wary. 
Moreover, functionalist comparative legal scholarship would benefit from 
more methodological diversity than legal origins scholarship in its quest to 
take causality seriously. None of this is to suggest that all comparative legal 
scholars should ask causal questions or make causal claims about legal 
institutions; but when they do, they should be explicit about the process by 
which they make their causal inferences’.307 
Absent from consideration by the theory of Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, is 
the variable of ‘laws in context’. Whytock suggests that of the functionalist theories that the 
‘laws context theory’ should be taken seriously. This is because, and as Tushnet has noted: 
‘Every society’s law is tied to so many aspects of that society, its particular history, its 
intellectual life, the institutional forms in which its activities are conducted, and many 
more, that no functionalist account can identify and take into account all the variables that 
might affect the degree to which participants in one system can learn from the experience 
of others’.308 
Another weakness of Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz ‘s theory is that it does not 
indicate if the theory is: 
(a) applicbale to private law; 
(b) applicable to public law; or 
(c) applicable to public and private law. 
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Further, Jhering’s theory fails to indicate whether: 
1. there is a distinction between public law and private law; 
2. there is no distinction between public law and private law; or 
3. in either case, the extent the public law and private law debate serves to buttress or to 
undermine their respective legal transplant theories, if at all. 
It is therefore questionable as to whether or not the Legrand theory is a valid tool for 
determining whether a law or rule has been effectively transplanted, especially in the 
instance where public is the subject of examination.309  
Further, according to Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, ‘comparative legal scholars should 
understand different countries’ laws as a means of finding solutions to similar social 
problems; the functional method.310 This assertion suggests that there is only one form of 
functionalism. This, according to Ralf Michaels, is not the case.  
According to Michaels, ‘one can distinguish at least seven different concepts of 
functionalism across disciplines: 
(1) finalism, a neo-Aristotelian functionalism based on inherent teleology, (2) 
adaptionism, an evolutionary functionalism in a Darwinian tradition, (3) 
classical (Durkheimian) functionalism, explaining institutions through their 
usefulness for society, (4) instrumentalism, a normative theory of using law 
for social engineering, (5) refined functionalism, a functionalist method that 
replaces certain postulates of classical functionalism with empirically 
testable hypotheses, (6) epistemological functionalism, an epistemology that 
focuses on functional relations rather than on the ontology of things, and (7) 
equivalence functionalism, building on these concepts but emphasizing the 
non-teleological, non-causal aspect of functional relations. Largely oblivious 
of incompatibilities, functionalist comparative law (8) uses all of these’.311 
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2.6.1  Finalism 
Underlying this was a teleological image of the world, in which everything strove toward 
perfection. ‘Is’ and ‘ought’ were connected: the correct laws could be deduced from the 
nature of things. Such thoughts were later rejected both in philosophy and in legal theory, 
before the crisis of legal positivism spurred a simultaneous return to Natural law and 
comparative law, and to Aristotelian ideals, in the twentieth century. Once it could be 
shown that not only problems but also their solutions were similar, a return to a minimal 
version of Natural law or at least ius gentium, based on an Aristotelian notion of function, 
seemed possible. To this end, the revived rhetorical tradition of topics could be made 
fruitful. Topics, taking the role of problems, did not spur universal solutions by themselves, 
but inspired similar analyses that might lead to similar results. Comparative law became 
phenomenological: Comparatists viewed the solutions in different legal systems as 
responses to common problems, contingent in their form but none the less required by the 
nature of the problem.312 
The most important theoretical treatise in this tradition and, at the same time, one of the 
most important works for functionalist comparative law is Josef Esser’s book on principles 
and rules in judicial law-making. Esser’s functionalism is richer and more sophisticated 
than the one developed later by Zweigert, but its central elements are strikingly similar: 
Institutions are contingent while problems are universal, the function can serve as tertium 
comparationis, different legal systems find similar solutions by different means, so 
universal principles of law can be found and formulated as a system with its own 
terminology. The reason for the similarity is that solutions are deemed inherent in 
problems and arguments can be made from the Natur der Sache (the thing’s nature); a 
commonality of values is both the basis for and the consequence of this. Another 
comparatist, more openly in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, is James 
Gordley. His general approach is more philosophical than Esser’s, but in effect quite similar: 
Gordley also sees different laws as different responses to the same, universal problems. 
Neo-Aristotelians postulate that comparative law can lead us to universal, common legal 
principles. Different laws provide answers to similar problems that are doctrinally 
(formally) different but substantively similar, and their relative similarity suggests 
                                                        
 




inherently correct solutions to these problems—a Natural law, a ius commune (Gordley), a 
ius gentium (Esser), or ‘universal legal principles’ (Troller).313  
Both Esser and Gordley call their approaches functional, and both have been influential in 
functionalist comparative law. But they use function in a very specific sense: For them it is 
synonymous with purpose and causa finalis. This is quite different from the modern notion 
of function as developed by Durkheim. Durkheim explicitly distinguished an institution’s 
functions from its cause and from its nature, rejected the Aristotelian fourfold concept of 
causa by confining ‘cause’ to causa efficiens, and replacing end or goal (causa finalis) with 
function. Since then, the function of a thing (or a law) is normally separated not only from 
the reasons for its origin and evolution, but also from its essence; functional relations are 
separate from the things themselves. Esser’s and Gordley’s functionalisms are different; 
they must be understood against the background of Aristotelian ontology and metaphysics 
and answer the criticisms brought forward against these.314 
2.6.2 Adaptionism 
This version of functionalism, which one may call adaptionism, seemed especially apt for 
comparative law. That field had hitherto consisted largely of comparative legal history, 
understood as the history and diffusion of ideas and doctrines. The new sociological 
interest in interrelations between law and society changed this focus. Now ideas about law 
were drawn neither from texts nor from the spirit of a particular people, but from general 
ideas about societies and their development. Consequently, generalisation across borders 
became possible; comparative law could become a science of the way in which societies 
dealt with similar problems on their paths toward progress. Central to this new approach 
was the focus on the functions that both law at large and its individual institutions fulfilled 
for society. An early example comes from Franz von Liszt, a supporter of a functional 
criminal law in the tradition of Beccaria (and a cousin to the famous composer). Liszt 
suggested that because punishment was necessary for maintenance of the legal order and 
because the legal order in turn was necessary for the maintenance and development of the 
state, criminal law norms had to be judged against their ability to maintain the legal 
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order.315 This function was useful for comparative law; it served as the tertium 
comparationis for the (functional) comparison of criminal law in different legal orders. 
Philipp Heck, the most important proponent of a jurisprudence of interests, also argued for 
functionalist comparative law: Similarities of values among societies created laws different 
in doctrine but similar in results. Also, Roscoe Pound, while not a strict functionalist 
himself, shared some of functionalism’s convictions. Pound was interested in ‘law in action, 
not law in the books’ and in ‘how the same things may be brought about, the same problem 
may be met by one legal institution or doctrine or precept in one body of law and by 
another, quite different institution or doctrine or precept in another’—both central 
elements of functionalist comparative law.316 
Adaptionism survives today in only a very reduced form. In political science it is used in 
some integration studies as an explanation of convergence, especially of the European 
Union.317 But the loss of teleology and awareness of the complexity of the world have made 
the simple 
functionalism of means and ends harder to justify both as an explanatory theory and as a 
guiding principle. Adaptionism seemed to suggest a false determinism.318 Evolutionary 
functionalism in political science has therefore been called ideological and ethnocentric, a 
criticism replicated in reference to comparative law.319  
2.6.3 Classical Functionalism  
Sociologists interested in a value-free sociological science perceived this as an illegitimate 
faith in progress and tried to develop a non-teleological functionalism instead. These 
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efforts can be traced back to Émile Durkheim, who introduced two important ideas. First, 
he separated functions from origins and established functions as relations between, not 
qualities of, elements. Second, he emphasised that the goals of individuals were contingent 
and therefore not the valid material of scientific endeavours; sociology as a science had to 
focus on objective functions.320 
Both steps had crucial implications. As long as the ends or goals of an institution had been 
its inherent elements, any explanation had to be teleological, and an analysis would have to 
focus either on the will of a transcendent creator or on the inherent nature of things. If 
institutions were defined by the purposes defined by their creators, a systematic analysis 
had to be impossible, for individual goals were hard to observe as well as arbitrary and 
contingent. The emphasis on objective functions on the other hand, distinct from both 
origin and purpose, allowed the search for general laws, the goal of all sciences. Still, 
Durkheim did think an institution’s existence and its function interrelated. On the one 
hand, causes often determine functions: An institution is established in order to maintain a 
certain status quo, and it then fulfils that function. On the other hand, functions often 
determine if not the origin then at least the persistence of institutions: Dysfunctional 
institutions cannot compete with more efficient institutions, societies with wasteful, 
dysfunctional institutions cannot survive.321 
Elements of Durkheim’s functionalism reappear in functionalist comparative law: the 
scientific character and objectivity of research, a perception of society as a whole that 
transcends the sum of its parts because its elements are interrelated, the idea that societies 
have needs, the idea that law can be understood in terms of the needs it meets, a focus on 
observable facts rather than individual ideas (law in action versus law in the books), the 
discovered similarity of institutions of different societies, and the competitive advantage of 
more functional institutions within one society’s law and of societies with better laws vis-á-
vis other societies. None the less, although Durkheim himself was a trained lawyer, his 
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functionalism had less immediate impact on comparative law than his concept of social 
facts. Saleilles followed Durkheim (and Weber) in maintaining that comparative law 
‘cherche à définir le type d’idéal tout relatif qui se dégage de la comparaison des 
législations, de leur fonctionnement et de leurs résultats’ and in emphasizing ‘l’unité des 
résultats dans la diversité des formes juridiques d’application’.322 But most comparatists in 
the Durkheimian tradition focused rather on a non-teleological comparative legal history 
than on functional analysis46 and opposed more functionalist versions of comparative 
law.323 
2.6.4 Instrumentalism 
One reason why comparatists lacked interest in Durkheimian sociology may have been that 
they did not share the social scientists’ fear of normativity. Instead, comparatists embraced 
an offspring of adaptionism that was popular in law: instrumentalism. If law fulfils 
functions and meets societal needs, then the lawyer’s job is to develop laws that perform 
these tasks (‘social engineering’), and comparative law can help compare the ability of 
different solutions to solve similar problems, and spur similar degrees of progress.324 
These ideas, which can be found already in Jhering’s work, became prevalent in legal 
realism. Realism made functionalism fashionable not only in academic writing but also for 
curriculum reform proposals. One strand of realism starts from the sociological concept of 
function, but then translates objective functions into purposes to be set by legislatures. 
These realists substitute teleological analysis for Durkheim’s objective science, and they 
assume that the effect of laws on society can be both measured and controlled. While 
American legal realists remained surprisingly uninterested in comparative law, European 
comparative law was influenced. Zweigert and Kötz put it bluntly: ‘Law is ‘social 
engineering’ and legal science is a social science. Comparative lawyers recognise this: it is, 
indeed, the intellectual and methodological starting point of their discipline’.325  
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Such ideas became especially attractive to the law and development movement, which 
hoped to use law in order to aid the economic progress of developing countries—a 
combination of the Darwinian faith in progress and teleology with the instrumentalist’s 
hope placed in law. Such ideas, out of fashion for some time,326 have recently been 
revitalised, specifically for former communist economies, generally in the World Bank’s 
‘Doing Business’ project.327 Yet they face problems.328 First, researchers frequently place 
naïve faith in both the mono-functionality and effectiveness of legal institutions. Second, 
they are often insufficiently aware of the non-legal elements of success or failure of 
societies, including cultural differences.329 
Experience in domestic contexts has shown that social engineering through law is far more 
complex than one thought; the insight still has to make its way into comparative law.330  
2.6.5 Refined Functionalism 
Developments in the social sciences also contributed to their disjunction from comparative 
law: sociological functionalism became more complex and thereby less useful for 
functionalist comparative law. The work of Radcliffe-Browne, Malinowski, and Parsons has 
had little direct response in comparative law, mostly because their interest in a theory of 
societal systems was not congruent with the search in comparative law for a method. But 
comparative lawyers have also ignored sociologists interested in functionalism as a 
method. In particular, Robert Merton’s seminal text on latent functions should have shown 
the problems of translating functionalism into comparative law.331 
First, Merton introduces the important distinction between manifest functions (functions 
intended and recognised by participants) and latent (unknown and unintended) 
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functions.332 Separating objective functions from subjective intentions has a pedagogical 
effect: it points researchers to the importance of latent functions, which yield more 
important insights precisely because they previously went unrecognised. Comparative 
lawyers are sometimes in accord when they focus on what the courts do in fact, as opposed 
to what they say they are doing. Yet when lawyers wish to use comparative law for social 
engineering, they forget that legislatures cannot know latent functions precisely because 
these functions are only latent. Social engineering presumes unrealistically simple relations 
between society and laws.  
A second contribution is Merton’s challenge to the postulate of functional unity of society—
the axiom, shared by Rabel and Zweigert, that societies are so integrated and 
interdependent that changing one element affects all others. In response, Merton suggests 
that different societies are integrated to different degrees and empirical tests are necessary 
to determine this degree.333  
Merton’s third challenge attacks the assumption that every element in society fulfils some 
vital function, ignoring non-functional or even dysfunctional institutions. Such institutions, 
so-called survivals, were known in both sociology and functionalist comparative law.334 But 
traditional sociologists and anthropologists, and likewise comparative lawyers, consider 
survivals to be unstable and only temporary. Merton in turn emphasizes that whether 
institutions are functional or not is a matter of empirical research,335 a point made 
forcefully in comparative law from an anti-functionalist perspective by Alan Watson.336  
Merton’s critique was powerful, while his constructive ‘paradigm for functional analysis in 
sociology’,337 was less successful. (This is similar to Felix Cohen’s article on legal 
functionalism,338 which contains, in its first part, a brilliant critique of conceptualism, while 
its second part, developing a constructive theory of values, is much weaker. Criticism of 
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sociological functionalism grew. Functionalism is criticized as intrinsically teleological and 
therefore unable to fulfil Durkheim’s own postulate of a value-free social science.339 Related 
to this is a criticism of implicit tautology and circularity, mirrored in comparative law:340 
The survival of societies is explained by the existence of institutions, while the existence of 
these institutions is explained in turn by the needs of society. For critics this means either 
that functional relations are no different from causal relations (and therefore dispensable 
as a separate category) or that teleology is reintroduced into sociology.341 Other critics go 
against the programme of functionalism. For them, emphasis on the stability of systems 
makes its proponents both politically conservative and methodologically incapable of 
explaining social change342—again, a criticism raised also against functionalist comparative 
law.343 And finally, and perhaps most importantly, sociological functionalism is considered 
unable to account for culture, in particular to explain practices that serve no function—
another critique also of comparative law.344 In general, Parsons’s ‘grand theory’ was 
considered too abstract and therefore often unable to predict all empirical findings,345 
again a concern shared in comparative law.346  
After these critiques, functionalism lost ground; a proclaimed ‘neofunctionalism’ has not 
been successful.347 Within sociology and especially social anthropology, functionalism 
made way for cultural and hermeneutic methods348—a ‘cultural turn’ reflected in legal 
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studies generally and comparative law specifically.349 At the same time, sociology as a 
discipline, not least due to the perceived lack of methodological sophistication, had to yield 
its once leading position within the social sciences to economics, again, a development 
replicated in comparative law.350 
Legal functionalism has faced similar challenges. Already before 1900, criticism abuses of 
functionalism by the Nazis351 made the concept unattractive in the post-war period. 
Instead, the paradigm for statutory interpretation and legal argumentation moved from a 
functionalist jurisprudence of interests to a jurisprudence of values, thereby substituting 
the legislator’s individual goals or a specific society’s values for objective functions and 
abolishing the universalist aims of functionalism which had made it attractive for 
comparative law. of the German Civil Code’s structure as non-functional remained unheard; 
later abuses of functionalism by the Nazis made the concept unattractive in the post-war 
period. Instead, the paradigm for statutory interpretation and legal argumentation moved 
from a functionalist jurisprudence of interests to a jurisprudence of values, thereby 
substituting the legislator’s individual goals or a specific society’s values for objective 
functions and abolishing the universalist aims of functionalism which had made it 
attractive for comparative law. 
2.6.6 Epistemological Functionalism 
All proponents of functionalism discussed so far stand before a dilemma. Either they must 
explain function as mere causality, or they have to insert some kind of teleology into their 
worldview, some ‘Natur der Sache’. A way out can be found in Ernst Cassirer’s functionalist 
epistemology. Cassirer posits that, since Kant suggested laws of nature as human 
constructs, there has been a seismic shift from a focus on substance to a focus on function, 
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from attempts to understand how things ‘really’ are (their substance, ontology) to 
understanding them only in their (functional) relation to particular viewpoints (their 
function, epistemology).352 No longer could classes of elements be defined simply by 
common traits, because such an abstraction would ignore the necessary relation between 
the element and the whole. Rather, individual elements had to be understood in relation to 
particular aspects, as different results to the same function. A series of elements a α1 β1, a 
α2 β2, a α3 β3 . . . cannot be understood merely by the common criterion a, but rather by 
the regularity in which its elements are brought about through the function a x y, in which 
the variable x defines all α, the variable y defines all β, and all these elements stand in a 
functional regularity so that it is possible to create new elements in the series. cannot be 
understood merely by the common criterion a, but rather by the regularity in which its 
elements are brought about through the function a x y, in which the variable x defines all α, 
the variable y defines all β, and all these elements stand in a functional regularity so that it 
is possible to create new elements in the series. 
This move has two decisive advantages. First, it is not necessary to recognise some essence 
of a particular element; it is sufficient to understand the element as variable result of a 
functional connection with another variable element. Individual numbers do not have an 
essence, but the totality of all numbers does.353 Functionalism need not declare the 
existence of any α or any β but only that if there is a certain α there will be a certain β. 
Second, it is possible to conceive of groups of elements and to describe them without the 
loss of specificity that comes with traditional classifications requiring abstraction.354 The 
function a x y describes all elements of the This move has two decisive advantages. First, it 
is not necessary to recognise some essence of a particular element; it is sufficient to 
understand the element as variable result of a functional connection with another variable 
element. Individual numbers do not have an essence, but the totality of all numbers does. 
Functionalism need not declare the existence of any α or any β but only that if there is a 
certain α there will be a certain β. Second, it is possible to conceive of groups of elements 
and to describe them without the loss of specificity that comes with traditional 
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classifications requiring abstraction.355 The function a x y describes all elements of the 
series completely, whereas a focus on the common element a as classificatory criterion 
would ignore both the differences between two elements a α1 β1 and a α2 β2 as well as the 
specific functional relation between a and y that creates the respective elements. 
Although Cassirer had no direct influence on functionalist comparative law,356 several 
parallels exist. First, functionalist comparative law is also interested not in some essence of 
legal institutions, but rather in their functional relation to particular problems. Second, 
functionalist comparative law also aims at avoiding the abstraction inherent in both 
conceptual comparisons and the macro-comparison of legal families, and instead focuses 
on a legal institution’s relation to the whole. Third, Cassirer’s emphasis on the totality of 
elements as opposed to individual elements is akin to Max Salomon’s attempt to define 
universal jurisprudence beyond individual national institutions. Cassirer’s concept of 
function, which he borrowed from mathematics, can work as a formalisation of functional 
equivalents in comparative law: If we define a as a particular problem, ‘x’ as the variable for 
legal systems α1, 2, 3 . . ., and ‘y’ as the variable for legal institutions β1, 2, 3 . . ., we can 
formalise the functional comparison of different legal institutions as a series, where, for 
example, a α1 β1 is French law’s (α1) response (β1) to problem a, a α2 β2 is German law’s 
(α2) response (β2) to the same problem a, and so on. This approach enables the 
comparatist to focus not only on the similarity between institutions (the common problem 
a and the institutions’ similar ability to respond to it) but also on the differences (between 
α1 and α2, and between β1 and β2, respectively), and furthermore allows her to explain 
these differences between institutions as a function (!) of the differences between legal 
systems. Such formalisation, while raising many problems (e.g. whether the social sciences 
reveal the same degree of regularity as do mathematics and the natural sciences), is a 
promising step towards more rational comparative law.357  
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2.6.7 Equivalence Functionalism 
The insight that different elements can respond to the same problem is crucial. Finalism, 
adaptionism, and classical functionalism all contain traces of determinism and teleology: if 
similar problems cause similar solutions, then the solutions must somehow be inherent in 
the problems, and similar functions must be fulfilled by the same kinds of institutions. 
Durkheim expressly rejected functional equivalence as finalist and proclaimed a 
remarkable similarity between institutions of different societies as responses to functional 
requirements. Goldschmidt’s otherwise original study of comparative functionalism in 
anthropology claimed that ‘certain social needs repeatedly call forth similar social 
institutions, that correlations between institutional forms can be found because, broadly 
speaking, they are the ‘natural’ or ‘preferred’ means by which certain necessary social tasks 
may best be performed in given circumstances’.358 Even Rabel marvelled at the finding of 
‘essentially related institutions and developments’359 be performed in given circumstances’. 
Even Rabel marvelled at the finding of ‘essentially related institutions and 
developments’.360 
Given how different institutions are in detail, such a view is hard to maintain except in very 
abstract analysis; the similar institutions must be ideal types. Comparative lawyers, with 
their focus on details and specificities, have long known this. They knew on the one hand 
that similar institutions can fulfil different functions in different societies or at different 
times, and they found, on the other hand, that similar functional needs can be fulfilled by 
different institutions, the idea of the functional equivalent. This idea, central to 
functionalist comparative law, appears in all kinds of functionalism: Max Salomon’s focus 
on problems as the unifying element of general jurisprudence enabled scholars to see 
different solutions as functionally equivalent;361 Josef Esser developed the concept for 
comparative law;362 and Konrad Zweigert made it the central point of his approach to 
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comparative law and an important tool in seeing universalities in what may look like 
differences.363 
Indeed, the recognition of functional equivalents gave a boost to the possibilities for 
comparative law. In particular, the comparison between common law and civil law has 
traditionally tempted functionalists, for two reasons: First, functionalist comparison 
overcomes the epistemic/doctrinal difference between civil and common law by declaring 
it functionally irrelevant. Second, the common law with its organic development should be 
particularly apt for functional understanding. Not surprisingly then, some of the most 
influential works applying the functional method have focused on institutions from the 
common law and their functional equivalents in the civil law, for example trusts364 and 
consideration.365 Some even found functionalism helpful for intersystemic comparison 
between socialist and capitalist legal systems.366 Yet equivalence functionalism in 
comparative law has always been explicated by examples rather than developed 
theoretically.367 Thus, it is not clear whether functional equivalence suggests some 
uniformity of values beyond the universality of problems. Likewise, the concept of a 
function suggests a comparatively naïve relation between the problem and the institution, 
either between cause and effect (so that the problem causes an institution to exist), or 
between purpose and use (so that a legal solution serves the purpose of solving a 
recognised problem). 368 
Here, comparative law could profit from sociological equivalence functionalism as 
developed especially by Niklas Luhmann (who in turn was influenced not only by Merton 
but also by Cassirer). Merton questioned the postulate of indispensability, according to 
which every element in a society is indispensable for the working of the system, and 
pointed out that even indispensable necessities can be met by different institutions that act 
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as functional substitutes or functional equivalents.369 Cassirer’s epistemology provided a 
formalised version of the argument. 
Functional equivalence means that similar problems may lead to different solutions; the 
solutions are similar only in their relation to the specific function under which they are 
regarded. Luhmann brings the two together to overcome a main problem of classical 
functionalism—the problem that functions either are nothing more than causal relations, 
or contain an element of teleology. Equivalence functionalism by contrast explains an 
institution as a possible but not necessary response to a problem, as one contingent 
solution amongst several possibilities. As a consequence, the specificity of a system in the 
presence of (certain) universal problems lies in its decision for one against all other 
(functionally equivalent) solutions.370 Legal developments are thus no longer necessary but 
only possible, not predetermined but contingent.371 This method in turn requires an 
understanding of society (and its subsystems, including law) as a system constituted by the 
relation of its elements, rather than set up by elements that are independent of each 
other.372 It does not avoid the criticism of tautology—institutions are still understood with 
regard to problems, and problems are understood as such by their relation to institutions. 
But because Luhmann’s functionalism is constructivist, he can use these tautologies as the 
means by which societies constitute themselves, by which they make sense of institutions.  
Luhmann emphasizes that ‘the functional method is ultimately a comparative one’373 and 
occasionally suggests the comparison of systems as a valuable project of verification, but 
does not, apart from a passing reference to Josef Esser,374 use this for comparative law. 
Functionalist comparative law in turn has rarely reacted to Luhmann’s method,375 despite 
the similar focus on functional equivalence. This is unfortunate. Of course, Luhmann’s 
systems theory has been criticized severely—as being indifferent to individuals, inherently 
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conservative (again), and as ignorant of the permeability of systems. Yet all these criticisms 
can also be launched against functionalist comparative law as it stands; they are not 
reasons against enriching current functionalism with Luhmann’s constructivism. rarely 
reacted to Luhmann’s method,376 despite the similar focus on functional equivalence.377 
This is unfortunate. Of course, Luhmann’s systems theory has been criticized severely—as 
being indifferent to individuals, inherently conservative (again), and as ignorant of the 
permeability of systems. Yet all these criticisms can also be launched against functionalist 
comparative law as it stands; they are not reasons against enriching current functionalism 
with Luhmann’s constructivism.378 
2.6.8 Functionalist Comparative Law: Synthesis 
It is necessary to affirm here that this thesis is not a comparative law thesis. However it is 
necessary to deal with the general concept of comparative law because Zweigert and Kotz 
are (like Watson, Legrand, Kahn-Freud) are comparative theorist. As such arguments about 
the functionalist comparative law have implications for their respective theories. The 
question to be raised here is: which of these concepts underlies the functional method of 
comparative law? According to Ralf Michaels, the answer is all of the above.379 His rationale 
is that all Comparative lawyers pick and choose different concepts, regardless of their 
incompatibility. There is still a strong faith that the similarities between different legal 
orders revealed by the functional method are neither the result of circular reasoning, nor 
mere indications of similar needs between societies, but proof of deeper universal values. 
While this suggests an Aristotelian background, elsewhere functionalists place themselves 
outside of legal philosophy and within legal sociology and emphasize objective needs over 
contingent values. In the concept of function itself, comparative lawyers borrow, if 
inadvertently, the antimetaphysical focus of epistemological functionalism as opposed to 
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an essential concept of legal institutions; they understand institutions through their 
relation to problems. But it is not clear whether this concept of function is teleological or 
not. Sometimes comparatists use functions in an openly teleological fashion, as a way 
towards progress reminiscent of adaptionism—when only legal systems at similar stages of 
evolution are deemed comparable,380 or when the development of the law is deemed 
important for the discovery of its function, a combination of cause and function that is 
anathema to Durkheim’s postulates. Sometimes comparatists focus on legal institutions as 
tools for the preservation of stability, something more akin to classical functionalism.381 
But then it is often unclear whether they include latent functions in their focus on what 
laws do in effect, or whether they confine themselves to manifest functions, as in 
instrumentalism and social engineering. And finally, the claim that ‘there will always 
remain . . . an area where only sound judgment, common sense, or even intuition can be of 
any help’382 has an irrational ring to it that would, it seems, altogether distance functional 
comparative law from the scientific aspirations of functionalism in all other disciplines.383 
In particular, the functionalism of sociology and that of law are different. First, sociologists 
and lawyers use different concepts of function.384 While sociological functionalism is 
interested in latent functions (and largely ignores the intention of lawmakers), lawyers 
focus precisely on manifest or even imagined as opposed to latent functions: The judge 
must interpret a statute according to the function intended by the legislator even if the 
statute is dysfunctional; the legislator can consider only manifest functions because by 
definition he does not know about latent functions.385 Sociologists could be said to take an 
external, and lawyers an internal point of view. 386 
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Second, the goals of functionalism in sociology and law are different. This is only partly due 
to the difference between normative and descriptive analytical goals—after all, a large part 
of the judge’s task is descriptive, too. Rather, sociologists use functionalism in order to raise 
complexity, so their picture of observed societal systems becomes more accurate than a 
mere listing of its elements. Lawyers, on the other hand, use functionalism to reduce 
complexity—they hope for functionality to tell them which of several alternative decisions 
they should take.387 The effects of judicial decisions are only partly the responsibility of 
judges;388 even legislators must take decisions in necessary partial ignorance of effects. 
Finally, sociologists and legal philosophers often focus on the differentiated functions of 
relatively broadly defined institutions, while comparative lawyers take the existence and 
functionality of law for granted and focus on very specific legal issues. 
Ralf Michaels argues that the clash between sociological and legal concepts of comparative 
law is sometimes observable—when Roscoe Pound’s sociological comparative law is 
criticized from the Durkheimian tradition as unsociological, when a lawyer rejects a 
questionnaire proposal by a sociologist as too unspecific and too oblivious of legal 
categories,389 or when Zweigert’s concept of functional comparative law is criticized by 
lawyers as not sufficiently legal and by sociologists as not sufficiently sociological.390 
Whereas sociological functionalism has been criticized as inherently conservative, legal 
functionalism and social engineering have been rejected as overly progressive and activist. 
Whereas sociological functionalism is rejected as tautological, legal functionalism is 
criticized for its open introduction of new values into legal arguments. A big 
interdisciplinary project at the Hamburg Max Planck Institute involving both sociologists 
and lawyers largely failed due to these incompatibilities; the interaction between sociology 
and comparative law has focused more on empirical sociology than on theory.391 
In consequence, Ralf Michaels asserts that one reason for the methodological mishmash in 
comparative law is that the founders of the functional method were more pragmatically 
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than methodologically interested. In suggesting, almost in passing, that the function of 
institutions has to stand at the centre of the comparative endeavour, Ernst Rabel did not 
develop an elaborate method from this insight. His approach was deliberately pragmatic 
rather than theoretical; he was not interested in expansive methodological debate,392 but in 
solving practical problems. Ascribing a ‘functional method’ to him was rather the work of 
his student Max Rheinstein, who introduced his thoughts to the United States.393 Josef Esser 
came closer to developing an elaborate functional method, but his influence did not extend 
to the details of the method, and few would have shared his philosophical foundations. 
Konrad Zweigert,394 despite the disdain for methodological debates uttered in his textbook, 
published quite extensively on methodological questions. Yet he was driven primarily by 
an interest in universalist humanism and in legal unification; the functional method was 
simply the best tool to reach these goals. 
Methodological eclecticism could be justified as pragmatism. But it has invited criticism, 
and functionalist comparatists react surprisingly defensively. One defensive strategy is to 
acknowledge the relevance of culture as an add-on for functionalist comparative law. Yet 
with no clear view of the relationship between culture and function, this must lead to an 
eclectic, internally inconsistent method. Another strategy, according to Ralf Michaels, is to 
postulate a ‘methodological pluralism’ in which functionalism is only one of several 
methods, and the comparatist picks whichever method seems most appropriate for a given 
purpose.395 Neither strategy seems promising unless the strengths and weaknesses of a 
more clearly functional method are recognised. If the functional method is deficient, it is 
not clear why a moderated version should be maintained; if it is not deficient, it is unclear 
why it should be moderated. Yet we cannot evaluate this as long as we lack a coherently 
formulated functional method, with a consistent concept of function. 










2.6.9 What does Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz’s theory contribute 
to the current study?  
Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz ‘s theory contributes to the current study by 
way of its strong emphasis on the variable of ‘better solutions’, thereby offering another 
option for consideration when deciding whether or not a law or rule ought to be 
transplanted. Professors Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz ‘s theory also acts as a means for 
testing the validity of the hypothesis of this study. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion reached by way of the literature review of the five legal theories (those of 
Alan Watson, Pierre Legra, Otto Kahn-Freud, Rudolf von Jering, Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kotz).is that it is possible to transplant a law or rule from one country to another. However 
it is recognised that there may be occassions when a law or rule cannot be transplanted for 
its intended purpose- leaving one to determine if the law or rule can be transplanted for 





Chapter 3. Law reform, transplantation and the main legal 
theories 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted 
to Bermuda, because effectiveness requires that it be crafted to take into account the 
perspectives of both donor and recipient. To test this, reliance will be placed on 4 theories 
which are set out and described in this chapter. These theories are often associated with 
transplantation of laws and the comparative method, both often used as tools to advance 
societies. Although this work will not be relying on the comparative method, it is still 
necessary to understand what is meant by law reform and the comparative method.  
3.1 Law Reform 
The transplantation of laws or rules is often used as a means to reform laws, but there is no 
single definition. This difficulty was recognised by Hurlburt396 in his study of law reform 
commissions. He noted that differing definitions cause not only semantic difficulty, but also 
misunderstanding. Lawyers, too, have added to this problem by imposing unnecessary 
limits on what is meant by law reform, assuming that it only relates to legislative law397 or 
is confined to fundamental recasting of the law and not to mere technical changes.398 On 
other occasions it has been suggested that ‘if there is no pre-existing law on a particular 
topic then it is arguable that one cannot logically have law reform’.399 
There has also been a tendency to describe law reform as being the work of law reform 
commissions, but ‘law reform is too important to be the exclusive prerogative of 
commissions assigned that name’.400 According to Diamond, ‘law reform’ means not merely 
change, but change for the better.401 
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3.1.1 The comparative method 
The comparative method can be used by reformers to create or reform laws or rules for the 
betterment of a society. According to Cohn, it can be subdivided into four subcategories. 
They are: 
 Inventive Comparison where the reformer tries to invent a solution within a 
vacuum, comparing potential solutions with the current situation;402 
 Internal Comparison where the reformer looks internally within their legal 
system where the problem may have already been resolved;403 
 Historical Comparison where the reformer examines solutions adopted by their 
legal system in the past; and404 
 Heureux plagiats where the reformer tries to determine how the problem has 
been solved in other jurisdictions, and the solution can simply be borrowed for 
their own legal system.405 
Bermuda settled on option 4 (‘heureux plagiats’), to bring about legislative reforms to solve 
its gang violence and most of its financial concerns. 
However, these methods and the comparative method as a whole should not always be the 
first or the final tool for bringing about law reform. As Cohn points out: 
‘It is of great importance to remember that the part that comparative 
jurisprudence can play in the solution of the task set to critical jurisprudence 
[i.e. law reform] should not be exaggerated. It is probably not right to say that 
comparative jurisprudence constitutes the last tool to which the critical jurist 
ought to resort. But if would certainly be wrong to consider it as the first or 
the most important tool….All that can claimed is that comparative law 
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furnishes a valuable alternative method…. It forms a valuable supplement to, 
but under no circumstances a substitute for, the other alternatives’.406 
Indeed, there are other forms or methods by which law reform can be achieved, such as: 
academic study, to get an understanding of the operation of law; judge made law; the 
unification and harmonisation of laws; treaties creating a common international standard 
by which countries are to operate; and international understanding.407 
3.1.2 The transplantation and reception of laws 
The transplantation of laws is achieved when a donor country shares the same problem as 
a recipient country, and the recipient (seeing that the donor has been more successful in 
finding solutions) simply borrows or transplants that solution for their own country’s 
purposes; the ‘heureux plagiats’. Laws are transplanted on an involuntary basis due to 
colonisation; or on a voluntary basis, due to respect for the recipient, to further the cause of 
unification or harmonisation of laws, to solve a problem shared by donor and recipient 
which the donor has successful addressed,408 or because a foreign solution is seen as 
having functioned effectively in practice.409 However, Kamba cautions against transplanting 
laws and argues that even if a law may look good on paper, it might be a disaster in 
practical application, such as the American experience with prohibition. He states that this 
experience should serve as a strong warning to any other country that was contemplating 
creating similar legislation. 
Although transplanting laws can be beneficial, there are dangers associated with it. This is 
because ‘error of law is probably more common in comparative law than in any other 
branch or legal study’410 and because it is difficult to discover ‘the exact state of the law of a 
country at any given moment’.411 Even if the person transplanting the law is able to gain 
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access to primary or secondary law sources, they may be out of date by the time they seek 
to rely on them.412 
Over time the combined use of Law Reform and Comparative Law has become fashionable 
or, as Tallon puts it, comparative law: 
‘…has become something of a bandwagon on which academics and 
practitioners alike scramble for seats, so much so that the older passengers 
may sometimes be surprised at the company in which they now travel’.413 
There are two specific dangers that arise when one adheres to this type of fashion 
adherence. The first arises when reform is adopted from abroad rather than from native 
origin or, in the case of misuse of the comparative method, it is used ‘merely as an artifice 
to enable foreign rules to be introduced surreptitiously into a national system of law’.414 
This has happened in some of Bermuda’s finance laws and Orders in Council. 
The second arises when there is a fashionable demand from the public or those thinking 
that they require the use of foreign rules, to find out what foreign jurisdictions are doing 
and using that to solve a problem. This is because there is a risk that a gap will be created 
‘between very extensive comparative research in connection with a legislative project and 
a practical result on the proposals made’.415  
3.1.3 Transplant bias 
Transplant bias, or preferring to borrow from some jurisdictions over others, tends to 
come about because a recipient has particular respect for a specific jurisdiction. To guard 
against this, Marsh gives the following advice: 
‘I think it important for law reformers who are tempted to adopt some law or 
institution of another society to ask themselves whether it is the 
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appropriateness of the law or institution to their own society which attracts 
them or whether it is in fact some broader-based approval of the foreign 
country which makes them look on the particular law or institution with 
favour’.416 
In contrast, Watson views such transplant bias in a positive light and uses the term 
transplant bias to denote: 
‘a system’s receptivity to a particular outside law, which is distinct from an 
acceptance based on a thorough examination of possible alternatives. Thus, it 
means for instance a system’s readiness to accept Roman law rules because 
they are Roman law rules, or French rules because they are French rules’.417 
Watson reasoned that existence of such bias will depend on: 
‘…such matters as linguistic tradition, the general prestige and accessibility 
of the possible donor, the training and experience of the local lawyers’.418 
However, as this thesis will show, such a simplistic approach is reckless, as it can result in 
laws or rules being transplanted without being naturalised for the recipients or recipients 
use.  
3.1.4 Fear of other legal systems 
The fear of other legal systems is something that often hinders law reform. It discourages 
the combined use of the comparative method and of law reform, with negative 
consequences. As Zweigert, et al. put it: 
‘the result is legal narcissism,419 insularity, provincialism and isolationism,420 
combined with a fear of foreign influences and a horror alieni juris’.421 
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Foreign legal systems are, therefore, valuable resources from which to get new ideas, as 
solutions to problems confronting the recipient within its jurisdiction.  
3.2 The five legal theories for testing the thesis and the emergence of 
‘history’ and ‘legal culture’ core variables  
In order to test the laws used in this thesis, four legal theories will used: 
 The Watson theory; 
 The Legrand theory; 
 The Kahn-Freud theory; 
 The Zhreing theory; and 
 The Zweigert and Kotz theory. 
3.2.1 The Watson theory, or the transferist theory 
The Watson Theory is a theory that agrees with the transplant theory (i.e. that it is possible 
to transplant a law or rule from one country to another). Specifically, the Watson theory 
(the preferred theory of this this thesis), or the transferist theory states that ‘…law is a 
somewhat autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural 
baggage’.422 Gatain defines transferists as those legal academics who support law makers in 
the copying of foreign rules.423 They believe that any law or rule can be transplanted from 
one country to another, without the need to naturalise it – that is to alter the law or rule to 
accommodate the characteristics of the new country. The foundation on which Watson 
asserts this theory is that the transplantation of laws has been the biggest source of legal 
change in the western world.424 For example, he observes that Roman law had been 
transplanted into most of the countries of Western Europe for centuries, and still forms the 
basis of those countries’ legal systems today. He asserts that change occurs within a legal 
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system as a result of borrowing, when a new rule is developed analogous to an old rule.425 
This is a historical approach used to interpret how laws are transplanted,426 but omits the 
practical reality that with transplanted law comes the history and culture of its place of 
origin. It also omits any acknowledgement that Roman law was imposed on conquered 
lands by the Roman Empire.427 
The Watson theory has its supporters. For example, Ewald argues that: 
‘the transplant bias of western legal systems is grounded in the nature of the 
legal profession [and that] lawyers (whether they act as legislators, judges, or 
scholars) constitute an elite law making group within society; into their 
hands has been entrusted the task of interpreting, preserving and developing 
the law’.428  
He also asserts that, on the basis of historical observation, it is possible to make some 
general comments on how lawyers achieved this end:  
‘As a group, lawyers exhibit certain but three distinctive characteristics: they 
are creatures of habit; they tend to view legal rules as ends in themselves; 
and in altering the law they seek either to play down the extent of change, or 
to borrow a rule from some foreign legal system that has great prestige and 
authority’.429  
Distilling from these three characteristics, he concludes that: 
‘Law is treated by the legal elite as existing in its own right; it is being in 
conformity with laws that make law [the] law. Hence, first, the means of 
creating law, the sources of law come to be regarded as a given, almost as 
something sacrosanct […] secondly, law has to be justified in its own terms; 
hence authority has to be sought and found. That authority (in some form, 
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which may be perverted) must already exist; hence law is typically backward 
looking. These two features make law inherently conservative’.430 
Unfortunately, both the Watson theory and Ewald’s arguments omit three key variables: 
the history of, and problems unique to, its place of origin; the culture associated with the 
place of origin; and the need of the new host to naturalise the law once it has been 
transplanted which, in effect, creates a new naturalised and transplanted law. These three 
variables are more apparent in the Legrand theory and the supporting theories of other 
legal academics. 
Although the main legal theories associated with the transplantation of laws can be roughly 
divided into groupings in favour and opposed to transplantation, the main two groups are 
able to agree on two things: 
 transplanted laws can serve as a major irritation which is capable of activating 
unwanted and unexpected events when a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic 
culture; and 
 a legal rule in one country, expressed using the same words in another country, 
may not be the same law in the other country. 
Effectiveness- to be determined by the rule of law's existence 
The rule of law, as read with the Watson theory, means that in order for a rule or law to be 
effective that it (the law or rule) must apply to all of the inhabitants of the country in which 
the law or rule has been transplanted. However, there is nothing within the Watson theory 
that appears to prohibit the rule of law from applying in such a case. Also, it would be 
difficult to determine effectiveness in isolation. The Watson theory and the matter off 
effectiveness would have to be applied to a specifc transplanted rule or law to determine 
the same.    
3.2.2 The Legrand theory or the culturalist theory 
The Legrand Theory or the culturalist theory, in contrast to the Watson Theory,  is opposed 
to the notion that a law or rule can be transplated from one country to another, Gatain 






defines the ‘culturalism’ as a more pessimistic stream represented mainly by Legrand who 
believes legal transplants are impossible.431 According to Legrand, ‘law is not an 
autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, epistemological or cultural baggage’.432 He 
further states that, in relation to the transplanting of laws: 
‘…there could only occur a meaningful legal transplant when both the 
propositional statement as such and its meaning…which jointly constitute 
the rule […] are transported from one culture to another. Given that the 
meaning invested into the rule itself is culture specific, it is difficult to 
conceive, however, how this could ever happen […] a crucial element of the 
ruleness of the rule […] its meaning […] does not survive the journey from 
one legal system to another […] thus the imported form of the words is 
inevitably ascribed a different, local meaning which makes it ipso facto a 
different rule. As the understanding of a rule changes, the meaning of the rule 
changes. And as the meaning of the rule changes, the rule itself changes’.433  
To understand the meaning of Legrand’s theory of what a law is not, one must examine his 
language in the context of the transplantation of laws and from a historical and a cultural 
perspective.434 
A consistent definition of law is crucial to this study because the four legal theories used, in 
various places, deem laws to mean one thing and in other places to mean another thing. For 
the purpose of this thesis a consensus definition is used, which is that law consists of 
institutional rules, doctrines and epistemologies.435 The ‘legal system’ refers either to the 
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common law system based primarily on the English legal system, or the civil law system 
based primarily on the Roman legal system.436 
According to the World Bank, the word ‘culture’ is: 
‘often a broad, catch-all term for an array of complex beliefs, symbols, and 
patterns of behaviour [...and] attempting to define it in a way that permits 
measurement will inevitably invite objection that the definition is faulty, that 
it doesn’t really capture culture, but only public opinion, religion, language, 
or whatever other element is used’.437  
A logical means by which it can be defined is by placing it in context. As the Legrand theory 
is based on a legal academic context, the most obvious context to place it is in that context, 
but defining legal culture is also problematic, as it too is too broad. There are three 
methods that can be used. 
The first is to use ‘very general categorical variables, such as religion, language, or ethnic 
background as a proxy for culture’. This method has the benefit of being very relatively 
clear and straightforward to conceptualise, but is ‘vulnerable’ to attack for ‘being crude and 
inaccurate’.438 The second is to use survey data on attitudes and beliefs.439 This method is 
more focused than the first, but it too is subject to criticism for being likely to ‘miss 
important nuances of legal culture, making inferences from aggregate opinion data without 
regard to other (undiscovered) factors’. The third is the ethnographic approach. This is 
achieved by ‘immersing [oneself] in a particular community and attempt to sort out 
particular signs, symbols, rituals, and practices’. This has the effect of helping to capture 
even more cultural detail, but it also creates more problems that require resolution. These 
are, that this type of data gathering: 
 is ‘time consuming, expensive, and difficult to understand and interpret; 
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 is unreliable because the ethnographer (i.e. the person collecting the data) tends 
to produce findings ‘that are often hard to verify or reproduce, even by another 
well trained ethnographer’. 
 is inherently problematic as, ‘even if a particular ethnographic account could be 
considered a valid and reliable source of cultural data, cross-country [...] 
comparisons may be difficult or impossible, precisely because sophisticated 
ethnographies can be so case specific’. 
As each method has its own shortcomings, and the obvious solution is to use a less 
problematic method, and one is available; it is to ask what effect the law has on culture. 
Winn argues that ‘evidence has been demonstrated [that] legal modernisation is of a 
marginal importance relative to traditional patterns of business behaviour’.440 Mattei 
expands on Winn’s argument, indicating that there is evidence ‘that the transplant of a 
foreign legal system tends to be less successful than practices that [have] developed 
indigenously [suggesting that] existing legal culture is resistant to simple reform’.441  
Overall, what can be gathered from the interplay between these 4 methods is that beliefs, 
assumptions, and practices understood as ‘cultural’ affect the operation of legal systems.442 
It is these beliefs, assumptions, and practices that will help to determine whether a law has 
been successfully transplanted to Bermuda.  
Legrand did not allow himself to become bogged down in trying to settle on a meaning of 
‘culture’ or even ‘legal culture’, as it can only be determined within a particular context. It is  
 
fEffectiveness- to be determined by the rule of law's existence 
The rule of law, as read with the Legrand theory, means that in order for a rule or law to be 
effective that it (the law or rule) must apply to all of the inhabitants of the country in which 
the law or rule has been transplanted. However, there is nothing within the Legrand theory 
that appears to prohibit the rule of law from applying in such a case. However the Legrand 
                                                        
 
440 Winn 1994.  
441 Mattei 1995. 




theory's emphasis on the need to take into account the recipient country's history and 
culture, before transplanting a law or rule, suggests that the theory is trying to make sure 
the rule of law  will apply to every person in the recipient country. Still, it would be difficult 
to determine effectiveness in isolation. The Legrand theory and the matter off effectiveness 
would have to be applied to a specifc transplanted rule or law- in order to determine 
effectiveness.. 
 
3.2.3 The Kahn-Freud theory 
The Kahn-Freud Theory supports the notion that a law or rule can be transplanted from 
from one country to another. However it does recognise that there will be times when, for 
various reasons, it may not be possible. The Kahn-Freud or ‘centrist’ theory concludes that 
a transplanted law or rule will always be liable to rejection by the recipient jurisdiction. He 
equates the act of transplanting a law or rule to the act of transplanting an organ from one 
human body to another. In particular he stated: 
‘legal transplants like surgical transplants have the risk of being rejected and 
that it is dangerous to transplant a law (or rule) that is culturally and vitally 
attached to a particular society because all jurisdictions have a unique and 
different social construction’.443 
He relies on the determinations of the legal scholar Montesquieu. In Montesquieu’s opinion 
it was only in the most exceptional cases that the institutions of one country could serve 
those of another at all. In words ‘which for more than two centuries have sounded a 
warning to all comparative lawyers’ Montesquieu said : 
 ‘ The political and civil laws of each nation. . . must be clean so the people for 
whom they are made, this is a great chance if those of one nation may agree 
to another’.444  
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According to Kahn-Freud, Montesquieu’s view of legislative transplantation was much 
closer to the organic than to the mechanical terminus of our continuum. This observation 
applied not only to the private law governing the relations between citizens, but also to 
public law covering constitutional, administrative and judicial arrangements.445 
Kahn-Freud explores whether the forces linked the law so closely to its environment that it 
could hardly ever change its habitat. He concludes that Montesquieu’s environmental 
criteria which determine the spirit of the law and permeate the whole work are to some 
extent geographical, determined by climate and the location of the country. Others are 
sociological and economic, such as the wealth of the people, their population density, and 
their trade. Kahn-Freud also identifies religion as a factor, and what Montesquieu refers to 
as ‘leurs inclinations, ... leur moeurs, ... leurs manitres’.446 
T.T. Arvind, a supporter of Kahn-Freud, uses the analogy of wine grapes by concluding that: 
‘even though a variety of wine grapes (seeds) are able to travel abroad and 
grow outside its native ground, the wine (produced) will always taste 
different and this scenario applies to transplanted law (and rules) as well’.447 
The Kahn-Freud theory, however, only focuses on end-use reception of transplanted laws 
as the location for finding matters that may affect transplantation. This is a logical inference 
to make as, logically, one would not generally attempt to transplant an organ from one 
human body to another if it did not work effectively in the donor.448  
As a theory, the Kahn-Freud theory does not offer a definitive benchmark of whether a law 
has effectively been transplanted. At best, it only allows one to infer the existence of a 
benchmark. These are:449 
(a) whether there was an active search, by the transplantor, for signs of 
possible rejection of the proposed transplanted law due to matters inherent 
to the place of origin of the transplanted rule or law;  










(b) whether there was an active search, by the transplantor, for signs of 
possible rejection of the proposed transplanted law due to matters inherent 
to the law’s place of reception; 
(c) in the event that that there was a foreseen risk of rejection, whether there 
was an attempt to weigh the degree of possible rejection versus the mischief 
the transplanted law was intended to cure; 
(d) whether there was a positive decision to ignore the possible existence of 
high probabilities of rejection of the transplanted rule or law due to an even 
higher demand by the people of the place of reception to find a way to cure 
the mischief at issue; and 
(e) whether there was a positive decision to accept the existence of high 
probabilities of rejection of the transplanted rule or law due to an even 
higher demand by the people of the place of reception to find a way to cure 
the mischief at issue. 
The answers to these questions seek to determine whether a law has been transplanted 
effectively. 
fEffectiveness- to be determined by the rule of law's existence 
The rule of law, as read with the Kahn-Freud theory, means that in order for a rule or law to 
be effective that it (the law or rule) must apply to all of the inhabitants of the country in 
which the law or rule has been transplanted. There is, however, nothing within the Kahn-
Freud theory that appears to prohibit the rule of law from taking root in the recipient 
country. The Kahn-Freud theory's emphasis on recognising that there may be instances 
where (for various and including unkown reasons) a law or rule is not capable of being 
transplanted, is perhaps a means of ensuring the transplanted rule of law will apply to all of 
the recipient countries inhabitants. 
 
3.2.4 The Jhering theory  
The Jhering Theory is one where instead of focusing on whether or not a law or rule can be 
transplanted (like the Watson and Legrand Theories) from one country to another, to focus 
instead on whether or not the law or rule can be transplanted for some useful purpose. The 
Jhering theory states that to determine successful transplantation, the focus ought to be 
one of utility. According to him:  
‘the reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of 




one as good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine just 
because it didn’t grow in his back garden’.450 
Jhering theory seeks to determine if the transplanted law can work for the intended 
purpose. However, this begs a further question: when one determines the intended 
purpose, is one to include or to exclude the end-users, and if so, which end-user. 
Effectiveness- to be determined by the rule of law's existence 
The rule of law, as read with the Jhering theory, means that in order for a rule or law to be 
effective that it (the law or rule) must apply to all of the inhabitants of the country in which 
the law or rule has been transplanted. There is, however, nothing within the Jhering theory 
that appears to prohibit the rule of law from taking root in the recipient country. The 
Jhering theory's emphasis on trying to determine if the transplanted law can work for the 
intended purpose, is perhaps a means of trying to ensure the transplanted rule or law will 
apply to all of the recipient countries inhabitants. 
 
3.2.5 The Zweigert and Kotz theory 
The Zweigert and Kotz theory, or ‘better solutions theory’ is, like the Jhering theory, 
founded on functionality. This is to say that ‘the legal system of every society faces 
essentially the same problems’451 and, therefore, the objects for comparison (by way of the 
comparative method) should be diverse legal solutions to those societal problems.452 
Inherent in functionalist analysis are two primary elements: problem definition; and 
solution identification. According to Zweigert and Kotz, this means that only rules which 
perform the same function and address the same real problems can profitably be 
compared, causing functionality to be: 
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‘…the basic methodological principle of all comparative law….From this basic 
principle stem all other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, 
the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparison and so 
on’.453  
From this principle is derived applied comparative law,454 allowing functionalism to 
provide advice on legal policy by suggesting how a specific problem can be solved under 
given social and economic circumstances.455 In using comparative law, Zweigert and Kotz 
see comparative law as a means by which to discover models for preventing or resolving 
social conflicts, and: 
‘providing a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science 
devoted to a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world 
can offer a greater variety of solutions than could be thought up in a lifetime 
by even the most imaginative jurist who was corralled’.456 
The first argument against the functionalist theory is from James Whitman, who is of the 
view that the reliability of this theory is doubtful because inherent in this theory is the 
dubious proposition that all societies view life as presenting the same social problems.457 
Richard Hyland, also finding the functionalist theory wanting, finds that the idea that the 
social issues the law is asked to resolve are so similar as to present a constant across legal 
systems is highly questionable.458  
Hill questions the basis on which comparative lawyers are qualified (or at any rate better 
qualified than lawyers whose studies are limited to their own countries) to make 
evaluations of different legal systems.459 He is of the view that functionalists believe that 
they can make such judgments because the method used is an objective one, but Hill argues 
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that different legal solutions require value judgments, such as about fairness and justice 
and that functionalism cannot provide a basis for making these kinds of judgments.460 
There is also the issue of for whom a legal rule is functional. According to Christopher 
Whytock: 
‘Societies are not monolithic; they are composed of diverse individuals and 
groups. Thus it is difficult to speak of societal functions per se. Instead we 
must speak in terms of which individuals and groups define the intended 
consequences of a legal institution. Functionalism proposes neither an 
answer nor a general approach’.461 
Abrahamson cautions against using the functionalist theory because there is a tendency to 
assume that different societies face similar problems and a tendency to imply the ability to 
make objective claims about which legal solutions to those problems are superior.462  
3.2.5.1 Casual inference 
Also linked to the Zweigert and Kotz functionalist theory, is the casual inference theory. 
This is founded on the proposition that: 
‘Whenever it is proposed to adopt a foreign solution, which is said to be 
superior, two questions must be asked: first, whether it has proved 
satisfactory in its country of origin, and secondly, whether it will work in the 
country where it is proposed to adopt it’.463 
Whytock contends that the first question can only be answered ‘by having an 
understanding of the actual effects of a legal solution on a specified outcome in the country 
of origin’. And to answer the second question, he contends that ‘one must have some 
understanding of the likely effects of a similar legal institution in a country that adopts 
it’.464  
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As a legal theory, for use as a tool of legal reform, Whytock raises the caution that: 
‘…when legal origins scholarship drifts from testing to attempting to 
establish causal claims, comparative legal scholars should be wary. 
Moreover, functionalist comparative legal scholarship would benefit from 
more methodological diversity than legal origins scholarship in its quest to 
take causality seriously. None of this is to suggest that all comparative legal 
scholars should ask causal questions or make causal claims about legal 
institutions; but when they do, they should be explicit about the process by 
which they make their causal inferences’.465 
Finally, Whytock suggests that of the functionalist theories that the ‘laws context theory’ 
should be taken seriously. This is because, and as Tushnet has noted: 
‘Every society’s law is tied to so many aspects of that society, its particular 
history, its intellectual life, the institutional forms in which its activities are 
conducted, and many more, that no functionalist account can identify and 
take into account all the variables that might affect the degree to which 
participants in one system can learn from the experience of others’.466 
 
Effectiveness- to be determined by the rule of law's existence 
The rule of law, as read with the Zweigert and Kotz theory, means that in order for a rule or 
law to be effective that it (the law or rule) must apply to all of the inhabitants of the country 
in which the law or rule has been transplanted. There is, however, nothing within the 
Zweigert and Kotz theory that appears to prohibit the rule of law from taking root in the 
recipient country. The Zweigert and Kotz theory's emphasis on trying to identify the 
problem that needs fixing and then finding a solution to fix that problem (to be obtaine 
from a contry that is facing the same problem, is perhaps a means of trying to ensure the 
transplanted rule or law will apply to all of the recipient countries inhabitants. Still, this 
cannot be determined in isolation. This theory would have to be applied to a specific case 
study, in order to determine effectiveness. 
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Chapter 4. Transplantation of criminal rules to Bermuda and 
their effectiveness 
This chapter examines the validity of the four legal theories at issue, by applying them to 
criminal law in Bermuda: 
(a) Section 315F of the Criminal Code Act 1907 (‘s 315F’); and  
(b) Section 29A of the Firearms Act 1973 (‘s 29A’). 
4.1 Section 315F: ‘Stop and Search’ 
Section 315F is the transplanted version of the UK’s s 60 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Its aim 
is the suppression of violent crime. The section, along with a number of other pre-made 
legislative provisions,467 was transplanted to Bermuda in 2008 to give the Bermuda Police 
Service a tool to halt unlawful gang activity involving the use of guns and the resultant but 
previously unheard of broad daylight murders of rival gang members. In the 40 years to 
2008, there were only 5 fatal shootings in Bermuda468 but between 2008 and 2011, the gun 
murder rate rose to around one or two every month.469 This sudden spike was, according 
to one Bermudian MP, Bermuda’s version of terrorism, as the ongoing gun murders served 
to place the inhabitants of Bermuda in a state of terror.470 It is therefore understandable 
that, with this history and culture of very low levels of gun crime, Bermudian law makers 
would want to find the tools to stem this spike in gun violence.471 
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4.1.1 Section 315F and the Watson theory 
Section 315F was, indeed, transplanted from the UK to Bermuda. However, the Watson 
theory ignores the need to make a law work once it has been transplanted.  
4.1.2 Section 315F and the Legrand theory 
Bermuda, contrary to the Legrand theory, did not naturalise s 315F. This is because the 
same problems that presented themselves in the UK also presented themselves in 
Bermuda, in that the rule was applied or at least affected visible ethnic groups.472 This 
resulted in a number of leading cases which came before the European Court of Human 
Rights, in particular, Gillan and Quinton v UK in which it was held that that the section was 
incompatible with the UK’s obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Court went on to list factors necessary to ensure compliance. 
In the case of Bermuda, ‘stop and search’ has had very similar negative outcomes to those 
that resulted in England and Wales. Public outcry from members of the predominate black 
community, particularly young black men, indicates that a negative consequence of s 
315F’s enactment is that the black male community feels targeted by the police and are 
being disenfranchised from Bermuda society as a whole, as the enactment has resulted in a 
whole racial segment of Bermudian society becoming criminalised. This is not surprising 
as, according to statistics released by the Bermuda Commissioner of Police on the 21 
February 2012, in the year ending 31st December 2011, the Bermudian Police conducted 
17,429 searches, an increase of 82% compared to 2010. 
The ultimate end-users, in particular the young black male population of Bermuda, found 
themselves targets of the Bermudian Police in the application of s 315F. During an 
interview with a senior police officer of the Bermuda Police Service, he acknowledged that 
the specific intent of s 315F, the suppression of violence, had not been achieved. He 
concluded that the majority of searches under s 315F resulted in arrests for non-violent 
offences such as the possession of small amounts of marijuana, unpaid fines, and 
outstanding warrants of arrest, with the majority the people stopped and searched being 
                                                        
 




young black males. No firearms were seized as a result of s 315Fs transplantation to 
Bermuda from the UK. 
Of course the reason the majority of people stopped were young black males is because the 
majority of the people committing the gun crimes were young black males. However, it is 
evident that, with Bermuda having an approximately 60% black population, the application 
of an un-naturalised s 315F would result in racial friction between the Bermudan Police 
Service and Bermuda’s young black male population, adding further to the historical 
friction between them,473 which was first highlighted in The Report of the Royal 
Commission into the 1977 Disturbances (The Pitt Report). 
According to the Legrand theory, s 315F has not worked and thus has not been effectively 
transplanted into Bermuda’s statute book. 
4.1.3 Section 315F and the Kahn-Freud theory 
The Kahn-Freud theory focuses on end-use reception of transplanted laws and rules as the 
location for finding matters that may affect effective transplantation by applying 
benchmarking (see Section 2.3).  
Unfortunately during the period 2008 to 2012 (the time period the author of this study 
used randomly select Bermuda laws and rules for examination), no legal mechanisms were 
available which could determine what factors the Bermudian government considered in 
determining whether or not they should transplant section 315F into Bermuda’s statute 
book.474  
4.1.4 Section 315F and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories, 
The ‘usefulness’ variable 
The combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories, relying on the utility variable and 
not as simplistic as the Watson theory, serve as an alternative to the Legrand theory 
                                                        
 
473 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disorders of 1968 (‘the Wooding Report’), paragraph 
35. 
474 The Public Access to Information Act 2010 did not come into operation until 2014. Had this Act been in 





because the Legrand and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories, have, at 
their core, a need to determine whether the law has worked once it has been transplanted. 
Although the intended purpose of s 315F was to allow the Bermudian Police Service to 
seize firearms, and none were seized, it did disrupt intended gun use by forcing gang 
members to constantly seek other means to move unlawful firearms around Bermuda by, 
for example, giving the weapons to younger children or to women who were less likely to 
be stopped.475 This helped to reduce the high levels of gun crime. So s 315F worked by 
‘disrupting’ the use of unlawful firearms in Bermuda, the combined Zhreing and Zweigert 
and Kotz theories ‘usefulness’ variable is satisfied and thus s 315F has been successfully 
transplanted to Bermuda. This also casts doubt on the validity of the Legrand theory as 
being preferred in determining if a law has been effectively transplanted. 
4.1.4.1 Interim conclusion- s. 315F 
The hypothesis of this thesis, in relation to s. 315F, has been proven. This has been 
achieved by determining whether this rule was capable of being transplanted from the UK 
to Bermuda unconditionally. The Legrand and the the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and 
Kotz theories, two of the theories used to determine whether this rule can be transplanted 
unconditionally, serve to indicate that this rule was incapable of being transplanted to 
Bermuda uncondtionally. Again, the effectiveness of transplanted legislation requires 
crafting the same and taking into account the perspectives of the government or 
governments (i.e. in the present case the UK and Bermuda Governments) that caused the 
legislation to be transplanted, and the people who affected by it. 
4.2 Section 29A warrant for detention without charge 
Section 29A of Bermuda’s Firearms Act 1973, inserted by the Firearms Amendment Act 
2010, is another rule that was transplanted from the UK. It is Bermuda’s version of the UK’s 
s 41 and schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Section 29A (like s 315F), was enacted to 
arrest the spike in gun crime in Bermuda.476 In the UK, s 41 has proven to be very 
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controversial, primarily because of the debate concerning the period of detention and 
because its intended purpose, the pre-charge detention and subsequent charge of terrorist 
suspects (excluding Northern Ireland), has historically proven to have been ineffective.477  
 
4.2.1 Section 29A and the Watson theory 
The Watson theory concludes that any rule or law can be transplanted from one 
jurisdiction to another, and that no other variables need be considered in determining if a 
law has been effectively transplanted, and s 29A was indeed transplanted.  
4.2.2 Section 29A and the Legrand theory 
The Legrand theory requires naturalisation of the transplanted law, and Bermuda did 
naturalise s 29A. Bermuda had the same concerns as the UK concerning the 28 day period 
of pre-charge detention.478 In order to mitigate this concern, the Bermudian legislature 
ensured that s 29A was subject to a ‘sunset clause’.479  
In Bermuda, ‘stop and search’ has had very similar negative outcomes to those that 
resulted in England and Wales and culminated in Gillan and Quinton v UK.  
 
4.2.3 Section 29A and the Kahn-Freud theory 
It was not possible to assess whether this law was effectively transplanted under the Kahn-
Freud theory, as the necessary information was not available at the time of writing (see 
Section 4.1.3).  
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4.2.4 Section 29A and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories, The 
‘usefulness’ variable 
The intended purpose of s 29A was to give law enforcement time to gather evidence that 
would lead to the charge of an accused person, and that purpose has, according to a Senior 
Prosecutor and a Senior Bermuda Police Officer, been achieved. Both the Deputy Director 
of Public Prosecutions480 and the Bermuda Police Superintendent481 agree that s 29A is 
draconian, but that draconian measures are necessary to counter gun crime. The Deputy 
Director also pointed out that, because of the draconian nature of s 29A, applications made 
to the Supreme Court for the provision’s use are only made when its deemed necessary, 
and with the oversight of a Supreme Court Judge,482 otherwise senior prosecutors rely on 
other less draconian provisions within Bermuda’s statute book. Judicial oversight acts to 
ensure that the state conforms with key democratic values such as freedom and fairness, 
even in trying times.  
Section 29A has been useful in that it has helped to reduce gun crime. According to the 
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, there were at least two instances where gun 
related violence was either averted, or the offenders were arrested immediately after the 
event. In each case the offenders were prosecuted and sentenced to lengthy prison 
sentences. As s 29A has been useful in bringing about the charge and successful 
prosecution of these people, the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories 
‘usefulness’ requirement is satisfied. 
 
 
.    
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4.2.4.1 Interim conclusion- s. 29A 
The hypothesis of this thesis, in relation to s. 29A here, too, has been proven. This has been 
achieved by determining whether this rule was capable of being transplanted from the UK 
to Bermuda unconditionally. The Legrand and the the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and 
Kotz theories, two of the theories used to determine whether this rule can be transplanted 
unconditionally, serve to indicate that this rule was incapable of being transplanted to 
Bermuda uncondtionally. Again, the effectiveness of transplanted legislation requires 
crafting the same and taking into account the perspectives of the government or 
governments (i.e. in the present case the UK and Bermuda Governments) that caused the 
legislation to be transplanted, and the people who affected by it. 
4.3 Section 70JA and 70JB 'Unlawful Gangs' 
Sections 70JA and 70JB were transplanted from Canada, where in its previous guise it was 
known as s. 467 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985, to Bermuda by the Government of 
Bermuda in 2012. Of note, the transplantation of s. 467 to Bermuda from Canada serves to 
demonstrate that Bermuda transplants its rules from countries other than from just the UK. 
Like the other criminal rules examined under this chapter the enactment of ss. 70JA and 
70JB, by the Bermuda Government, was done as means of trying to bring a halt to the 
unlawful gang murders that were plaguing Bermuda.  
4.3.1 Unlawful gang laws in Canada 
S. 467 of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985 was crafted by the Canadian Government 
originally as a means of following its international obligations under the Article 10(2) of 
the Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. It was subsequently used by the 
Provincial Police of the Canadian Province of Quebec as a means of dealing a deemed 
menace of biker gangs in the province. In Canada as a whole, s. 467 was immediately 
recognised as being far reaching and broad in application. In a speech to the Standing 
Committee on Human Rights and Justice, in 2007, Mr. Randall Richmond, the Deputy Chief 
Prosecutor of Quebec’s Department of Justice, said: 
‘The results obtained demonstrate that it is possible to prove gangsterism, but one should 
not conclude that it is easy to do so. On the contrary, it can be arduous. In almost all of the 
cases where we have charged gangsterism, this came after lengthy investigations of 12 to 
14 months, during which wiretapping and physical surveillance were carried out and 
prosecutors were involved as legal advisors during the investigations’. 
From this it became clear that it was going to be difficult to determine what is gangsterism 




Canadian criminal cases were tried, using s. 467 for the purpose of prosecuting criminal 
gangs. The most crucial constitutional law protection variable, quickly identified as being 
under threat, and in quick need for determination, was that of ‘freedom of association’. In 
order to determine if the legal concept of freedom of association was being destroyed, by 
the use of s. 467, the definition of 'criminal organisation' had to be determined but in the 
context of preserving the constitutional right of ‘freedom of association’. By way of two 
legal authorities, Canadian Courts determined that the use and definition of ‘criminal 
organisation was not unconstitutional and thus legally sound.483 However the true test for 
determining whether or not the definition of ‘criminal organisation’ was unconstitutional 
came by way of the Canadian criminal case of Re Lindsay and Bonner v The Queen484 where 
the court affirmed that the definition of ‘criminal organisation’ was not unconstitutional 
but went on conclude that in order to determine whether or not an organisation was a 
criminal organtisation, one had to determine the same on a case by case basis.485 In doing 
so, the court was making the decision that the application of s. 467 the would be ever 
evolving and that its constitutional validity would be only determined at the time of trial. 
4.3.2 Sections 70JA and 70JB and the Watson theory 
According to the Watson theory any rule or law can be transplanted from one jurisdiction 
to another, inferring that it is a simple process and that nothing is needed in order to 
ensure that the transplanted rule or law has been transplanted effectively. It is indeed 
correct that ss. 70JA and 70JB were transplanted from Canada to Bermuda. Watson's 
theory, however, simplistically overlooks the need to ensure that once the sections have 
been transplanted to every effort is made to ensure that they work. 
4.3.3 Sections 70JA and 70JB and the Legrand theory 
The Legrand theory, in recognition of the fact that the transplantation of a law or rule is not 
a simple process, highlights the fact that a transplanted rule or law can only be effectively 
transplanted in cases where there is a recognition of the parent country and recipient 
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country's history and culture and an understanding of each other's legal systems. Doing so 
adds to the 'naturalising process' for transplanting the rule, thereby making sure that the 
same fits effectively within the recipient jurisdiction's legal system. As with the 
transplantation of any rule, doing so results in the creation of a new rule. Bermuda, in 
adherence to the Legrand theory, did naturalise ss. 70JA and 70JB. This was done by: 
(a) changing the definition of 'criminal organisation' to 'unlawful gang' as Bermuda 
was concerned about gangs and not organised crime; 
(b) adding a 'sunset clause' in recognition of the fact that prior to the advent of the 
unlawful gang murders Bermuda, in the case of gun murders, had been historically a 
peaceful place prior to 2008. Doing so was also in recognition of the fact that the 
Government hoped the unlawful gang murders would come to an end; 
(c) policy input was obtained from Bermuda's Judiciary, Bermuda Prosecutors, and 
the Bermuda Police Service.486  
Accordingly, the three criteria were met in that the same were implemented before ss. 70JA 
and 70JB were enacted. In doing so, the Bermuda unlawful gang provisions affirm the 
Legrand Theory (i.e. that once transplanted, legislation cannot operate effectively unless it 
is naturalised, taking into account the history, culture, etc, of is place of origin versus the 
history, culture, etc of the end user). 
4.3.4 Sections 70JA and 70JB and the Kahn-Freud theory 
Here, too, the Kahn-Freud theory focuses on end-use reception of transplanted laws and 
rules as the source for finding out whether or not there has been effective transplantation 
of ss. 70JA and 70JB.  
During the period 2008 to 2012 (the time period the author of this study used randomly 
select Bermuda laws and rules for examination) ss. 70JA and 70JB, although enacted by the 
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Bermuda Government, have not been relied upon by Bermuda prosecutor for the purposes 
of prosecuting unlawful gang related offences. During an interview with the Deputy 
Director of Public Prosecutions Ms. Cindy Clarke, she indicated that because of the several 
and difficult ingredients that would have to be proven by way of ss. 70JA and 70JB, her 
prosecutors prefer to rely on the old and simpler reliable provisions (within the Bermuda 
Criminal Code 1907) such those dealing with aiding and abetting or joint enterprise. 
4.3.5 Sections 70JA and 70JB and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert & Kotz 
theories, The 'usefulness' variable 
The purpose behind the enactment of ss. 70JA and 70JA was to give the Bermuda Police 
Service and Bermuda Prosecutors an additional tool for the arrest and prosecution of 
unlawful gang offences. Moreover, the enactment of ss. 70JA and 70JB was also used to 
demonstrate to the Bermuda public that the Bermuda Government was at least trying to do 
something to put an end to the unlawful gang crimes. However, according to the Deputy 
Director of Public Prosecutions, ss. 70JA and 70JB have not been used by Bermuda 
prosecutors- preferring to rely on easier to establish offences, found within the Bermuda 
statute book, such as aiding and abetting and the offence of conspiracy. Still, since ss. 70JA 
and 70JB have been useful in demonstrating to the people of Bermuda that their enactment 
is proof that the Bermuda Government is doing something to try and put a halt to the 
unlawful gang offences, the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories ‘usefulness’ 
requirement is satisfied. 
4.3.5.1 Interim conclusion- s. 70JA and 70JB 
The hypothesis of this thesis, in relation to ss. 70JA and 70JB have been proven. This has 
been achieved by determining whether this rule was capable of being transplanted from 
the UK to Bermuda unconditionally. The Legrand and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert 
and Kotz theories, two of the theories used to determine whether this rule can be 
transplanted unconditionally, serve to indicate that this rule was incapable of being 
transplanted to Bermuda unconditionally. Again, the effectiveness of transplanted 
legislation requires crafting the same and considering the perspectives of the government 
or governments (i.e. in the present case Canada and the Bermuda Governments) that 




Effectiveness and the rule of law 
Effectiveness could  not be determined under any of the legal theories in this section. This 
is because  sections 70JA and 70JB have yet to be used the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in Bermuda.487 
CHAPTER FOUR CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS 
1. Factually, ss. 29A, 70JA, 70JB and 315F were, as determined by way of the case studies, 
transplanted to Bermuda by Bermuda (as indicated by way of the interviews with the 
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and the Bermuda Police Service Superintendant for 
Intelligence and  as indicated by way of its existence within Bermuda's staute book) . 
2. Theoretically, ss. 29A, 70JA, 70JB and 315F were, as determined by way of the case 
studies, either:  
a. transplanted  (in accord with  the Watson and Kahn-Freund theories); 
b. not transplanted (in accord with the Legrand theory); 
c. capable of being transplanted if ss. 29A, 70JA, 70JB and 315F  could be used for the 
intended purpose (as determined by Bermuda or the people of Bermuda as end users) or 
for an alternative purpose (in accord with the Jhreing, Kahn-Freund. Zweigert & Kotz 
theories). 
3. Effectiveness, in the case of ss. 29A, 70JA, 70JB and 315F  and ultimately determined by 
the existence of the rule of law.  has been determined not to have been met because these 
rules were applied in an arbitrary manner by the Bermuda Government as end user (albeit 
it was never the intent of the Bermuda Government to apply or deploy these two rules to 
all of the inhabitants of Bermuda). 
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Chapter 5. Transplantation of financial rules to Bermuda and 
their effectiveness 
This chapter seeks to discuss and to test the validity of the four legal theories at issue, by 
applying them to the regime between Bermuda and members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other countries, and the 1986 Tax 
Convention between Bermuda and the US. 
5.1 Background 
From the late 1960s Bermuda began to develop two pillars to its economy; tourism and 
international business. Until the mid-1980s, the tourism industry remained Bermuda’s 
main source of income, and then international business began to overtake the tourism 
industry as Bermuda’s dominant source of income. Bermuda is now ‘the second biggest re-
insurance market in the world, with $15 million in activity running through Bermuda [and] 
the second biggest insurer in the world’. He stated that the ‘tax issue has always been an 
issue’ and that there were ‘threats of blacklisting’ arising from the global ‘Insolvency II’ 
project and the TEIAs.488 Like other offshore jurisdictions, Bermuda has become known as 
a tax haven.489 
5.2 TEIAs: the OECD, France, and the threat of blacklisting 
Since 2008 the OECD has been encouraged purported tax havens such as Bermuda to enter 
into TEIA with other countries, primarily those that are members of the OECD. The 
Agreements came into being with the mixed goals of going after people seeking to hide 
money generally, and those seeking to fund terrorism.490 The argument for doing so, 
according to the OECD, is that the more of these agreements a purported tax haven enters 
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into, the more transparent the purported tax haven is in relation to its offshore business 
sector.  
In the case of Bermuda, the recption of  these Agreements is ongoing, although the goals 
have been substantially achieved.491 This is the case even though the force of Agreements 
that have been found to be ‘one sided’,492 akin to ‘a poisoned bond’ and leaving Bermuda 
‘no choice’ but to sign them.493 Of the OECD member countries, France has been the most 
aggressive in its efforts to force Bermuda to sign a TEIA,494 threatening to brand Bermuda 
as a tax haven. 
5.2.1 Tax havens  
According to the OECD, a tax haven can determined by a number of factors, such as: 
1. no or nominal tax on the relevant income; 
2. lack of effective exchange of information; 
3. lack of transparency; or 
4. no substantial activities. 
However the OECD has determined that no or nominal tax alone is not sufficient to classify 
a country as a tax haven.495 This means that there is no definitive definition. The US has 
argued that a country with a low tax rate or one below 20% is a ‘potential’ tax haven,496 and 
one US Senator stated that: 
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‘tax havens are countries that allow corporations, trusts and other businesses 
to be established within their territory on the condition that any business 
they conduct is only with people who are offshore, meaning with people who 
are not citizens or domestic businesses operating inside the country. He 
indicated further that offshore tax havens charge hefty fees for establishing 
and maintaining an offshore business. The offshore businesses are often shell 
operations, established by attorneys, trust companies or banks within the 
offshore jurisdiction, and operate under corporate secrecy laws that make it 
difficult to learn the true owner of a business. The offshore businesses also 
usually open accounts at banks licensed by the offshore jurisdiction and 
conduct financial transactions under bank secrecy laws that make it difficult 
to trace transactions or identify bank account owners’.  
He concludes that: 
‘the money deposited in these banks is usually held in correspondent bank 
accounts that the banks have opened at larger banks in the United States or 
other countries. Many of the offshore corporations and trusts serve as mere 
place holders for individuals who want to hide their identity and their 
activities’.497  
The US Senate has over the years singled out a number countries as tax havens. However 
there is an apparent bias, within the US, in favour of purported onshore tax havens (or at 
least a desire to ignore the existence of onshore tax havens), even though onshore and 
offshore tax havens can be used for the same purposes. It is very common for offshore tax 
havens to be linked to the activities initiated by onshore tax havens.498  
The Canadian government has its own definition of a tax haven: 
1. no tax, or very low rates of taxation; 
2. strict bank secrecy provisions; 
3. a lack of transparency in the operation of its tax system; and 
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4. a lack of effective exchange of information with other countries.499 
5.2.2 The effect of labelling a jurisdiction as a tax haven 
Labelling a country a tax haven has international and legal ramifications as it allows other 
jurisdictions to levy sanctions, individually or collectively, against the tax haven 
jurisdiction, especially if the levying of sanctions is contingent on the definition of tax 
haven being applied.500  
There are currently several negative outcomes of allowing tax havens to exist. The obvious 
one is that large sums of money belonging to nationals of other countries are not accessible 
to their tax authorities, and are sent to offshore tax havens by often complicated or 
intricate systems known as ‘corporate inversion’501 where a company first incorporated in 
a high tax jurisdiction subsequently re-incorporates overseas in a low, or no, tax 
jurisdiction, thereby reducing its tax burden. The corporate governance obligations of these 
low tax jurisdictions, also tend to be far less or less rigid and convoluted than in a 
jurisdiction with high taxes, and they use subsidiary banks of large global banks located in 
low tax jurisdictions, to help these companies or high net worth clients retain huge sums of 
money. 
Many of the large global banks have subsidiaries with private wealth management 
activities in Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands, and it is estimated that about a third of 
global offshore wealth is in Switzerland; 20% in Jersey, Guernsey, and Ireland; 20% in the 
Caribbean and the US; 15% in Luxembourg; and 10% in Singapore and Hong Kong.502 
One way to deal with the negative outcomes of tax havens is to bring about global tax 
harmonisation. Doing so would have challenges, in that a jurisdiction or an economic bloc, 
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such as NAFTA or the EU, may lose the ability to effectively compete in the global markets. 
This possibility has not gone un-noted by the US or the OECD. 
5.2.3 TEIAs and the Watson theory 
The Watson theory concludes that any rule or law can be transplanted from one 
jurisdiction to another, and this includes TEIAs. 
5.2.4 TEIAs and the Legrand theory 
Bermuda, according to the Legrand theory, did attempt to naturalise the TEIAs by enacting 
the International Cooperation (TEIA) Act 2005 (‘TEIA Act’), to give effect to the TEIA 
regime.  
Unfortunately the Act was problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it clashes with Bermuda’s 
laws on judicial review and the right of an aggrieved person to appeal the decision of a 
government minister. Bermuda, like many jurisdictions that follow the common law 
tradition codifies the legal construct of judicial review which allows an aggrieved person or 
person likely to be affected by a pending decision of the Government to challenge the act or 
pending action. This includes a Minister of Finance’s intrusive but lawful request for 
information on behalf of an OECD Country or a country that is a member of the TEIA 
regime. The ‘Bunge Ltd’ case was, for example, one of the first to challenge a Minister of 
Finance’s request for information, in this case for the purposes of giving effect to a Tax 
Exchange Information Agreement entered into between Bermuda and Argentina.503 Judicial 
Review, as a legal concept, appears to be foreign to some civil law jurisdictions.504  
Secondly, the provisions of the TEIA Act strike at the heart of the rules of natural justice, 
namely a person’s or company’s right to know of the allegations that have been made 
against them, a right that is enshrined in Bermuda’s Constitution.505 A possible outcome of 
handing information over to a TEIA country is the loss of property in the form of fines or 
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sanctions, or criminal prosecution for offending the TEIA country’s laws. The concept of 
natural justice and the resulting ‘right to know’ caused France to see this as a reluctance on 
Bermuda’s part to assist it, in contravention of Bermuda’s TEIA with France, causing them 
to temporarily place Bermuda on its list of blacklisted countries..506 
For these reasons, and because there is nothing barring an OECD country (such as France) 
from unilaterally placing Bermuda on its own blacklist, it cannot be said that the TEIAs 
have been naturalised. The mere fact that Bermuda can be blacklisted even though it: 
a. has entered into multiple TEIAs with the majority of the OECD membership 
(creating windows through which to look into Bermuda’s international business 
sector); 
b. has entered into a specific TEIA generally with non-OECD countries; and 
c. it wishes to ensure that people aggrieved by the receipt of a directive to hand over 
information, albeit in accordance with a TEIA, have the right to recourse to 
Bermuda’s own legal system (one based on the long established English Common 
Law which has enshrined in it the rules of natural justice… ‘a fair trial’), 
imposes a disproportionate burden on the people of Bermuda, bearing in mind that 
Bermuda does not have any sources of income other than its tourism, finance and re-
insurance sectors, and this clearly smacks of agreements entered into under duress. Such 
an act also smacks of bullying of smaller states by bigger states. This is especially so in light 
of the fact that a number of the OECD countries such as the US, the UK (in particular the 
City of London), Denmark, Iceland, Israel and Portugal’s all exhibit traits of or fall within 
the various definitions of tax havens. The US also exhibits a number of tax haven traits, 
namely: 
a. a lack of reporting requirements; 
b. a failure to tax interest;  
c. exempted passive income that is paid to foreign entities; 
d. limited liability incorporation which allows a flexible corporate vehicle not to be 
subject to taxation; and 
                                                        
 




e. in the case of incorporating within certain US states or territories, such as in 
Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico, low levels of taxation to act as lures 
for incorporation.507  
There has been no obvious effort by the OECD or the United Nations to address this form of 
international bullying and inequality, made worst because a number of the tax havens’ sole 
or primary source of income is (like Bermuda) international business. This is in stark 
contrast to OECD Countries, such as the US and France, which have vast amounts of natural 
resources on which to generate sources of income for their respective countries. This form 
of international bullying and forced international inequality begs the following question: 
Can one see the OECD countries, as a whole, referring to the US as a tax haven and thus 
liable to blacklisting by the OECD as a whole, or even by France and the other OECD 
countries independently? The current state of geopolitics serves to indicate that such an act 
is very unlikely to happen.508 
Accordingly, the TEIAs have failed to be naturalised in Bermuda due to the inequality of 
bargaining power between the OECD and Bermuda and, therefore, have failed to meet the 
threshold standard necessary to satisfy the Legrand theory.  
5.2.5 TEIAs and the Kahn-Freud theory 
It was not possible to assess whether TEIAs have been effectively been transplanted under 
the Kahn-Freud theory, as the necessary information was not available at the time of 
writing (see Section 4.1.3).  
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5.2.6 The Legrand theory and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz 
theories 
Efforts have been made by Bermuda to bring about greater transparency by entering into a 
large number of TEIAs with member states of the OECD. Although greater transparency has 
been achieved, the fact that doing so failed to stop a member of the OECD (France) from 
placing it on a blacklist of tax havens indicates that the regime cannot be said to have been 
useful for Bermuda. This in turn means that Bermuda’s TEIAs have failed to satisfy the 
‘usefulness’ variable which is at the core of the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz 
theories. At best, TEIAs have been useful for members of the OECD only, allowing them to 
probe into Bermuda’s finance and re-insurance sectors. 
5.3 Bermuda and 1986 US Tax Treaty 1986 
On behalf of Bermuda, in 1986, the UK signed a tax treaty (‘the Treaty’) with the US. This 
had the effect of making the Treaty a part of Bermuda's separate legal order or separate 
legal system in the form of the USA, Bermuda Tax Convention Act 1986 (which transformed 
the Treaty into an enactment of Bermuda's statute laws or rules. The Treaty and the 1986 
Act also, collectively, acted as the means by which the Treaty was tranplanted into 
Bermuda's statue book. 
The Treaty concerned the taxation of insurance enterprises and mutual insurance tax 
matters,509 wherein the US would grant Bermuda a waiver of insurance excise tax, the 
effect of which was to do away with double taxation on income generated by insurance 
companies doing business with Bermuda.510 Fortunately for Bermuda but not for the US, 
this resulted in zero tax for insurance companies doing business with Bermuda. In other 
words the affected insurance businesses paid no taxes within the US (due to a ‘tax 
loophole’) or in Bermuda, as Bermuda does not charge income tax on income earned.511 
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The primary intent of the Treaty was that the US’s wished to bring about a sense of fairness 
between Bermuda and Barbados within the international insurance industry.512 They were 
also of the view that granting such assistance to Bermuda would further diplomatic 
relations between Bermuda and the US513 during the Cold War, especially in relation to the 
existence of the two naval bases in Bermuda.514 
At the conclusion of the Cold War, and the resulting closure the bases, the tax loophole was 
closed.515 One would have assumed that the closing of the tax loophole would have silenced 
those who had been branding Bermuda as a tax haven. This was not to be the case as, with 
the advent of the twenty-first century, the repeated branding of Bermuda as a tax haven 
(especially by the OECD) dramatically intensified.  
5.3.1 The Treaty and the Watson theory 
The Watson theory concludes that any rule or law can be transplanted from one 
jurisdiction to another, with the inference being made that no other variable or variables 
need be considered when trying to determine if a law has been effectively transplanted. 
The 1986 Bermuda and USA Tax Treaty was, indeed, transplanted from the US and 
originated from a diplomatic good will gesture on the part of the US toward Bermuda. By 
affirming that it was transplanted from the US to Bermuda, this serves as another example 
of where one can conclude that the Watson theory is a valid theory. On the contrary the 
Watson theory is proven, once again, to be false in relation to 1986 Bermuda and USA Tax 
Treaty by virtue of: 
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(a) the fact that the 1986 Treaty had to be naturalised by Bermuda which was achieved 
by way of the USA, Bermuda Tax Convention Act 1986 (enacted to give effect to the 
1986 Treaty); and 
(b) the existence of the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories. This is 
because the Watson theory does not have, at its core, a demanding desire to ensure 
a law works once it has been transplanted. 
5.3.2 The Treaty and the Legrand theory 
The Legrand theory concludes that a rule or law can only be ‘effectively’ transplanted when 
there is a recognition of the parent and recipient jurisdiction’s history and culture, and an 
understanding of its legal systems. Bermuda did naturalise the 1986 Treaty by enacting the 
USA, Bermuda Tax Convention Act 1986, thereby taking into account Bermuda’s desire to 
compete effectively for insurance business with Barbados.  
However the original ‘shelf life’ of the 1986 Treaty, (1986 to 1998, or the date of inception 
until the US overriding Cold War contingent concerns ended with it the need to have two 
naval bases in Bermuda), suggests that the Legrand theory may have a flaw which suggests 
that the Legrand theory only applies to laws or rules that are not subject contingent events. 
5.3.3 The Treaty and the Kahn-Freud theory 
It was not possible to assess whether this treaty was effectively been transplanted under 
the Kahn-Freud theory, as the necessary information was not available at the time of 
writing (see Section 4.1.3).  
5.3.4 The Bermuda and US Tax Treaty of 1986: The Dichotomy of the combined 
Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories 
The intended purpose of the 1986 Treaty was to give Bermuda an ability to compete with 
Barbados for American insurance business. This purpose was achieved, thereby providing 
some ‘usefulness’ for the US and for Bermuda. This concept of ‘contingent usefulness’ is not 
a measure of certainty by which one can determine if this theory has been satisfied. At best, 
the 1986 Treaty can only be said to satisfy the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz 
theory’s ‘usefulness’ variable. 
5.3.4.1 Interim conclusion- The Bermuda and US Tax Treaty of 1986 
The hypothesis of this thesis, in relation to the Beermuda and US Tax Treaty of 1986 has 
been proven. This has been achieved by determining whether this rule was capable of 
being transplanted from the OECD to Bermuda unconditionally. The Legrand and the the 




thesis to determine whether this rule and law could be transplanted unconditionally, serve 
to indicate that this rule was incapable of being transplanted to Bermuda uncondtionally. 
Again, the effectiveness of transplanted legislation requires crafting the same and taking 
into account the perspectives of the government or governments (i.e. in the present case 
Canada and the Bermuda Governments) that caused the legislation to be transplanted, and 
the people who affected by it. Bermuda was able to achieve some usefulness from the 1986 
Treaty, satisfying the ‘usefulness’ variable which is at the core of the combined Zhreing and 
Zweigert and Kotz theories. Like the Legrand theory, there appears to be a lacuna in the 
combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories. The 1986 Treaty only remained useful 
until the end of the Cold War. 
CHAPTER FIVE CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS 
1. Factually, the 1986 US Tax Treaty was, as determined by way of the case studies, 
transplanted to Bermuda by the US, UK and Bermuda (as indicated by way of its existence 
within Bermuda's staute book). 
2. Theoretically, the 1986 US Tax Treaty  was, as determined by way of the case studies,  to 
be either :  
a. transplanted  (in accord with  the Watson and Kahn-Freund theories); 
b. not transplanted (in accord with the Legrand theory); 
c. capable of being transplanted if 1986 US Tax Treaty could be used for the intended 
purpose (as determined by Bermuda or the people of Bermuda as end users) or for 
alternative purpose (in accord with Jhreing, Kahn-Freund. Zweigert & Kotz theories). 
3. Effectiveness, in the case of the 1986 US Tax Treaty was and ultimately determined by 
the existence of the rule of law.  has been determined to have been met because this rule 
was applied to all of the people of Bermuda and not in an arbitrary manner by the Bermuda 
Government as primary end user; AND 
4. Factually, the TEIA's were, as determined by way of the case studies, transplanted to 
Bermuda by the US, UK and Bermuda (as indicated by way of its existence within 
Bermuda's staute book). 
5. Theoretically, the TEIA's were, as determined by way of the case studies,  to be either :  
a. transplanted  (in accord with  the Watson and Kahn-Freund theories); 




c. capable of being transplanted if the TEIA's could be used for the intended purpose (as 
determined by Bermuda or the people of Bermuda as end users) or for alternative purpose 
(in accord with Jhreing, Kahn-Freund. Zweigert & Kotz theories). 
6. Effectiveness, in the case of the TEIA's were and ultimately determined by the existence 
of the rule of law.  has been determined to have been met because this rule was applied to 
all of the people of Bermuda and not in an arbitrary manner by the Bermuda Government 





Chapter 6. Transplantation of Orders in Council to Bermuda 
and their Effectiveness 
This chapter seeks to discuss and to test the validity of the four legal theories at issue, by 
applying them to the Ottawa Treaty, the Landmines Act 1998, and the Landmines Act 1998 
(Overseas Territories) Order 2001 (the rules) and to determine if these rules collectivel 
satisfy the rule of law- that they are not arbitrary.. 
6.1 Orders in Council  
Orders in Council are used by the UK, from time to time, to make rules for Bermuda and the 
other Overseas Territories, most notably for the purpose of extending or transplanting the 
UK’s United Nations treaty obligations to Bermuda (see Chapter 1).516 
The rationale for Orders in Council is when there is a common purpose, and the Bermudian 
and UK governments agree that there is a common need to extend a specific legal 
obligation via an Order in Council. However the constitutional law relationship can cause 
friction, as there are times when the interests of the UK are not the same as those of 
Bermuda. The conflict of interest may be apparent prior to the extension of an Order in 
Council, or only afterwards. To avoid such conflicts, the UK Government tends to consult 
the Bermudian Government prior to the extension of an Order in Council, but there is 
nothing in law that mandates consultation or consent. Indeed the likelihood of conflicting 
purposes and this lack of a need for an agreed mandate was noted in the Privy Council 
authority of Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke and George,517 where Lord Hoffmann held: 
‘Her Majesty in Council is therefore entitled to legislate for a colony in the 
interests of the UK. No doubt she is also required to take into account the 
interests of the colony (in the absence of any previous case of judicial review 
or prerogative colonial legislation, there is of course no authority on the 
point) but there seems to me no doubt that in the event of a conflict of 
interest, she is entitled, on the advice of Her UK Ministers, to prefer the 
interest of the UK’. 
                                                        
 
516 See: Ian Hendry and Susan Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law, Hart Publishing Ltd. 2011, 22.  




6.2 Orders in Council and the Ottawa Treaty 
The Ottawa Treaty bans the use of antipersonnel landmines.518 It was chosen as an example 
in this thesis for three reasons. First, it is a seemingly non-contentious example of where 
there is a recognised common need to uphold humanitarian law by agreeing to banning the 
use of landmines. Second, it is an example of where no realistic or practical consideration 
was made of the un-naturalised provisions of the parent Treaty (specifically paragraph 1 
(e)), and third, because it is an example where of Bermuda and the UK did not foresee some 
unintended consequences. 
6.2.1 The negative implications of extending the Ottawa Treaty to Bermuda 
The negative implications of the extension of the Ottawa Treaty519 to Bermuda using the 
legislative tool of an Order in Council arise from the fact that the US, a major military 
superpower, and a key trading partner of Bermuda, has not signed the Ottawa Treaty and 
continues to use and stockpile large numbers of landmines around the world, principally in 
demilitarised zone located between North and South Korea, although it has said it will be 
bound by the Treaty’s terms. 
Although there is a global acknowledgement that landmines represent a lingering threat to 
civilian populations, there is a desire amongst some countries to retain them as defensive 
weapons. Indeed, the conflicting interest between humanitarian benefit and defensive 
military benefit has been a subject of concern for several US Presidents. The Ottawa Treaty 
has been ratified by 133 countries, including Bermuda. However Article 1(e) of the Ottawa 
Treaty is a provision that has caused military planners in the US continued concern, and 
should do likewise for both the UK and the Bermudian Governments. This is because the 
wording of Article 1(e) is ambiguous and open to interpretation, and may very well lead to 
unintended difficulty if a US flagged ship or aircraft carrying land mines entered Barbadian 
territory. Bermuda would be obligated under Article 1(e) to seize and destroy the 
landmines under the terms of the Ottawa Treaty and of the Order in Council. 
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Although these difficulties and obligations are entirely hypothetical, there is currently 
nothing that would prohibit Bermuda from seizing and destroying the landmines owned by 
the US, as doing so would be in keeping with the purpose of the Ottawa Treaty and the 
Order in Council.520 This is especially so as the UK did nothing to naturalise the Ottawa 
Treaty or the Order in Council for the purposes of effective operation in Bermuda. Giving 
effect to the Treaty may be effective for the UK’s humanitarian purpose of upholding 
humanitarian treaty obligation but doing so creates a very real possibility that any 
enforcement actions by Bermuda (as agent of the UK) could cause Bermuda to be liable 
sanctions by the US government. 
6.3 Orders in Council and the Watson theory 
The Watson theory concludes that any rule or law can be transplanted from one 
jurisdiction to another, implying that no other variables need be considered when trying to 
determine if a law has been effectively transplanted. The Treaty was imposed by the UK on 
Bermuda. 
6.4 Orders in Council and the Legrand theory 
The Legrand theory concludes that a rule or law can only be ‘effectively’ transplanted from 
one jurisdiction to another when there is a recognition and understanding of the parent 
and recipient jurisdictions’: 
(a) history; 
(b) culture; and  
(c) legal systems.  
In other words, this recognition and understanding is achieved by ‘naturalising’ the 
transplanted law to ensure that it can ‘effectively’ work within the recipient jurisdiction’s 
legal system or statute book.521 Doing this, the naturalisation, also serves to create a new 
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law for the recipient as it is no longer looks or functions as it did (or could have done) 
when it was in the parent jurisdiction. 
The UK, in contravention of the Legrand theory, did nothing to naturalise the Order in 
Council. This is because the Order in Council did nothing to address the apparent likelihood 
that Bermuda, acting as agent for the UK, would be obligated under the Order in Council 
and the Treaty, to seize and destroy illegal contraband property of the US, risking an 
international standoff between Bermuda (as agent of the UK) and the US if the latter were 
unwise enough to use Bermuda as a transhipment location. Most worrying about this 
failure to naturalise the Order is that the US is Bermuda’s nearest geographical and largest 
international trading partner, and any possible standoff would most likely affect Bermuda’s 
trading relationship with the US and matters of military assistance via the NATO protection 
umbrella. 
The UK Government’s apparently altruistic reason for agreeing to and extending the 
Ottawa Treaty to Bermuda, to uphold a human rights treaty, by way of the Order in Council, 
serves as an act that conflicts with the interest of Bermuda. This conflict of interest, 
according to and by applying the rationale of Lord Hoffman,522 takes place within the 
constitutional hierarchy that exists between the UK (as the parent country having 
responsibility for Bermuda’s international affairs) and Bermuda (an overseas territory of 
the UK). 
In summary although the UK Government and the Bermudian Government failed to 
naturalise the Order in Council, in accordance with the Legrand theory, their failure do not 
make the Legrand theory invalid, for had the UK Government and the Bermudian 
Government adhered to this theory, by taking into account Bermuda’s neighbour the US’s 
continued use of land mines, the Order in Council could have been effectively naturalised 
for use in Bermuda. 
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6.5 Orders in Council and the Kahn-Freud theory 
It was not possible to assess whether this treaty was effectively been transplanted under 
the Kahn-Freud theory, as the necessary information was not available at the time of 
writing (see Section 4.1.3).  
6.6 Orders in Council and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and 
Kotz theories 
The combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories rely on the utility variable, and 
serve as alternatives or substitutes for the Legrand theory because they have, at their core, 
a demand for a way to make a law work once it has been transplanted. 
The purpose for extending the Order in Council to Bermuda by the UK was to uphold a 
human rights treaty by banning the use of landmines. This is in keeping with the 
‘usefulness’ variable inherent within the combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories. 
Bermuda’s military does not have as part of its offensive or defensive military equipment 
arsenal a single landmine,523 and so by this measure the transplant was successful. 
To ensure that Bermuda has the last and final say as to which treaties are extended to it, it 
will necessitate Bermuda becoming its own sovereign state, something that has been 
rejected in plebiscite. Until that time comes, the only equitable solution would be for the UK 
to exercise great restraint or greater consideration in the use of its inherent and ultimate 
colonial ability to impose treaties on Bermuda by way of Orders in Council. 
6.7 Interim conclusion- Orders in Council/ Landmines Treaty 
The hypothesis of this thesis, in relation to the Beermuda and US Tax Treaty of 1986 has 
been proven. This has been achieved by determining whether this rule was capable of 
being transplanted from the OECD to Bermuda unconditionally. The Legrand and the the 
combined Zhreing and Zweigert and Kotz theories, being two of the theories used in this 
thesis to determine whether this rule and law could be transplanted unconditionally, serve 
to indicate that this rule was incapable of being transplanted to Bermuda uncondtionally.  






This is because the UK, in contravention of the Legrand theory, did nothing to naturalise 
the Order in Council. Further, the Order in Council did not contain within it anything to 
address the apparent likelihood that Bermuda, as agent for the UK, would be obligated 
under the Order in Council and the Treaty, to seize and destroy illegal contraband property 
of the US, thereby risking an international standoff between Bermuda (as agent of the UK) 
and the US if the latter was unwise enough to use Bermuda as a transhipment location. 
Moreover, most concerning about this failure to naturalise the Order is the fact that the US 
is Bermuda’s nearest geographical and largest international trading partner, and any 
possible standoff would most likely affect Bermuda’s trade relationship with the US and or 
matters of military assistance via the NATO protection umbrella. 
 
CHAPTER SIX CASE STUDY SYNOPSIS 
1. Factually, the Ottawa Landmines Treaty was, as determined by way of the case studies, 
transplanted to Bermuda by the UK (as indicated by way of its existence within Bermuda's 
staute book)524. 
2. Theoretically, the Ottawa Landmines Treaty  was, as determined by way of the case 
studies,  to be either :  
a. transplanted  (in accord with  the Watson and Kahn-Freund theories); 
b. not transplanted (in accord with the Legrand theory); 
c. capable of being transplanted if the Ottawa Landmines Treaty could be used for the 
intended purpose (as determined by Bermuda or the people of Bermuda as end users) or 
for alternative purpose (in accord with Jhreing, Kahn-Freund. Zweigert & Kotz theories). 
3. Effectiveness, in the case of the Ottawa Landmines Treaty was and ultimately determined 
by the existence of the rule of law.  has been determined to have been met because this rule 
was applied to all of the people of Bermuda and not in an arbitrary manner by the Bermuda 
Government as primary end user. 











Chapter 7. Recommendations for the future: Bermuda onward 
and upward 
This chapter recommends solutions to specific cultural and historical social, economic and 
legal problems of Bermuda, as explored in the previous chapters of this thesis. The specific 
social, economic and legal problems highlighted in this thesis are: 
1. Bermuda’s gang problem525 affecting predominantly Bermuda’s young black 
males (see Chapter 3); 
2. Bermuda’s unwanted status as a tax haven and the resulting imposition of TEIAs 
(and enabling legislation) imposed upon it by the likes of the OECD S(see Chapter 
4); and 
3. the imposition of Orders in Council on Bermuda by the UK (see Chapter 5).  
More often than not it is very easy to identify problems but difficult to identify absolute 
solutions, which represents the dichotomy in the preparation of this chapter. Each 
recommended solution should not be seen as a stand-alone solution, but rather as a a 
continuum.  
7.1 Bermuda’s Gang Problem 
The finding or the offering of solutions to Bermuda’s unlawful gang problem was done with 
the following haunting statements from Bermuda’s history in mind: 
‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it;’526  
‘If Bermuda is to remain prosperous, it must be peaceful. If it is to be 
peaceful, Bermudians cannot afford to forget or to ignore the issues which 
                                                        
 
525 The definition of ‘unlawful gang’ is set out in ss 70JA and 70JB Bermuda’s Criminal Code Act 1907, and are 
transplanted from Canada’s Criminal Code s 467.  




have hitherto divided them. They need to face these and, in particular, to take 
stock of race relations’.527 
These statements can be summed up best by concluding that the answer has been staring 
the people of Bermuda and its successive governments in the face from the very first date 
that the gang problem began, in the form of Bermuda’s unsettled history and those 
encapsulated by the various Reports that have resulted from Bermuda’s oftentimes volatile 
history. Had successive Bermudian or UK governments been brave enough to follow and 
implement the recommendations put forward by these Reports the gang problem may not 
have become a problem at all.  
The lure of gangs for young black Bermudian males can be summarised as follows (see 
Chapter 3): 
(a) a desire to attain fame; and  
(b) a sense of identity or belonging, by having an affiliation with those already in the 
Bermudian gangs.528 
The cause of these lures has been the successive failure of the Governments of Bermuda 
and the UK to follow up and act on the use of Rule of Law Indicators,529 indicators 
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contained in successive Commission of Inquiry Reports hidden on the back shelves of the 
Bermuda Archives and the Bermuda Library.530 
Within the successive Reports can be found a historical review of Bermuda’s social and 
economic problems, with modest positive change having been made between each Report’s 
creation, most notably in regards to race relations. A review of Bermuda’s social and 
economic history from the 1960s is akin to reading about the continuous demolition of 
villages of wooden houses by hurricanes and their rebuilding. This is to say, successive 
Bermudian and UK Governments have appeared only to be interested in finding temporary 
solutions to the Island’s social and economic problems, rather than finding long term 
solutions, such as replacing wooden houses with more storm-resistant brick houses. Like 
all countries, Bermuda has and will continue to have its share of social and economic 
problems. In order to prepare for these problems, Bermuda needs to move toward relying 
on solid solutions but first it needs to deal with the results of the problems it faced in the 
1960s, most notably racial and economic inequality.  
In any event the specific subject warning signs of things to come, and of their possible 
solutions, can be found in the rule of law indicators as encapsulated by the: 
1. Wooding Report;531 
2. Pitt Report;532 
3. Tumin Report;533 and  
4. Mincey Report.534  
                                                        
 
530 Wooding Report, Pitt Report,. 
531 Wooding Report, Bermuda Civil Disorders 1968. 
532 Pitt-Report-1978, Report of the Royal Commission into the 1977 Disturbances. See also: Sir Peter 
Ramsbotham’s Declassified Written Report of 15th February 1978, sent to the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in the aftermath of the 1977 Riots. 
533 Tumin Report, 1992, Report of the Criminal Justice Review Board. 
534 Mincy Report, A Study of Employment, Earnings, and Educational Gaps between Young Black Bermudian 




Almost all of these Reports were commissioned by the Bermudian Government or the UK 
Government in the aftermath of failed Bermudian Government policies on education, or 
civil unrest which has usually been the result of economic or racial tensions. The Reports 
allowed the Bermuda and UK Governments to be seen to be doing something in the short 
term, but there appears to have been no political will to seek long term or sustained means 
for implementing the recommendations made in the Reports.  
7.1.1 The Wooding Report, 1968 
The Wooding Report’s primary area of examination were racial tension, a lack of job 
opportunities, Bermuda’s artificial society, drink and drugs, a general disaffection with the 
police; and Bermuda’s education system. Unfortunately, each and every one of these issues 
has continued unchecked and, arguably, has deteriorated 1968. By way of the Wooding 
Report’s primary area heads of examination, which remain unresolved and alive today in 
Bermuda, I now use the same as a means of offering solutions to the specific social, 
economic and legal problems currently being faced by Bermuda.  
7.1.1.1 Race relations 
Problem: According to the Wooding Report, racial conflict or racial division was, in the late 
1960s, an ongoing problem within Bermuda. Regrettably, it continues to be a problem 
today. This is most evident in Bermuda’s party politics. Its majority black population, for 
example, has tended to vote for the Progressive Labour Party. The minority white 
population has tended to vote for the One Bermuda Alliance (formerly the United Bermuda 
Party).535 
Solution: Bermuda needs to address its poor and toxic race relations problem. This can be 
done by both political parties leading by example to address the issue head on, rather than 
taking advantage of it as a means of garnering votes. This can be done by way of a 
Bermudian type of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with a mandate to: 
(a) invite open discussion on specific unresolved racial injustices that have occurred in the 
past; and 
                                                        
 




(b) invite solutions from the Bermudian people and businesses for the resolution of specific 
unresolved racial injustices.  
In an effort to ensure that it does not become a mere venue to just talk or vent, the 
Commission’s mandate needs to be one of actually finding solutions. To do otherwise is to 
only perpetuate the toxic racial division that exists within Bermuda. 
7.1.1.2 Job Opportunities and Bermuda’s artificial society 
Problem: According to the Wooding Report and successive census reports, the incomes of 
black Bermudians are consistently lower than those of white Bermudians. Because of 
Bermuda’s image as a playground for the wealthy many people outside of Bermuda could 
be forgiven if they were of the view that extreme poverty does not exist in Bermuda, and 
that job opportunities are very different for black and for white Bermudians. The wealth 
gap is continuously widening. During a recent exposé and documentary on Bermuda’s poor, 
Poverty in Paradise: the Price We Pay, shocking revelations were made that there were 
single black Bermudian mothers and their children living rough in abandoned cars, on 
beaches and in caves as these mothers could not afford to pay the high rents and high food 
prices.536 
During one of the interviews, it was noted by one of the black Bermudian mothers that the 
black gang members were born in the 1990s, the period in which Bermuda’s international 
business sector began to take root and flourish in terms of the numbers of international 
businesses entities moving to Bermuda. This was also a time when Bermudian employers 
began to hire unskilled or low skilled workers from overseas, to do the menial and low paid 
jobs that unskilled or low skilled Bermudians would not do or could not afford to do. In the 
case of the latter, the wages would not be enough to allow a single unskilled and in some 
cases skilled Bermudian mother to be able to pay for rent, utilities and for food. Some of the 
mothers also said that there may have been a very real possibility that the black young 
men, born in the 1990s to single mothers, may have seen their mother struggle to feed 
them and to keep a roof over their heads. By seeing this, the exposé mothers suggest, the 
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black Bermudian males would be easily lured into the fast money making illegal drug 
business, businesses that became franchises run in competition by the then developing 
gangs.537  
Solutions: Bermuda’s economy needs to become more diversified, rather than relying on 
income generated from the tourism and international business sectors.538 Doing so could 
mitigate against the harsh effects often incurred by societies generally during times of 
global recession.539 In addition, Bermuda needs to become more self-reliant rather than 
having its people at the mercy of overseas food producers.540 This would allow every 
Bermudian the dignity of being able to be part of the workforce and be able to sustain 
themselves and live a decent life in Bermuda. 
Bermuda also needs to change its inequitable taxation system from one relying on import 
duties to one being reliant on income. Doing so would allow each person, based on income, 
to pay into the government coffers their fair share of taxes. To do otherwise is to allow the 
wealthy Bermudian to pay a lower level of taxation than a Bermudian in a medium to low 
income bracket.541 All of these cumulative solutions, too, would go a long way to make 
Bermuda a more equitable society, regardless of one’s race.542 
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7.1.1.3 Drink and Drugs 
Problem: The Wooding Report identified drink and drugs as major causes leading to the 
continued societal erosion of Bermudian society, most evident within the black 
population.543 Since the publication of the Report, successive Bermudian Governments 
have made great strides in trying to tackle these substance abuse problems that were, at 
the time of the Wooding Report’s publication, becoming endemic. In relation to Bermuda’s 
fight against the illegal drugs trade, successive Bermudian Governments and the UK 
Governments do not appear to have taken the damaging impact of this scourge seriously. 
This is best illustrated by the fact that Bermuda does not have a dedicated Coast Guard 
Service (with air and waterborne assets), with the primary mission to monitor and 
intercept suspect marine traffic entering Bermudian territorial waters. At most Bermuda 
has a few unarmed boats (made of rubber and fiberglass hulls), manned by unarmed 
members of the Bermuda Police Service and on occasion the Bermuda Regiment 
(Bermuda’s local defence force).544  
Solution: Bermuda needs to create its own full time armed Coast Guard Service to stop the 
importation of illegal drugs by sea into Bermuda. However, the UK in the form of the Royal 
Navy is responsible for the defence of Bermuda’s territorial waters. The role of the Royal 
Navy in the case of Bermuda, presents as something of a conundrum. Does the defence of 
Bermuda mean: 
(a) the use of Royal Navy assets only to deter or repel aggressive actions such as an 
invasion by a foreign State; or 
(b) the use of Royal Navy assets to deter or repel aggressive actions such as an invasion by 
a foreign State and the illegal importation of drugs into Bermuda?  
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The answer is surely the latter. There is precedent for this as illustrated by the Falkland 
Islands conflict of 1982, and the Royal Navy’s routine anti-drug patrols in the Caribbean 
Sea and North Western Atlantic in the form of dedicated Caribbean Guard ships.545 Having 
Royal Navy assets many miles from Bermuda serves to render the presence of the Royal 
Navy in the nearby Caribbean Sea as feckless. 
The lack of a dedicated Bermudian Government or a UK Coast Guard Service, therefore, 
continues to leave Bermuda wide open for drugs to be smuggled into Bermuda by sea. Any 
measures taken on land by the Bermudian Government to deter the use of imported illegal 
drugs into Bermuda is simply rendered useless as long as Bermuda cannot interdict import.  
One major solution for dealing with Bermuda’s illegal drugs problem would be the creation 
of a full time armed coast guard service, of a size commensurate with Bermuda’s size but 
similar in role to that of the US Coast Guard Service (i.e. having the tasks of armed illegal 
drug interdiction, water pollution prevention, and search and rescue).546  
7.1.1.4 General disaffection with the police 
Problem: The Wooding Report highlighted that the Bermuda Police Service was then made 
up of mostly white non-Bermudian police officers from the Caribbean and the UK. It is 
obvious why this factor alone would give rise to general Bermudian disaffection with a 
mostly white non-Bermudian. A majority of Bermudians in the 1960s appeared to be 
against a police force that was majority white and majority non-Bermudian. White officers 
from the UK, when viewed objectively, would remind 1960s Bermudian’s of their status as 
a colonial people, with the inference that they are people of lessor value within the colonial 
construct.547 Although great strides have been made to reduce the number of non-
Bermudian and white police officers in the Bermuda Police Service over the years, the 
Bermuda Police Service still remains a police service that is composed of a majority of non-
Bermudian police officers. 
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This matter highlighted by the Wooding report may not just be a problem about racial or 
ethnic diversity. The general disaffection with the Police may then, as may currently be the 
case, be enflamed the draconian laws that the Bermuda Police Service was then and still is 
now being called upon to enforce. As indicated in the Tumin Report, Bermuda has a long 
tradition of draconian laws, in the form of legislation that tends not to have the goal of 
regulating human behaviour, but rather of punishing bad behaviour.548 These elements as a 
collective (the combination of draconian laws of Bermuda and the nationality and the racial 
makeup of the Bermuda Police Service) may also explain why the Bermuda Police Service 
has continued to have difficulty in attracting sizable numbers of Bermudians to join its 
ranks.549  
Solution: Bermuda needs to put in place a fully functioning Law Commission, with one of 
its mandates being a focus on ensuring that Bermuda’s laws are effective and not overly 
punitive or outright draconian. Although Bermuda enacted legislation in 2009 for the 
creation of a Law Commission, it has yet to be set up.550 By having a Law Commission in 
place, Bermuda would be able to continuously reform its laws to ensure that they remain 
current, and as a means of trying to ensure that its laws have a preference for regulating 
human behaviour rather than for punishing human behaviour.551 This, in turn, could allow 
the officers of the Bermuda Police Service not be seen as enforcers of draconian laws that 
have become tainted as the tools of colonial masters, but of laws generally, without regard 
to race or nationality. 
7.1.1.5 Bermuda’s Education System 
Problem: One of the various problems raised by way of the Wooding Report was the fact 
that Bermuda’s education system in the late 1960s was one of two systems: one where 
white Bermudian children from wealthy families were afforded a quality education; and 
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one where black Bermudian children, coming from mostly poor families, were afforded an 
inferior education.552 
White Bermudian children went to schools that were better housed, better staffed, and 
better supplied with equipment and materials than the schools that black Bermudian 
children attended.553 It is therefore obvious that white Bermudian children were given a 
greater chance at attaining economic success and social stability than their fellow black 
Bermudian children, with race being the primary deciding factor.  
Solution: The obvious solution here is that the Bermudian Government, in the 1960s, had 
to do away with legalised racial segregation; do away with the economic disparities 
existing between the two education systems; and integrate the two school systems. 
Although schools in Bermuda were desegregated in 1965, racial and economic division still 
remain factors within Bermuda’s education system, with more white Bermudian children 
attending affluent private schools than black children.554 In the case of the latter, black 
Bermudian children are in the majority at the Government funded public schools.555 
Therefore, the matters of racial division and economic inequality in Bermuda’s schools still 
remain as matters that require resolution.556  
7.1.2 The Pitt Report, 1978 
The Pitt Report examined, primarily, the following issues: 
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1. A history of being a small and isolated colonial society which meant that Bermuda 
developed not as a singular society, but as dual societies (made worse by the existence of 
racial segregation);557 
2. Post racial segregation struggles;558 and 
3. Capital accumulation in the hands of a select few (mostly the white inhabitants of 
Bermuda).559 
Problem: The publication and content of the Pitt Report served as proof that not much had 
changed between the writing of the Wooding Report in 1968 and the writing of the Pitt 
Report in 1977, in relation to racial and economic disparity, a period of nine years. 
Solution: The Bermudian Government, after the publication of the Wooding and the Pitt 
Reports, urgently needed to address their contents. By the time of the Pitt Report’s 
publication, a period of thirty-nine years had elapsed but leaving the issues of racial and 
economic inequality still unresolved. All of this serves to create the appearance of a 
Bermuda society that was refusing to dislodge what was an entrenched system of racial 
and economic inequality, amounting to institutionalised racism and economic inequality.560 
Racial and economic inequality are prime indicators of why those affected by them can feel 
disengaged from mainstream society.561  
According to Tumin, sociologist define ‘institutionalised racism’ as: habits of discrimination 
that have become crystallised into the social structure, in institutional patterns of housing, 
schooling, employment etc. These patterns continue despite an absence of conscious 
deliberate discrimination. He then went onto conclude that the ending of legal 
discrimination in Bermuda did not bring in its immediate wake social integration, or 
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anything like it. Tumin went on further to state in the Report that institutional racism is not 
the same as individual racism. 
Individual racism is based on attitudes and misinformation about other groups. Institutions 
do not have attitudes but they do have policies, practices and traditions. Some of these may 
form the part of written constitutions or mission statements for everyone to see. However, 
there are often unwritten policies, practices and traditions that are subtle, which have the 
effect of keeping certain groups out of the institution. Therefore, it can be easily argued that 
by being born within a society with deeply entrenched racial and economic inequality, 
Bermuda’s soon-to-be-gang members were predestined to appear on the Bermuda scene in 
the 2000s.  
7.1.3 The Tumin Report, 1992 
The Tumin Report examined, almost exclusively, negative systemic problems concerning 
Bermuda’s criminal justice and prison system.562 The Report also raised the ongoing 
historical and cultural issues of racial and economic inequality that existed in Bermuda, 
issues that were linked to the extremely high level of incarcerated black Bermudian males 
within Bermuda’s prison system.563 The Tumin Report also identified Bermuda’s draconian 
laws as the means by which black Bermudian males were being incarcerated.564  
Problem: The Bermudian Government after the publication of the Tumin Report, not only 
needed to deal with the problem of Bermuda’s draconian laws but it also to address and 
resolve what had clearly become, by the time of the Report’s publication, a Bermuda with 
deeply embedded institutionalised racism and economic inequality. 
Solution: The Bermudian Government needs to find a way to make Bermuda’s laws less 
draconian, with an emphasis on regulating human behaviour rather than having an 
emphasis on punishing human behaviour. Further, the Bermudian Government (including 
any future Governments) must turn their attention to ripping from the roots Bermuda’s 
problems of institutionalised racism and economic inequality. 
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7.1.4 The Mincy Report 
The Mincy Report, although focusing on Bermuda’s school education system, also 
considered the consequences of its poor performance, most notably young black males at 
risk of engaging in crime. 
Problem: The Mincy Report indicated that the Bermuda’s public education system was 
failing to educate Bermuda’s young black male students to a high standard. 
Solution: The Bermudian Government must find a way to make sure that Bermuda’s public 
education system is brought up to and maintained at a standard that ensures that all young 
Bermudian students, regardless of race or economic background, are afforded a high 
standard of education. If they continue to fail to address this problem, Bermuda’s young 
black males may find that they have no choice but to engage in criminal activity as a means 
of ensuring that they and their families are provided for, based on primal human desire to 
survive. This is because the absence of a quality education will more than likely cause them 
to have no effective educational means by which to survive in an affluent and expensive 
society like Bermuda.565  
7.1.5 Race, racial stigma and its consequences566 
Embedded in the Reports has been the ongoing cultural and historical problem of poor to 
mediocre race relations in Bermuda, which have been a part of Bermuda’s history and 
culture for many years. Unfortunately, as the very presence of these Reports illustrates, 
Bermuda cannot move forward as a people until its cultural and historical problem of race 
relations is resolved. 
Racism may be a cause for the disconnect that young black Bermudian males have in 
relation to Bermuda society as a whole, with the disconnect erupting in the form of 
Bermuda’s gang problem. This is because, according to some who have studied the issue of 
racial stigma or racism, it leads to vicious circles of cumulative causation: self-sustaining 
processes in which the failure of blacks to make progress justifies whites’ prejudicial 
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attitudes that, when reflected in social and political action, ensure that blacks will not 
advance.567 This lack of advancement, when objectively considered, logically anticipates 
that young black Bermudian males would become disengaged from mainstream Bermuda 
society. This is illustrated in the form of what has become the black Bermudian gang 
member, showing no belief in or respect for human life, or for the laws of Bermuda. 
Therefore, the advent of Bermuda’s gang problem pointedly indicates that race relations in 
Bermuda must be addressed, not in a mediocre fashion but with a sense of collective 
boldness by all of Bermuda’s people. 
7.1.6 Lessons from South Africa 
Race relations in Bermuda have been a constant source of deep division. Its roots stem 
from a time when Bermudian society was overtly racially segregated. According to the 
Wooding Report and other authors of works on race relations in Bermuda, hotels, 
neighbourhoods, churches, schools, and businesses were all racially segregated.568 Still 
today there remains racial segregation and friction in Bermuda, only now racial 
segregation has been obscured by varying degrees of economic affluence enjoyed by some 
of Bermuda’s black inhabitants.569  
A possible way of moving Bermuda towards a truly racially integrated society by 
borrowing South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a template for obtaining 
candid discussions about race relations in Bermuda, past and present. The topic of racism 
can often be a sensitive one but as long as the topic of racism remains deeply rooted within 
Bermuda’s past and present, Bermudian society cannot move forward as a single and 
unified entity. To facilitate a true open discussion on racism in Bermuda, perhaps the 
Bermudian Government could implement a rule as a pre-condition of a Bermudian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission being set up. Doing so may very well encourage 
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Bermudians generally and past and present employees of Bermudian businesses to speak 
openly of past and present racially discriminatory acts or practices that have taken place or 
are taking place, with verbal or written testimonials protected by immunity from criminal 
prosecution or civil suit.  
7.1.7 Lessons from France 
The lesson to be learned from France is that there needs to be one identified ‘thing’ that can 
be used to bring a country of diverse people from different racial, religious, cultural, ethnic, 
socio-economic backgrounds, and places of family origin together. Unfortunately this 
lesson from France is not one that they have learned within the current context of their 
multicultural society. Still, this ‘lesson’ had been known of by France for centuries. It first 
emerged at a time when France was focused on its survival of France as a singular state and 
at a time when its people were a predominantly homogeneous.570 France failed to learn its 
own lesson? Because the people of mainland France never truly saw its colonial people as 
French.571 The people of mainland France appear to have never truly understood or wanted 
to understand the need to embrace the people of their colonies as their own. 
France, a country that continues to be negatively impacted by a colonial history similar to 
that exists between Bermuda and the UK, has for many years struggled with the issue of 
national identity. In other words, although there has been concerted efforts made by state 
actors to bring about greater racial, ethnic, socio-economic and religious tolerance, there 
appears to have been less effort to definitively identify what it means to be French. This has 
also been a problem for the UK in relation to what it means to be British, and Bermuda in 
relation to what it means to be a Bermudian, resulting in crises of national identity for all 
three countries. This situation has only been made more difficult because of their societies 
becoming increasingly more multicultural societies or perhaps due to the absence of state 
sovereignty in the case of Bermuda. 
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There have been varying attempts by state actors in Bermuda, France, and in the UK, to 
bring their respective people together as a singular multicultural society. Unfortunately, 
these actions have been neutralised by other actors engaged in spewing or allowing to be 
spewed volatile fuels of division to or through the forces of division in the form of 
nationalist groups like the National Front and newspapers such as Charlie Hebdo, the latter 
mocking leaders of religion, all under the guise of freedom of speech, and fanning the 
flames of racial division and tension within France.572 These forces of division are people or 
agents opposed to the greater good of national unity and, therefore, appears to be a 
primary reason why national unity in the form of a national identity has yet to be achieved. 
These forces of division, when they have put forward solutions of national unity or national 
identity, have usually been with the exclusion of visible minorities or the financially 
deprived in mind. National unity has always, historically, been hard to achieve within the 
context of a multicultural society.573 The battle for national unity must still be fought by 
each person, as a collective, from within the respective multicultural societies of Bermuda, 
France and the UK. An argument can be made that this lesson to be learned is too simplistic 
or too ideological. Not so, as what other choice do the named multicultural societies have 
but to fight, as a collective, for and toward national unity? If they do not, their present 
situations of divided peoples can only get worse, perhaps leading to increased gang activity 
or increased numbers of foreign terrorist fighters.  
7.1.8 Bermuda’s ‘tax haven’ problem 
The scrutiny of Bermuda’s TEIAs (which includes Bermuda’s tax information regime as a 
whole), by way of this thesis and its reliance on the combined microscope of the Watson, 
Legrand, and the combined Zhreing and Zweigert & Kotz theories (see Section 2.2), serves 
to home in on the fact that tax havens, however defined, have historically been used for 
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criminal and immoral purposes, purposes which are at the core of the OECD’s ongoing 
efforts to eradicate them.  
7.1.9 The criminal and immoral use of tax havens 
Tax havens have long been considered to be immoral by the OECD (especially during 
periods of economic decline or economic recession) because they have been used as a tool 
by financially savvy companies and the rich but unscrupulous as a means to reduce their 
tax liability in their home countries. Had these unpaid taxes (either by tax evasion, which in 
most countries is a criminal offence, or by tax avoidance, which in most countries is not 
criminal, but is arguably immoral) been paid to their respective countries, they could have 
been used to better education systems, health care systems, and to assure that each person 
was paying their fair share.  
Although there is no definitive definition of what a tax haven is, or any settled notion on 
whether tax avoidance is morally correct or incorrect, the certainty associated with the 
criminal act of tax evasion allows one to understand why the likes of the OECD would like 
to get rid of tax havens.  
However, this could cause those countries and territories to incur catastrophic financial 
loss. The only way of avoiding that loss, especially in the case of Bermuda, would be to levy 
taxes on the companies and individuals investing there, which could, of course result in 
disinvestment and re-domicile in less tax adverse countries. For this reason, before any 
country that relies heavily or solely on income generated from their tax haven status was to 
begin to apply such taxes, they would first have to find other sources of revenue  
Ever since the late 1960s and early 1970s there have been calls for the eradication of tax 
havens, and these are now almost deafening, something symbolic of the OECD’s 
intensifying wish to put an end to actual or perceived tax havens, and clearly has no 




Rather than Bermuda continuing to fight this war with the OECD, a war that it cannot 
win,574 maybe it is now time for Bermuda to explore or consider options as they relate to 
the question of being labelled as a tax haven and as it relates to exempted companies575 
benefiting from Bermuda’s tax haven status.576 Three come to mind and they are: 
Option 1: consider requiring exempted companies to pay taxes on profits, income, 
dividends, and capital gains to their countries of origin, using Bermuda as a conduit for 
facilitating the same; 
Option 2: consider requiring exempted companies to pay taxes on profits, income, 
dividends, and capital gains to the Bermudian Government; or 
Option 3: consider requiring exempted companies pay taxes, at a 50/50 rate, on profits, 
income, dividends, and capital gains to the Bermudian Government and to their countries 
of origin respectively. 
These three Options would clearly serve to benefit public coffers of Bermuda and the 
member states of the OECD, in the form of additional revenue by which various goods and 
services could be made available to their respective peoples. Each would serve to clearly 
demonstrate that Bermuda is no longer a tax haven, and may very well cause the OECD to 
remove Bermuda from being branded as a tax haven. However, the obvious issue from 
these three options is the consequences of Bermuda implementing any of them. The most 
likely consequence for Bermuda would be the wholesale fleeing of Bermuda’s entire 
offshore business sector (most notably its reinsurance business sector) to other 
jurisdictions, especially to those that remain as low taxation jurisdictions and have the 
ability to fend off the threats by the OECD, such as Delaware and Nevada, Switzerland or 
London.  
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In the event that exempted companies were to leave Bermuda in significant numbers, 
Bermuda would most certainly have to quickly find viable alternatives to the lost revenue. 
These alternatives, although viewed primarily in the context of being alternatives or 
substitutes for the loss of revenue, should also be seen as the first steps on the ladder 
toward diversifying Bermuda’s economy. 
7.2 The introduction of new industries 
Introducing new industries would not serve as a means of removing Bermuda from the 
cross hairs of the OECD but could be the first stepping stones from which to launch the 
effort for making Bermuda into a more self-sufficient country, less influenced by the 
negative concerns or even the outright intimidation by other countries.  
International business has exposed Bermuda to criticism that it is a tax haven, and it is 
under threat from the OECD. Perhaps it is now time for Bermuda to call a truce with the 
likes of the OECD, and move away from its reliance on international business.  
Bermuda could begin to tax international businesses at levels comparable to the levels of 
tax that they would pay onshore or at levels comparable to the tax levels paid by 
businesses within Bermuda. However, both of these options would obviously lead to the 
international businesses fleeing Bermuda to find jurisdictions where they would be paying 
lower taxes. This situation, therefore, amounts to a lose/lose situation. So what, then, is the 
solution? Again, the obvious solution is for Bermuda to move away from offering itself to 
international business as a jurisdiction from which international business can do business 
but with the goal of diversifying Bermuda’s economy but before doing so, put into 
operation options for diversifying the Bermuda Economy. 
7.2.1 Affordable housing industry  
The cost of rents and mortgages in Bermuda has been, for quite some time, one and if not 




housing make the act of renting or buying a home in Bermuda out of reach for a number of 
low to middle income Bermudians.577  
Bermuda homes are constructed using thick brick walls and with roof tops made from 
Bermuda slate stone.578 The rationale for using these building products, over the centuries, 
is due to the fact that Bermuda is seasonably prone to being hit by tropical storms and 
hurricanes. These products provide increased strength or resistance to strong (and 
sometimes violent) tropical storm winds and hurricane winds. Unfortunately these bricks 
and slate are very expensive and serve to make renting or buying a home in Bermuda even 
more expensive.579  
As an alternative or solution for using these high expensive building materials, providing a 
low cost solution for providing affordable housing in Bermuda, Bermuda could increase its 
use of modular housing units. Bermuda could also import shipping containers as a means 
of providing affordable and hurricane resistant housing. In keeping with the topic of 
diversifying the Bermudian economy, these varied types of building affordable housing in 
Bermuda would also to stimulate the home construction business in Bermuda, encouraging 
Bermudians to acquire new skill sets required for building and fitting out new types of 
affordable housing in Bermuda. 
7.3 The imposition of Orders in Council on Bermuda by the UK; A 
time to rethink the matter of state sovereignty for Bermuda? 
Problem: How can Bermuda put an end to the imposition of Orders in Council, by the UK? 
                                                        
 
577 See: ‘Poverty in Paradise: the Price We Pay’. This is a video documentary that illustrates the level of hidden 
poverty that exists within Bermuda, most notably affecting single young black Bermudian mothers and their 
children. Copies of the video can be obtained in Bermuda from CURB (Citizens Uprooting Racism in Bermuda) 
or the Human Rights Commission of Bermuda. 
578 Bermuda Residential Building Code 2014. 
579 See: ‘Poverty in Paradise: the Price We Pay’. This is a video documentary that illustrates the level of hidden 
poverty that exists within Bermuda, most notably affecting single young black Bermudian mothers and their 





Solution: The only plausible way for Bermuda to put an end to the imposition of Orders in 
Council, by the UK, is by Bermuda obtaining outright independence from the UK, 
extinguishing its colonial relationship with the UK and by attaining sovereign status.580 
The matter of state sovereignty has long been a topic of interest for Bermuda but almost 
every time independence has been brought forward for consideration within Bermuda, the 
people of Bermuda have, usually by way of majority vote, rejected it, primarily due to 
economic fears.581 State sovereignty for Bermuda is an obvious answer to the problem of 
imposed Orders in Council, but this singular answer may very well be too costly for 
Bermuda to accept. On becoming a sovereign state, there will be sovereign state issues that 
Bermuda will have to deal with on a regular basis. For example, Bermuda would most 
certainly have to deal with the issue of having its sovereignty recognised by other 
sovereign states and the issue of regional foreign affairs or regional politics. In order to 
bolster its appearance and status of a sovereign state, Bermuda would have to continuously 
                                                        
 
580 For the purposes of this Thesis, I am reluctant to rely on the classical definition of State Sovereignty used 
by John Alan Appleman, who defines State Sovereignty to mean that a Sovereign State, to be a Sovereign State, 
is one where it is not restricted by any other Sovereign State other than itself. However, as Appleman rightly 
indicates, this classical definition of State Sovereignty contradicts the very existence of International Law, 
which is the reason I do not rely on this classical definition outright. If no Sovereign State or its actions can be 
restricted by another Sovereign State then how can a treaty exist as a regulating force over Sovereign State 
actions, especially in a case where a Sovereign State agrees to become or is made party to various 
international bodies (such as the United Nations, CARICOM, Caribbean Court of Justice, OECD, NAFTA, OAS, 
EU, and NATO, etc.), thereby subscribing to become bound by the resultant treaties and trade agreements or 
to allow treaties to be used as a means of assisting Sovereign States to settle trade or military wars between 
Sovereign States? Even in the context of Sovereign States within the Caribbean preferring to rely on the 
Caribbean Court of Justice or on the Privy Council in London, as a final court of appeal, in both instances there 
is a surrender of State Sovereignty to these respective final courts of appeal, inclusive of those instances 
where the Privy Council has been replaced by the Caribbean Court of Justice by them. Of course, in this latter 
case, the argument could be made that doing so allows a Caribbean Sovereign State to no longer have to rely 
on its colonial master, the UK, in legal decision making. Still, this doesn’t change the fact that State 
Sovereignty is still being surrendered to the body of the Caribbean Court of Justice, and not to an indigenous 
court of final appeal. This overall dichotomy, serves to indicate why the concept of State Sovereignty is 
nebulous and, arguably, impossible to truly give definition. At best, to determine if State Sovereignty exists, is 
to look for the visual indicators of State Sovereignty, which are also non-exhaustive. See: John Alan 
Appleman’s Military Tribunals and Crimes, 14 1954, Chapter IV; and W. Jethrow Bown on Sovereignty, 18 
Jurid. Rev. 1 1906-1907. 
581 In 1995 Bermuda held a referendum on independence, which was rejected by a majority. An Independence 




look for and create its own visible features of state sovereignty.582 State sovereignty for 
Bermuda would also have to be considered in the real world context of which sovereign 
state and how many sovereign states will recognise its existence for the purposes of 
legitimising its existence.583 
In terms of regional sovereign state politics, Bermuda’s existence and status as a sovereign 
state would most certainly be influenced by the foreign policy or ‘regionalism’ interests of 
the sovereign states within the Western Atlantic Region584 and the Caribbean Region585 but 
most notably by way of the dominant presence of the US. Regionalism, for Bermuda’s 
purposes, can be best understood if it were to mesh the concepts of ‘State Sovereignty’ and 
‘regionalism’ into one entity, leading to the creation of what the author has coined as 
‘Caribbean real politic’.586 587 Caribbean real politic would lend itself well as a contribution 
to academic study. This is because the subject regions, collectively, appear to be ripe for 
testing the subject theories of this thesis.  
                                                        
 
582 Thomas A. Garaci, ‘Overflight, Landing Rights, Customs, and Clearances’, 155 to 168, 37 A.F. L. Rev. 155 
1994. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Namely Canada, the Bahamas and the United States of America. 
585 This is not an exhaustive list but I include in this list: Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 
586 The author of this study, for the purposes of this study, has created the phrase of Caribbean real politic. 
Caribbean real politic means, according to the author of this thesis: 
‘an instance where the state sovereignty of the States or countries within the Caribbean and Western Atlantic, 
as in relation to the United States of America’s (aided at times by other Sovereign States of the Caribbean) 
military and non-military intervention in the affairs of the entities within the Caribbean and Western Atlantic 
internal affairs. This type of intervention has and will most likely continue to represent threaten the erosion 
of the classical definition of State Sovereignty’.  
For the rationale for the creation of ‘Caribbean real politic’ by the author of this thesis, see: Thomas Romig, 
The Legal Basis for United States Military Action in Grenada, The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army 
Pamplet 27-50-148, April 1985; Elisabeth Wallace, The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall, 17 Int’l J. 
269 1961-1962, 269 to 288; and Vilma McIntosh, Jamaica: Forty Years of Independence, Revista Mexicana del 
Caribe, vol. VII, núm. 13, 2002, 181-210 Universidad de Quintana Roo Chetumal, México, 190 to 209 
(specifically the retaliatory actions of the United States of America against the Island Sovereign State of 
Jamaica for its state to state engagement, under the Norman Manley Government, with Fidel Castro’s Cuba 





Aside from the non-exhaustive and at times nebulous features of statehood or state 
sovereignty,588 there are primarily two visible features of State Sovereignty. The first is 
recognition, often illustrated by the mutual setting up of embassy facilities by the 
respective sovereign states. The second most prominent visible feature of state sovereignty 
is the peaceful acknowledgment but at times continual testing of state sovereignty by other 
sovereign states. Examples of this can be found in the case of international borders 
between sovereign states, territorial waters and air space above a sovereign state.589 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter, on reflection, reads as something akin to a political speech. This, however, is 
not the author’s intent. On the contrary Chapter Six, by way of the illustrated Bermuda 
specific problems and the inherent need for recommendations to be put forward by the 
author, simply demonstrates that badly transplanted laws have been allowed to take root 
in Bermuda. The chapter also proves that alternative policy routes, those beneficial to 
Bermuda as a whole, have not been effectively explored, as laws have simply been imposed 
without naturalisation having taken place. Although the path to attaining effective 
transplantation (which is a necessary ingredient for attaining naturalisation) can often be a 
torturous one, a failure to stay on that path can and often does lead to long term and 
devastating consequences, as illustrated by the test case example of Bermuda. 
                                                        
 
588 James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, Downloaded from 
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/ at DePaul University, 123 to 182. 




Chapter 8. Summary  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted 
to Bermuda. In order to test this, three research questions were put forward to be tested 
using the Watson theory, the Legrand theory, Kahn-Freud theory, Jhering theory, and the 
Zweigert & Kotz theory (see section 1.1).. It concludes that laws and rules cannot, 
unconditionally, be transplanted to Bermuda because the variable of effectiveness, a 
necessary precondition for bringing about effective transplantation, is required for the 
purposes of truly effecting transplantation, aided by the sub-variables of Bermuda’s culture 
and history. Embedded into this variable of effectiveness is the troublesome sub-condition 
of always having to determine from whose perspective is one to determine effectiveness.  
8.1 Summary 
Effectiveness, in relation to the effective operation of a transplanted rule or law, occurs 
when a rule or law operates according to: 
(a) its intended purpose as determined by the perspective of the country or entity that first 
authored the rule or law; 
(b) its intended purpose as determined by the perspective of the recipient or host country 
prior to the impending; or 
(c) unforeseen but still beneficial purposes which may also include purposes (a) and (b), 
but; 
(d) in each case, the rule of law, its existence, must be used as the bench mark and final 
indicator of whether or not a law or rule is effective. 
The best way to achieve effectiveness is by ensuring that the transplanted or borrowed law 
has been modified or naturalised, taking into account the donor country’s or the recipient 
country’s history and culture, along with the existence of the rule of law thereby ensuring 
that the law or rule is generally fit for purpose within the recipient country. 
The crucial question to be asked is from whose perspective one should look; that of the 
primary end user or users or the ultimate end user or users. 
8.1.1 The primary end user 
Let us take, as our first example, the perspective of an author country – the original 




to its former colony as a means of addressing a mischief it deems to be of great importance, 
relative to its obligation to ensure good governance over its former colony. The 
transplanted law is being used to cure a problem not within the parent country itself but 
within its colony. In order to determine if the transplanted law has been effective, the 
parent country will have ask itself whether or not the transplanted law has addressed the 
mischief.  
8.1.2 The secondary end user 
The secondary end user is the recipient country or former colony which opts to transplant 
or borrow a law to itself from another country or entity in order to address a mischief. In 
this example the transplanted law may also act as a means of curing the country-wide 
problem or it may be seen by the people of that country as their government’s attempt at 
trying to fix the problem.  
8.1.3 The ultimate end user 
Within the academic discourse concerning transplantation and the added (but equally 
important) variable of effectiveness, is the people’s perspective which, in the case of a 
sovereign country, is often ignored as it is with the people of former colonies who are the 
ultimate end users of the law. 
8.1.4 Using the rule of law as a plausible benchmark for determining 
effectiveness 
The benchmark to be used for determining whether a law has been effectively transplanted, 
from an entity to Bermuda, is the rule of law itself. In other words, a law transplanted to 
Bermuda from an external entity can only be deemed effective as long as the transplanted 
rule or law serves to maintain the rule of law; that the law or rule applies to everyone and 
not just a select few. 
According to Hachez and Wouters,590 the rule of law is the characteristic of a society which 
is governed by a legal system yielding formally sound, effective, and legitimate rules which 
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serve to indicate that the legal system connects to the social order in three ways – 
cognitively, empirically, and axiologically – that ensure that the law will not be oppressive 
and arbitrary, but will act as a vector of harmony.591 The way the legal system is able to 
ensure that the rules it produces bear those qualities is by using them as validity 
conditions. A legal system whose validity conditions are formal soundness, effectiveness 
and legitimacy is more likely to produce legal rules which will be ‘ideal’ in the sense 
bestowed to it by the social order considered: it will ensure predictability and coherence to 
the legal system (formal cognitive soundness), it will ensure that the rules ‘govern’ and that 
personal designs backed by violence are averted (effectiveness), and finally it will ensure 
that the substantive content of the rules reflects, or at least takes into account in a fair 
manner, the aspirations of society (legitimacy).592 
Unfortunately due to the nebulous nature of the concept of the rule of law, something that a 
country can only aspire to obtain, this means that there can be no set criteria for 
determining whether a law has been effectively transplanted from an entity to Bermuda. At 
best, one can only aspire to attain the rule of law based on criteria in existence at any given 
point in time (an ever changing aspirational target). 
8.2 Synthesis Conclusion 
Section 7.1 affirms the conclusion of this thesis that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be 
transplanted to Bermuda. Even when one tries to establish a benchmark for determining if a 
law has been effectively transplanted to Bermuda, by using the rule of law as a benchmark, 
this does not result in a benchmark that can be used in all instances of transplanted law. At 
best, the example of the rule of law used by this thesis can only be used for determining 
effectiveness in relation to Bermuda. 
Therefore the author has determined that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be 
transplanted to Bermuda, as the variable of effectiveness as seen through the multi-ended 
and troublesome sub-condition of perspective represents the conditions by which laws and 
rules are transplanted to Bermuda. 







8.3 Comments on strengths and limitations of the thesis research 
This thesis relied on laws and rules from countries or entities such as Canada, France, the 
OECD, the US, and the UK, inclusive of the cultural, economic and historical matters that 
were common or of a similar nature between these countries and Bermuda (e.g. racial 
matters, cultural matters, disaffected racial or ethnic young males who have resorted to 
using acts of terror or terrorism, economic matters specific to the imposition tax avoidance 
and tax evasion). 
8.3.1 Difficulties in locating primary and secondary sources 
During the author’s time of conducting the necessary research for this thesis, it became 
apparent that primary and secondary sources of information were going to be difficult or 
even impossible to obtain. This was the case in relation to the matter of government 
produced statistical information, by the Governments of Bermuda, Canada, France, and the 
UK.  
8.3.2 Research bias 
As the author was born in and is currently living and employed in Bermuda, he was able to 
overcome various obstacles to research that would have impeded or even halted the efforts 
of a legal academic researcher not having any links to Bermuda or an understanding of 
Bermuda and its laws and people. However this also represented a research dilemma for 
the author. Although several Bermudians have written articles and books about Bermuda’s 
culture, laws, and history, the author was reluctant to rely on them because they had the 
appearance of being produced with various political agendas at their core. 
The author took great pains to avoid writing and structuring this thesis in a way that would 
cause the reader of this thesis to think that the same is a mere attempt to bash or attack the 
colonial relationship existing between Bermuda and the UK, thereby causing the reader to 
no longer focus on the positive contributions that this thesis was making to academic 
study. This thesis, in no way, has been written as a means to bash the UK as the parent 
country of Bermuda. 
The author also took pains to avoid turning this thesis into a study into the murky depths of 
Bermuda politics. On the contrary; the recommendations should be seen as tools by which 
the political parties of Bermuda, the Government of Bermuda (present and future), and the 
people of Bermuda (independently and as a whole) can advance into a more modern age of 




8.3.3 Contribution to academic study 
By using Bermuda as a model by which to test the four legal theories (in regards to the 
hypothesis used in this thesis), this not only serves to contribute to academic study in 
relation to legal transplant theory but it also serves to contribute to this area of academic 
study specific to the subjects of colonies and colonialism. A residual consequence of such a 
contribution is the fact that this thesis will not only be of interest to legal academics but 
also to entities such as the world’s remaining colonies, the parent countries of the 
remaining colonies, and to entities such as the United Nations and the OECD, as this thesis 
offers an inside look into the practical realities of laws or rules that have been transplanted 
willingly, by intimidation, or where the recipient colony has no choice but to transplant or 
borrow a law unto itself, due to threats or intimidation imposed by other countries or 
entities. 
Using Bermuda as a model for testing the four legal theories also serves to contribute to 
academic study in relation to what the author has newly coined as ‘Caribbean Real Politic’. 
This is illustrated by way of Bermuda’s close proximity to the US, which causes it and the 
other island countries in the Western Atlantic and the Caribbean to be forever 
overshadowed and influenced by the political and military interests of the US. This means 
that, whether former colony or a sovereign country, the regional actions or wishes of these 
islands will always be acted upon subject to the political or military interests of the US, an 
indication that state sovereignty (in the event that Bermuda was to seek it) will not mean a 
truly independent Bermuda. 
The author’s decision to use Bermuda to test the four legal theories resulted in the finding 
of a lacuna within the Legrand theory. Specifically, this was in regard to the original ‘shelf 
life’ of the 1986 Treaty, (1986 to 1998, or the date of inception until the US’s Cold War 
concerns and with it, the need to have two naval bases in Bermuda). This suggests that the 
Legrand theory may have a lacuna within it, a lacuna which strongly suggests that the 
theory only applies to laws or rules that are not subject to contingent events. In this regard, 
this lacuna is something that can be explored by way of future academic study, thereby 
keeping alive and keeping current academic study in relation to legal transplant theory.  
8.4 The application of the research findings 
By using Bermuda as a model by which to test the four legal theories, this not only serves to 
contribute to academic study in relation to legal transplant theory but it also to contribute 
to the ongoing debate, within the United Nations, in reference to the issue of colonialism 
and decolonisation of the world’s remaining colonies, and the economic sustainability of 




pegged to two industries: tourism and offshore international business. Such a reliance 
causes Bermuda and its people to be highly vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of global 
markets, the global economy, and the economic bullying or intimidation exerted by larger 




Chapter 9. Conclusion 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted 
to Bermuda. In order to test this, three research questions were put forward to be tested 
using the Watson theory, the Legrand theory, the Kahn-Freud theory, the Jhering theory, 
and the the Zweigert and Kotz theory (see Section 1.1). Further, the benchmark variable of 
the rule law, its existence, was used as the final determining factor for determinng if a law 
or rule had been transplanted effectively to Bermuda..  It concludes that laws and rules can 
be transplanted but not unconditionally to Bermuda. This is because the variable of 
effectiveness, a necessary precondition for bringing about effective transplantation, is 
required for effective transplantation, modified by the variables of Bermuda’s culture and 
history and the need to satisfy the  principle of the rule of of law- that a law or rule must 
not be applied in an arbitrary fashion. . Embedded into this variable of effectiveness is the 
task of  identifying whether the rule of law exists and always having to determine from 
whose perspective is one to determine effectiveness. Still, one is left questioning whether 
effectiveness can be determined in those cases where the law or rule was never intended to 
apply to an entire population of a country- as was the case for the criminal rules ss. 29A, 
315F, 70JA, 70JB transplanted to Bermuda to Bermuda to help them combat  its unlawful 
gang problrm. 
9.1 Conclusion 
Effectiveness is the effective operation of a transplanted law and it occurs when it operates 
according to: 
(a) its intended purpose as determined by the perspective of the country or entity that first 
authored the rule or law; 
(b) its intended purpose as determined by the perspective of the recipient or host country 
prior to the impending; or 
(c) unforeseen but still beneficial purposes which may also include purposes (a) and (b), 
but most crucially when; 
(d) the rule of .law exists (i.e. the law or rule is not applied in an arbitrary fashion). 
The best way to achieve effectiveness is by ensuring that the transplanted or borrowed law 
has been modified or naturalised, taking into account the rule of law, the donor or recipient 




within the recipient country. The crucial question to be asked is from whose perspective 
one should look; that of the primary end-user or users or the ultimate end-user or users. 
A donor country – the original primary end-user – elects to create a law to be transplanted 
to its former colony as a means of addressing a particular mischief. The transplanted law is 
being used to cure a problem not within the doner country itself, but within the former 
colony. To determine if the transplanted law has been effective, the donor country will have 
ask itself whether or not the transplanted law has addressed the mischief.  
The secondary end-user is the recipient country or former colony which receives the law 
from another country or entity in order to address a mischief. In this example the 
transplanted law may also act as a means of curing a national problem or may be seen by 
its people as their government’s attempt to fix the problem.  
Within the academic discourse concerning transplantation and the added (but equally 
important) variable of effectiveness, is the people’s perspective which, in the case of a 
sovereign country, is often ignored as it is the people of former colonies who are the 
ultimate end-users of the law. 
9.1.1 Using the rule of law  as a benchmark for determining effectiveness 
The benchmark to be used for determining whether a law or rule has been effectively 
transplanted is the rule of law itself. A transplanted law rule can only be deemed effective if 
it maintains the rule of law. According to Hachez and Wouters,593 the rule of law is the 
characteristic of a society which is governed by a legal system yielding formally sound, 
effective, and legitimate rules which serve to indicate that the legal system connects to the 
social order in three ways – cognitively, empirically, and axiologically – that ensure that the 
law will not be oppressive and arbitrary, but will act as a vector for harmony.594 The way 
the legal system ensures that the rules it produces bear those qualities is by using them as 
validity conditions. A legal system whose validity conditions are formal soundness, 
effectiveness and legitimacy is more likely to produce legal rules which will be ‘ideal’ in the 
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sense bestowed on it by the social order: it will ensure predictability and coherence to the 
legal system (formal cognitive soundness); it will ensure that the rules ‘govern’ and that 
personal designs backed by violence are averted (effectiveness); and it will ensure that the 
substantive content of the rules reflects, or at least takes into account in a fair manner, the 
aspirations of society (legitimacy).595 
Unfortunately, due to the nebulous nature of the concept of the rule of law, something that 
a country can only aspire to achieve, there can be no set criteria for determining whether a 
law has been effectively transplanted. At best, one can only aspire to attain the rule of law 
based on criteria in existence at any given point in time, an ever changing aspirational 
target. 
9.2 Conclusion 
Section 7.1 confirms that laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted to 
Bermuda. Even when one tries to establish a benchmark for determining if a law has been 
effectively transplanted to Bermuda using the rule of law as a benchmark, this does not 
result in a metric that can be used in all instances of transplanted law. At best, the example 
of the rule of law used by this thesis can only be used for determining effectiveness in 
relation to Bermuda. 
Therefore, laws and rules cannot, unconditionally, be transplanted to Bermuda, as the 
variable of effectiveness as seen through the condition of perspective represents the 
conditions by which laws and rules are transplanted to Bermuda. 
9.3 Strengths and limitations of the thesis research 
This thesis relied on laws and rules from countries or entities such as Canada, France, the 
OECD, the US, and the UK, and the cultural, economic and historical matters that were 
common to them. 






9.3.1 Difficulties in locating primary and secondary sources 
During the course of this project it became apparent that primary and secondary sources of 
information were going to be difficult or even impossible to obtain. This was the case in 
relation to the matter of government-produced statistical information, by the governments 
of Bermuda, Canada, France, and the UK.  
9.3.2 Research bias 
The author was born in and is currently living and employed in Bermuda; he was able to 
overcome various obstacles to research that would have impeded or even halted the efforts 
of a legal academic researcher not having any links to Bermuda or an understanding of 
Bermuda and its laws and people. However this also represented a research dilemma for 
the author. Although several Bermudians have written articles and books about Bermuda’s 
culture, laws, and history, the author was reluctant to rely on them because they had the 
appearance of being produced with various political agendas at their core. 
The author took great pains to avoid writing and structuring this thesis in a way that would 
cause the reader of this thesis to think that the same is a mere attempt to criticise the 
colonial relationship between Bermuda and the UK, thereby causing the reader to no 
longer focus on the positive contributions that this thesis was making to academic study. 
He also took pains to avoid turning this thesis into a study of Bermudian politics. The 
recommendations should be seen as tools by which the political parties of Bermuda, the 
government of Bermuda (present and future), and the people of Bermuda (independently 
and as a whole) can advance into a more modern age of a united Bermuda, irrespective of 
race or economic circumstances. 
9.3.3 Contribution to academic study 
By using Bermuda as a model by which to test the four legal theories, this thesis 
contributes to academic study in relation to legal transplantation theory and the area of 
academic study specific to colonies and colonialism. A consequence of this contribution is 
that it will not only be of interest to legal academics, but also to entities such as the world’s 
remaining colonies, their parent countries, and to entities such as the United Nations and 
the OECD, as this thesis offers an inside look into the practical realities of laws or rules that 
have been transplanted willingly, by intimidation, or coercion. 
Using Bermuda as a model for testing the four legal theories also serves to contribute to 
academic study in relation of the Caribbean Real Politic in which close proximity to the US 
which causes it and the other island countries in the region to be overshadowed and 




the regional actions or wishes of these islands will always be subject to the political or 
military interests of the US, an indication that state sovereignty (in the event that Bermuda 
was to seek it) will not mean a truly independent Bermuda. 
The decision to use Bermuda to test the four legal theories resulted in the identification of a 
flaw in the Legrand theory in the original ‘shelf life’ of the 1986 Treaty. This suggests that 
the theory only applies to laws or rules that are not subject to contingent events. In this 
regard, this lacuna is something that can be explored by way of future academic study.  
9.4 The application of the research findings 
By using Bermuda as a model by which to test the four legal theories, this not only serves to 
contribute to academic study in relation to legal transplant theory but it also to contribute 
to the ongoing debate within the United Nations on the issue of decolonisation, and the 
economic sustainability of small island countries. Bermuda’s primary means of generating 
income is pegged to two industries: tourism and offshore international business. This 
causes Bermuda and its people to be highly vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of global 
markets, the global economy, and the economic bullying or intimidation exerted by larger 
countries, especially those that have a very large geopolitical influence globally.  
